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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Development of a Hierarchical Fuzzy Model for the Evaluation of Inherent Safety. 
(August 2004) 
Michela Gentile, B.S., Universidad de las Americas, Puebla, Mexico 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
 
 
Inherent safety has been recognized as a design approach useful to remove or reduce 
hazards at the source instead of controlling them with add-on protective barriers. 
However, inherent safety is based on qualitative principles that cannot easily be 
evaluated and analyzed, and this is one of the major difficulties for the systematic 
application and quantification of inherent safety in plant design.    
The present research introduces the use of fuzzy logic for the measurement of 
inherent safety by proposing a hierarchical fuzzy model. This dissertation establishes a 
novel conceptual framework for the analysis of inherent safety and proposes a 
methodology that addresses several of the limitations of the methodologies available for 
current inherent safety analysis. This research proposes a methodology based on a 
hierarchical fuzzy model that analyzes the interaction of variables relevant for inherent 
safety and process safety in general.  
The use of fuzzy logic is helpful for modeling uncertainty and subjectivities implied 
in evaluation of certain variables and it is helpful for combining quantitative data with 
qualitative information. Fuzzy logic offers the advantage of being able to model 
numerical and heuristic expert knowledge by using fuzzy IF-THEN rules. Safety is 
traditionally considered a subjective issue because of the high uncertainty associated 
with its significant descriptors and parameters; however, this research recognizes that 
rather than subjective, “safety” is a vague problem. Vagueness derives from the fact that 
it is not possible to define sharp boundaries between safe and unsafe states; therefore the 
problem is a “matter of degree”. 
 iv 
The proposed method is computer-based and process simulator-oriented in order to 
reduce the time and expertise required for the analysis. It is expected that in the future, 
by linking the present approach to a process simulator, process engineers can develop 
safety analysis during the early stages of the design in a rapid and systematic way. 
Another important aspect of inherent safety, rarely addressed, is transportation of 
chemical substances; this dissertation includes the analysis of transportation hazard by 
truck using a fuzzy logic-based approach. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
 
Prevention is always better than control; however, process safety for the chemical 
industry has been traditionally applied as hazard control measures. The process safety 
approach based on control is known as “extrinsic safety” while the process safety 
approach based on prevention is known as “inherent safety”.  
Inherent safety is based on principles formalized by Trevor Kletz thirty years ago, 
and although the approach is recognized as the most effective to reduce the overall 
hazard level of a chemical process, it is still difficult to systematically apply the 
principles and analyze their effectiveness for hazard reduction.   
This dissertation establishes a novel conceptual framework for the analysis of 
inherent safety and proposes a methodology that addresses several of the limitations of 
the methodologies available so far for inherent safety analysis. This research proposes a 
methodology based on a hierarchical fuzzy model that analyzes the interaction of 
variables relevant for inherent safety and process safety in general.  
Fuzzy logic offers the advantage of being able to model numerical and heuristic 
expert knowledge by using fuzzy IF-THEN rules. Safety is traditionally considered a 
subjective issue because of the high uncertainty associated with its significant 
descriptors and parameters; however, this project recognizes that rather than subjective, 
“safety” is a vague problem. Vagueness derives from the fact that it is not possible to 
define sharp boundaries between safe and unsafe states; therefore the problem is a 
“matter of degree”. While traditional mathematics can deal with vagueness only by using 
arbitrary “categories” that generate discrete indices, fuzzy logic is a natural approach to 
describe vagueness as a continuous function between the two extremes, safe and unsafe.  
 
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection. 
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The proposed method is computer-based and process simulator-oriented in order to 
reduce the time and expertise required for the analysis. It is expected that in the future, 
by linking the present approach to a process simulator, process engineers can develop 
safety analysis during the early stages of the design in a rapid and systematic way. 
Chapter II introduces the basic principles of inherent safety and summarizes the 
limitations and expected benefits from the applications of this safety approach. The 
second part of the chapter explores the approaches suggested so far by other researchers 
and presents an analysis of strengths and limitations of the methodologies.  
A more ambitious goal of this project is to break the traditional boundaries of safety 
ideology associated with the idea that safety is subjective and hence non-quantifiable. 
One of the ideas of the present research is that safety is not subjective because safety is 
not a matter of opinion. The laws of physics, chemistry, and thermodynamics govern 
safety and these laws do not care about what a design engineer thinks is or is not safe. 
The only aspect of safety that is subjective is associated with human factors.  
As explained in Chapter II, several methodologies have been proposed for inherent 
safety analysis, but in general they tend to be simplistic and not computer-based. These 
methods therefore cannot describe the complexity of a chemical plant and the 
interrelations between chemical properties and design parameters. Complexity implies 
uncertainty however, as explained in Chapter III, not all uncertainty has a statistical 
nature. These type of problems can be described by fuzzy models, which are introduced 
in Chapter III along with the basic elements of fuzzy set theory. 
The present project evolved from the interest and the industrial need to develop a 
methodology to analyze inherent safety. Several methods have been proposed for 
inherent safety and many others have been developed to analyze extrinsic safety, it 
seems that industry does not need another “traditional” methodology that follows the 
same pattern of thinking established by the historical approaches of risk assessment and 
the Dow Fire and Explosion Index.  
As discussed in Chapters III and IV, the way process safety is understood today is a 
legacy of the requirements and design philosophy of the past (i.e., safety as an end-of-
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the-pipe solution) which are derived form the technical limitations existing thirty years 
ago (i.e., no computers and all their implications) during the time of fastest growth rate 
of the chemical industry. However, the technological development available today and 
the new demands of the industry justify the effort to explore different approaches to 
process safety and to challenge the field to look beyond the usual solutions.  
This dissertation explores the state-of-the art of inherent safety and, by taking a look 
at the history of process safety and history of mathematics, Chapter IV discusses why we 
use the methodologies we use today. Chapter IV introduces a conceptual background on 
which the proposed fuzzy logic-based methodology for inherent safety analysis is built. 
The attempt to fuzzify the problem of inherent safety quantification by applying fuzzy 
logic and fuzzy modeling opens up the opportunity to explore challenging and unusual 
questions such as what is safety and what are the limitations associated with its analysis 
and measurement. By analyzing the problem form its roots it is evident that the usual 
approaches to safety analysis are inadequate to describe inherent safety while the lack of 
knowledge and deep, holistic understanding of the problem sets boundaries that can only 
be broken by thinking out of the box and attempting new approaches, sometimes 
borrowed by improbable sources (i.e., non-engineering fields) such as social sciences.  
Chapters V and VI introduce the fundamental concepts and definitions of fuzzy logic 
and fuzzy models, which are applied for the development of the hierarchical model 
proposed in this dissertation. The basic structure of the hierarchical model for inherent 
safety analysis is described in Chapter VII, while Chapter VIII describes the technical 
background used for the design of the model. A simple case study is presented in 
Chapter IX to show how the model is used and its potential for the analysis of the 
interactions of parameters relevant for process safety. 
An important aspect of inherent safety, rarely addressed, is transportation of 
chemical substances. Because minimization of stored volumes of chemicals is the most 
applied principle in order to reduce the hazard level of a chemical plant, larger amounts 
of substances are “stored on wheels” outside chemical facilities. Therefore, the chemical 
hazard is moved from the plant to the community. In order to evaluate the overall impact 
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of volume minimization it is necessary to include transportation. The topic is briefly 
addressed in Chapter X. 
Except for Chapter V and part of Chapter VI, the language is kept simple in order to 
demonstrate the transparency and interpretability of the fuzzy model proposed and also 
to be congruent with one of the principles of inherent safety that demands to “keep 
things simple”. As indicated by Gupta (2003) a methodology developed for the 
evaluation of inherent safety must be simple in principle. The model proposed by this 
research achieves both goals; it is simple in nature but because of the hierarchical 
structure, it can capture the complexity of a chemical process by modeling the 
interactions of the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
CHAPTER II 
 
INTRODUCTION TO INHERENT SAFETY* 
 
Inherently Safer Design is a concept known since 1870, but it was not until a hundred 
years later when engineers considered it significantly. Despite the encouraging results 
obtained from past applications, there is a general resistance to adopt and systematically 
apply inherent safer design principles. The main purpose of Inherently Safer Design is 
quite different in comparison with the aim of the traditional concepts of Safety. While 
the former aims to eliminate or to reduce the hazards present in a process facility, the 
latter aims to control hazards and to reduce the consequences of a possible accident by 
using add-on barriers. Thus the hazard may still be present and “safety” depends upon 
the reliability of the protective barriers, which present other disadvantages such as high 
installation and maintenance costs [Lutz, 1997]. 
Inherent safety has been recognized as a design approach useful to remove or reduce 
hazards at the source instead of controlling them with add-on protective barriers. 
However, inherent safety is based on qualitative principles that cannot be easily 
evaluated and analyzed, and this is one of the major difficulties for the systematic 
application and quantification of inherent safety in plant design. The present chapter 
summarizes the history of inherent safety and reviews its strengths and limitations. The 
most important methodologies currently available for quantification and analysis of 
inherently safer design are briefly introduced and discussed.  
 
 
 
______________ 
*This chapter contains material reprinted from: Gentile M., Williams J.R., Mannan S., 2003, Development 
of an Inherent Safety Index Based on Fuzzy Logic, AIChE Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4. Reproduced with 
permission from the AIChE Journal, April 2003. Copyright 2003 AIChE. All rights reserved. 
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2.1  “WHAT YOU DON’T HAVE CAN’T LEAK” 
 
“What you don’t have can’t leak” is a very simple and straightforward idea that 
proved to be the tip of the iceberg enclosing a very complex and multifaceted problem.  
This concept is just not-so-common “common sense” that represents a new and 
powerful paradigm in process safety. It is also a concept that lies between art and 
science, and it challenges engineering with its uncertainty and intriguing complexity. 
This idea is a legacy of the tough lessons of the past and a reminder that they will happen 
again if we don’t learn from them. 
This was also the main concept of a lecture presented by Dr. Trevor Kletz, on 
December 14, 1977 in England. Dr. Kletz further expanded this concept during another 
lecture in 1985 in the US during the 19th Loss Prevention Symposium, of the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). Since then it has become the lemma of an 
approach to process safety known as “inherent safety” or “intrinsic safety”, and it has 
been the central topic of an increasing number of papers, regulatory attempts, and several 
research projects. 
 
2.1.1 The growth of the idea and its principles 
As Kletz recognizes [Kletz, 1996] “every idea has a pedigree” and the roots of 
inherent safety can be found in early attempts to improve chemical processes. The first 
known application is attributed to Ludwig Mond during the 1870s when the Solvay 
process for the production of sodium carbonate was modified to reduce ammonia leaks 
from a manhole at the top of a column when it had to be opened to feed powder lime. 
The problem of ammonia releases was eliminated by pumping milk of lime into the 
column. Another classical example of early application of inherent safety is the redesign 
of the nitroglycerine reactor.  The batch vessel, with a residence time of two hours and 
containing a mass of 1 ton, was substituted by a small well-mixed continuous reactor 
with a residence time of two minutes and containing a mass of 1 kg. This improvement 
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represented a dramatic reduction of explosion hazard but happened only during the 
1950s [Kletz, 1998].  
Kletz was exposed to the nitroglycerine example in 1970 and his attention was 
captured by the different approach used to increase safety as summarized by Kantyka 
“...it is far better to avoid the need for complex safety or control systems rather than to 
install them” (as cited by Kletz, 1996). As in the case of the Solvay process, the hazard 
reduction was achieved by modification of the design and removal of hazards rather than 
by addition of complex control systems or protective barriers. In both cases, the hazards 
were significantly reduced but not totally eliminated, hence demonstrating the essence of 
the inherently safer design [Kletz, 1996]. 
An inherently safer design is achieved by reduction and/or elimination of hazard 
sources by means that are integral parts of the processes and plants and thus cannot be 
separated as different entities or protective systems. However inherently safer design is 
different from inherently safe design. Since it is not possible to completely eliminate all 
the hazard sources, inherently safe designs cannot be achieved because a residual hazard 
will always be present. However, through inherently safer design the magnitude of the 
residual hazard can be sufficiently reduced in order to pose small or insignificant threat 
in case of an incident that can be controlled by simpler extrinsic protective systems.  
In 1974 the Flixborough explosion, UK,  was a significant and revealing event to 
Kletz, who observed that one of the reasons why the incident was so devastating was the 
large quantities of hazardous chemicals stored or in-process. During the next ten years 
Kletz collected information on other incidents, presented lectures, and slowly convinced 
the chemical engineering community about the “logic” of inherent safety [Kletz, 1996]. 
Few weeks later in 1984 the next legacy in the chemical industry history was delivered 
by the most deadly industrial incident: Bhopal, India. The leak of methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) killed more than 2000 people. The event produced a profound impact on the 
chemical industry and new demands for higher safety.   
In the United States the inherently safer approach was introduced by Kletz in 1985 at 
the 19th Loss prevention Symposium of the AIChE and was recognized as the most 
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significant paper of the meeting [Bollinger et al, 1996]. Since then, an increasing number 
of papers have been published, analytical methodologies have been proposed, and the 
interest has grown to a point where regulatory attempts have been proposed [Kletz, 1996; 
Johnson, 2003] and attempted [Corzine bill, 2001]. 
 
2.1.2 The principles of inherent safety and friendly plants 
Kletz first formalized the inherent safety principles in 1984 as strategies to reduce 
hazard sources and achieve inherently safer designs. The principles upon which the 
inherently safer design is based are: 
- INTENSIFICATION:  Reduction of the inventories of hazardous materials. 
- SUBSTITUTION:  Replacement of the chemical substances by less hazardous 
chemicals. 
- ATTENUATION: Reduction of the quantity of hazardous materials required in the 
process. Design processes working at less dangerous processing conditions by 
reducing temperature, pressure, flow, or other relevant variables. 
- LIMITATION of EFFECTS: The facilities must be designed in order to minimize the 
effects of the release of hazardous chemicals or energies. 
 
The list of principles has been extended by Kletz to include other aspects that make 
plants friendlier by reducing error opportunities or reducing the plant sensitivity to errors 
and abnormal situations. The principles for inherently friendlier plants include the 
following [Kletz, 1998]: 
- SIMPLIFICATION:  Design simpler plants that provide fewer opportunities for error 
or wrong operation. 
- AVOIDING KNOCK-ON EFFECTS: Design plants in such a way that when 
incidents occur the domino effect doesn’t happen. 
- MAKING INCORRECT ASSEMBLY IMPOSSIBLE: When it is not possible to 
assemble something in more than the correct way, errors and incidents are prevented. 
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- MAKING STATUS CLEAR: Friendlier plants or equipment allow clear 
understanding of their status. 
- TOLERANCE:  Safer plants forgive operator errors, poor installation, and equipment 
failures. 
- EASE OF CONTROL: By simplification of a plant, less instrumentation is required. 
Processes with slower response are more tolerant with respect to operation upsets. 
- SOFTWARE: Software must be simple to use and understand. It should be 
homogeneous for all the plant control systems. 
 
2.1.3 The benefits of inherently safer design (ISD) 
Several authors analyze the benefits and problems associated with both ISD and the 
traditional approach [Lutz, W.K., 1997; Gupta and Edwards, 2002b], and Zwetsloot et al. 
(1999) present cases where ISD has proven to be not only technologically feasible but 
also economically attractive for productive chemical facilities. Inherent safety is a 
concept that is naturally related to environmental protection. When a plant is designed to 
reduce or eliminate the hazards, not only does it become safer but possible emissions to the 
environment are also reduced or eliminated. The possible application of the inherent 
safety concepts to environmental protection has been recognized by Kletz (1996) and it 
has been referred to by many others. The relation between the principles of inherent 
safety and pollution prevention has been described, along with some successful 
applications, by Askounes-Ashford and Zwetsloot (2000). Therefore the environmental 
damage resulting from the release of chemicals during an incident can be significantly 
reduced. Moreover, contamination resulting from releases or leaks occurring during normal 
operations is also reduced because the quantities of chemicals or their hazards are limited. 
Thereby, both process and environmental safety of processing plants are increased. 
Inherent safety is sometimes referred to as “primary prevention” and it is also an 
approach to chemical incident and pollution prevention that is different compared to 
“secondary accident prevention” and mitigation. Inherent safety is based on the use of 
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technologies and chemicals that reduce or eliminate the possibility of incidents. This 
approach is in direct contrast to the traditional safety concept that relies on the reduction 
and mitigation of the consequences of an incident by controlling the hazard sources 
rather than eliminating them. This last approach alone is unable to avoid or reduce the 
risk of serious chemical incidents [Askounes-Ashford and Zwetsloot , 2000] as it is 
based on add-on protective barriers that are supposed to mitigate the consequences of an 
accident or release. This approach is parallel to pollution control and remediation 
measures. 
In contrast, inherent safety is parallel to pollution prevention given that its purpose is 
to avoid the occurrence of incidents that can produce environmental and human harm by 
removing the possibility of occurrence at the source. When these two concepts, inherent 
safety and pollution control, are brought together under one unique mathematical 
methodology, the resultant analysis tool becomes a powerful instrument to achieve not 
only safer processes but also a clean and sustainable chemical industry [Askounes-
Ashford and Zwetsloot , 2000].  
 
2.1.4 Problems and limitations 
Although the inherent safety approach is thought to be convenient not only from the 
safety viewpoint but also from the economic and operative viewpoint, it represents 
the technical and administrative challenges as reported by Kletz (1996) and Gupta and
Edwards (2002a).  
Inherent safety and pollution prevention are similar but they pursue apparently two 
different objectives that sometimes seem to be at odds with each other. One of the most 
notorious examples concerns the refrigerant gases chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) thought to 
be inherently safer due to their low toxicity and flammability compared to ammonia and 
propane [Hendershot, 1995]. However the use of CFC has resulted in ozone layer 
depletion, bringing the hazard to another time scale and risk level. The CFC example 
exhibits three major problems associated with safety evaluation (inherent or traditional) 
and the integration of environmental factors: 
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a)  Process safety focuses mainly on acute environmental effects and long-term human 
health consequences. Environmental protection focuses mainly on avoiding both long 
term and acute consequences to the biota and society. Safety applied to process 
design is mainly focused on the reduction of likelihood of a chemical incident, fire 
and, explosion. The long-term effects of small releases that do not pose fire or 
explosion hazards are rarely taken into consideration unless there are specific 
environmental regulations imposing limits on the type, flow, or concentration of 
released contaminant streams. 
b)  The limited knowledge available on the long-term effects of chemicals on the 
environment due to accumulation and slow degradation kinetics can drive the 
decision process into hazardous directions. As discussed previously, a classic 
example is the substitution of ammonia and propane with CFC. However, the 
recognition of the lack of information or data related to a specific chemical can be 
used as an additional piece of information for the assessment. For instance, if there is 
inadequate information about the life-cycle of a chemical (i.e., transportation across 
different environmental systems) its evaluation, from the environmental safety 
perspective, should be less favorable than the evaluation of another chemical whose 
properties are well known and supported by scientific data.  
c) In the chemical industry it is a common misconception that a chemical with low 
toxicity is environmentally safe. However, the evaluation of environmental hazard 
requires the analysis of specific chemical properties such as photo and 
biodegradation rates, water solubility, and bioaccumulation.  
 
When an industry is forced to undertake measures to move towards an inherently 
safer approach it is possible to interpret the principles in such a way that will impact 
other related aspects of safety. For instance, one of the easier ways to improve the 
inherent safety level is by reducing the inventory of hazardous chemical substances. 
However, if this step requires an associated increase in the frequency of shipments of 
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chemicals, the net effect could be an increased transportation hazard. This example 
shows why transportation consideration must be part of the inherent safety analysis of 
the plant and cannot be studied as a separate risk entity. Transportation of chemical raw 
materials and chemical products plays a very important role in the analysis of the 
inherent safety level of a chemical plant. Transportation, as well as an inherent safety and 
environmental hazard evaluation, share the problems of data uncertainty, complexity due 
to the many factors [Bonvicini et al, 1998] that should be analyzed, subjectivity, and lack 
of a quantification methodology. 
During the earlier stages of plant design, it is sometimes possible to choose the safer 
chemicals in order to obtain an inherently safer plant. However, the idea of “safer 
chemical” should be based not only on toxicity, reactivity, or flammability aspects, but 
also in terms of volumes, transportation, and environmental aspects. For instance, if two 
chemicals could be used, one required in small quantities and supplied from a nearby site 
but with hazardous toxicity and reactive properties, the other one with more benign 
properties but required in large quantities and supplied from a plant located far away, the 
question would be: “Which is the safer chemical?” 
It is therefore essential that the hazards posed by chemical plants and their chemicals 
be understood and analyzed jointly by an analytical methodology capable of integrating 
both aspects.  Lack of knowledge and willingness to change along with the lack of 
reliable and simple methodologies are cited as causes of the slow acceptance and 
implementation ISD. Similar results were presented by Kletz (1996) and Moore (1999) 
while Gowland (1996) summarized the problems into two fundamental questions:  
- How can the effects of the changes (to inherently safer process or equipment in the 
plant) be measured? 
- How to know if the plant follows the inherent safety principles or not? 
 
Several techniques and tools have been developed to overcome this problem. 
However these techniques analyze specific aspects of the factors that affect the inherent 
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safety level, and it is difficult to integrate all the results under one unique evaluation. 
Among other limitations for the application of inherent safety, organizational and 
managerial barriers, as well as lack of economic incentives and regulatory barriers have 
been identified by [Askounes-Ashford and Zwetsloot, 2000; Zwetsloot and Askounes-
Ashford, 2002]. The regulatory controversy is discussed in the following section.  
 
2.1.5 Regulatory efforts 
In October 2001 inherent safety became a political topic when the so-called Corzine 
Bill (2001) was introduced. Because goals of inherent safety address hazard reduction 
and elimination, it seemed an effective antiterrorism strategy given the fact that 
traditional layers of protection are designed under specific assumptions that do not 
include intentional events such as criminal attack. Under such extreme conditions any 
traditional layer of protection is likely to fail, and the only plausible strategy is inherent 
safety through the reduction or elimination of the possibility of releases of chemical 
substances able to threaten the public and the environment. The Bill (2001) refers to 
“inherently safer technology” as the “...input substitution, catalyst or carrier substitution, 
process redesign (including reuse or recycling of a substance of concern), product 
reformulation, procedure simplification, and technology modification...” according to the 
inherently safer design principles.  
The Contra Costa County, CA, was the first in the nation to try to regulate inherent 
safety through the passage and implementation of a county ordinance similar to the 
Corzine Bill. The attempt highlighted a fundamental misunderstanding of the inherently 
safer design approach and a lack of consistency in the interpretation of the principles 
within the same company and even among safety experts [Johnson, 2003]. The response 
to the Bill and the Contra Costa ordinance has been varied from different stakeholder 
groups and a number of papers have been published in order to increase awareness about 
the technical limitations and the difficulties associated with the implementation of the 
Bill’s requirements [Mannan et all, 2003]. One of the main impediments for government 
regulation of inherent safety is the complex nature of chemical plants and processes that 
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goes beyond the capability of regulatory authorities due to the lack of an objective 
decision-making tool to analyze compliance with the regulatory requirements.   
As recognized by Mansfield et al. (1997) two of the most important process safety 
regulations, OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119) in the US and the Seveso II Directive in 
Europe, use inventory thresholds as a trigger for compliance requirements. However, this 
type of regulation that does not address inherently safer approaches can encourage 
chemical companies to reduce their volumes of stored chemicals to quantities just below 
the thresholds in order to avoid compliance requirements. When inventory reduction 
becomes the goal without analysis of the impact from a plant-wide perspective, the 
resulting overall hazard reduction may not be very significant. In fact, the overall risk 
may increase if, as discussed earlier, transportation and other associated effects are not 
considerate. 
A similar problem occurs with technical engineering standards and codes because of 
their prescriptive nature that can hinder the application of the inherently safer principles. 
An example of this are the codes requiring overpressure relief valves even when it would 
be possible to design the vessel strong enough to withstand the maximum expected 
pressure [Mansfield et al, 1997]. Another limitation of the standards is that they are 
generic and focus on minimum acceptable design conditions [Snyder, 1996]. 
While regulation could be a stimulus for the application of inherently safer design, 
as has happened with some environmental regulations that forced industry toward 
emission reduction and pollution control measures, the regulation itself turned out to be a 
major obstacle towards real progress. While in the US the principles of inherent safety 
have not been widely accepted and fully understood, the phantom of a regulation has 
moved the general attitude from a positive and inquiring attitude to a cautious and 
defensive one.  
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2.2  INHERENT SAFETY MEASUREMENT: METHODS, ADVANTAGES, 
AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Since the introduction of the inherent safety principles, many people have embraced 
the concepts and the number of specialized publications has increased, but integration of 
the ideas into a systematic methodology has been slow. The published literature can be 
classified into four general categories: 
- Ideology and analysis of problems/benefits 
- Application of the inherent safety approach to real cases  
- Quantification methodologies 
- Application of the inherent safety approach to design methodologies 
 
Each one of these categories has its own importance with respect to the diffusion and 
acceptance of the inherent safety approach. The explanation of the concepts, principles, 
problems, and benefits opens the forum not only for discussion of the approach but also 
challenges the readers to look for solutions and applications. Information about real 
cases of successful applications provides examples about how the approach can be 
implemented during early stages of the life cycle of a plant and also during the 
productive stage when changes are more difficult and expensive to implement. Literature 
about the ideology and application cases has been published by Kletz (1996), Englund 
(1995), Mansfield (1996), Snyder (1996), Zwetsloot and Askounes-Ashford (1999), 
Askounes-Ashford and Zwetsloot (2000), Lutz (1997), Hendershot (1995, 1997a, and 
1997b), and Bollinger et al. (1996). As indicated by Kletz (1996), inherent safety 
principles can be applied also to environmental protection. The similarities between 
inherent safety and pollution prevention have been explained (Zwetsloot and Askounes-
Ashford (1999); Askounes-Ashford and Zwetsloot (2000), and application in European 
companies has been successful. The integration of inherent safety ideas for a systematic 
approach to plant design is an aspect that is being explored; for instance Palanippan et al. 
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(2002) proposed a design methodology to reduce waste and at the same time perform a 
safety evaluation by using an intelligent decision support system. 
 
2.2.1 Overview of the analytical methodologies 
The lack of a measurement methodology has been recognized as one of the reasons 
for the slow implementation of the inherently safer design approach. Several published 
papers deal with quantification issues, and associated problems and limitations. In 
general, the quantification methodologies can be classified into three groups: 
- Collection of several well-known indices used to evaluate various safety aspects. The 
results cannot be aggregated under an overall index. 
- Single overall index that evaluates aspects relevant to inherent safety and the results 
aggregated under an overall number. 
- Other methods such as risk-based approach and material-centric approach. 
 
The first category, collection of indices, includes indices based on a compilation of 
other well know indices such a the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), but they do 
not attempt the integration of individual indices under one overall number because they 
are based on different scales that cannot be directly compared. A methodology proposed 
by Hendershot (1995, 1997a, and 1997b) is based on a weighted scoring method and a 
decision analysis process similar to the Kepner-Tregoe method. This method uses well-
known indices such as the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), the ICI Mond Index, 
and others. The use of the F&EI index also has been proposed by Gowland (1996) and 
Etowa, et al. (2002), while Gupta (1997) reviewed the application of the F&EI index in 
the developing countries. The INSET Tool kit developed by the INSIDE Project 
(INherent SHE In DEsign) includes thirty-one tools for four stages of the entire life-cycle 
of a plant [Mansfield, 1997]. The tools are helpful to evaluate several safety aspects in an 
easy, simple, and flexible form. The tools can be used separately as required depending 
on the actual stage of the plant under analysis, and the indices should be interpreted 
individually because they are not meant to be aggregated under a unique index. A 
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graphical approach has been proposed by Gupta and Edwards (2002a). In this method the 
individual hazard indices rather than being added together are plotted individually and 
then analyzed. This approach is based on some of the recommendations and the expert 
advice collected by Lawrence (1996) in his thesis. 
The first overall index for the inherent safety assessment of a chemical synthesis 
route was proposed by Lawrence (1996), and Cave and Edwards (1997). The index for 
chemical route selection was extended and applied by Heikkila et al. (1996 and 1999) to 
the earlier stages of the life cycle of a plant (conceptual design and process synthesis).  
A risk-based approach was used by Khan and Abbasi (1998a) where the inherent 
safety evaluation is based on a “rapid risk analysis” that requires the definition of a 
specific scenario and acceptance criteria, selection of a design solution that is evaluated 
with deterministic calculations, and the evaluation of the results with acceptance criteria. 
An intelligent decision support system useful for inherently safer design and 
environmentally benign processes was proposed by Palaniappan et al. (2002). 
 
2.2.2 Overview of three relevant methodologies 
In this section the following three methodologies are reviewed in detail due to its 
relevance to the present project: 
1) Inherent safety index for chemical process route selection [Lawrence, 1996]. 
2) Inherent safety index for process synthesis [Heikkila, 1999]. 
3) INSIDE Project and INSET Toolkit [Mansfield, 1997]. 
 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index and Mond Index are briefly described in the next 
chapter because they were originally developed for hazard identification. However, as 
mentioned above, they served as basis for the development of the inherent safety index 
for chemical process route selection and the inherent safety index for process synthesis. 
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2.2.2.1 Inherent safety index for chemical process route selection 
The methodology developed by Lawrence (1996), is conceived on the idea that the 
greatest benefit of the inherent safety approach is obtained when hazards are identified 
and eliminated during the early stages of the life-cycle of a chemical plant. Hence the 
method assesses the inherent safeness of a chemical route by targeting the first stage of 
process development and by focusing on raw materials and chemical reactions required 
for the chemical synthesis of a specific substance. This stage represents the earliest point 
at which inherent safety can be applied and it is also the stage that will set the future 
technical needs and constraints on the final design of the plant. After the chemical route 
for a product is decided, a preliminary flow-sheet is generated and the engineering design 
phase begins. 
As reported by Lawrence (1996) “...This index is designed to indicate a quantitative 
assessment of inherent safety of a chemical route. It is not designed to be extremely 
accurate, hence it is defined as an index, giving an indication of the level of inherent 
safety. It is quantitative in order to remove the subjectivity from the comparison of the 
routes.” Furthermore, “... The index is intended to act as a guide and it does not lead to 
hard and fast recommendations on which route should be chosen.” The index serves 
three main purposes: 
- Assigns a score to each chemical route, which serves as a tool to compare several 
possible synthetic pathways for the production of a specific substance in terms of 
inherent safety. 
- Permits the evaluation and ranking of chemical routes for common products in terms 
of safety rather than from the economic viewpoint only. 
- Allows identification of the impact of changes that are made to each chemical route. 
 
The aspects analyzed by this index are: 
a) Chemical substances 
- Raw materials 
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- Intermediates 
b) Products of waste 
c) Reaction conditions 
d) Number of reaction steps 
 
The list of potential indicators of the inherent safety level of a chemical route included 
nineteen parameters, however, in order to simplify the application only seven parameters 
were chosen. The logic behind the selection was based on two points: 
- Information on the parameters should be available at the early stage of route selection 
- The parameters should have a strong influence on the inherent safety level of the 
route 
 
The parameters that were not selected are: conversion, reaction rate, side reactions, 
catalytic action, heat of reaction, number of steps and uniformity of reaction steps (as a 
measure of chemical synthesis complexity), phase of the reaction, phase change, 
viscosity, corrosiveness, waste and co-products generation. The seven selected 
parameters are: 
1) Temperature: represents a measure of energy content but also affects the phase and 
properties of the materials. The range selected goes from -25 to 900 °C and is 
divided into fourteen subintervals with assigned scores between 0 (10 °C ≤ T < 30 
°C) and 10 (T < -25 °C and 900 °C < T). 
2) Pressure: represents another measure of the energy content of the reactor and also 
affects the possibility of leaks and explosion. This variable ranges from 0 to 8000 
psi and is divided into ten subintervals with assigned scores between 0 (0 psi ≤ P 
<90 psi) and 10 (6001 psi ≤ P < 8000 psi). 
3) Yield: represents a measure of the overall reaction efficiency and is a function of 
conversion and selectivity. Low selectivity implies that reactants follow other 
reaction routes that can lead to undesired and potentially hazardous chemicals or 
 20 
conditions. The range of this parameter goes from 0 to 100% and is divided into 
eleven subintervals with assigned scores between 0 (yield = 100%) and 10 (0% ≤ 
yield < 9%). 
4) Inventory of the reactor: related to residence time and reaction rate. The range of 
this parameter goes from 0.1 to 100,000 tons and is divided into ten subintervals 
with assigned scores between 0 (0.1 ton ≤ inventory < 250 tons) and 10 (80,001 ton 
≤ inventory < 100,000 tons). 
5) Toxicity: measures the potential to produce harmful physiological effects. The 
range of toxicity varies between 0.001% and 1.0%, and is divided into nine 
subintervals with assigned scores between 0 (TLV < 0.001%) and 8 (1.0% ≤ TLV). 
6) Flammability: measures the potential to generate fire and explosions and depends 
on flash point and flammability limits. The evaluation of this parameter is based on 
NFPA scores (i.e., 0 to 4, NFPA 704 (2001)). 
7) Explosiveness: represents the potential to generate deflagrations and detonations 
and depends on the explosive limits of the chemical. This variable is based on the 
difference between the upper and lower flammability limits (i.e., S = UFL-LFL), 
therefore the range of the variable varies between 0% and 100%. This interval is 
divided into eleven subintervals with assigned scores between 0 (i.e., for 0% = S < 
10%) and 10 (i.e., 90% = S < 100%). 
 
Several of the parameters are selected and analyzed according to the guidelines 
provided by the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) and the Mond Index. The initial 
structure of the index was selected in order to keep the analysis simple and was formed 
by two sub-indices, (i.e., a chemical sub-index and a process sub-index) that were added 
to obtain the final overall evaluation. The chemical sub-index was obtained by adding 
the scores for inventory, flammability, explosiveness, and toxicity; the process sub-index 
was the summation of the scores for pressure, temperature, and yield.  The procedure 
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was applied to each step in the chemical route, and then the indices were added to 
evaluate the overall synthesis route.  
The index was applied to six chemical routes for the production of industrial 
chemicals, and the results were submitted to experts with surveys focused on the 
evaluation of the whole methodology. The observations returned by the experts included 
the following observations: 
- The scale and subdivision used for describing the inventory is based on the Mond 
index however, it was suggested that a vessel larger than 250 tons is likely to be a 
storage tank and hence should not be taken into account by this index.  
- The Mond and F&EI treat inventory as a separate variable, however it would be 
better to combine it with other parameters rather than evaluating it as one single 
variable. 
- The division and scoring of several parameters was too simplistic, and it was 
suggested to assign relatively higher score to the sub-ranges that implied larger 
hazards (i.e., higher temperature). 
- The parameters have the same importance with regard to the final results. However, 
weighting factors should be introduced to capture the larger impact of certain 
parameters on inherent safety. It was also suggested to identify equivalent levels of 
inherent safety for each parameter. 
- The calculation of the overall score based on simple addition of all the sub-scores 
was not considered appropriate, since values with different measurement units (e.g., 
pressure, temperature, volume) should not be combined by addition. 
- The combination of the indices for several steps of a chemical route was also 
questioned since it was assumed that all the steps had the same importance. 
 
The resultant index combines the selected parameters by using weighting factors 
derived from expert comments on the parameter ranking according to its relevance. 
Based on the expert comments, the structure of the index was modified to a structure 
based on three components: 
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a) Inventory and hazard assessment: includes storage volumes, reaction volumes, and 
separation equipment volumes. These volumes are estimated based on preliminary 
equipment design. The hazard assessment is based on unit-inventory and includes 
fire, explosion, and toxic effects. The estimation of the number of fatalities is based 
on the work of Marshall (1977) as reported by Lawrence (1996).  
b) Probability of release: based on the propensity of runaway reactions, release due to 
corrosion or extreme temperature or pressure. The parameters evaluated are: 
high/low temperature, corrosion and corrosion behavior in contact with air or water, 
heat of reaction, chemical stability, autoignition temperature, and pressure. 
c) Effect of modified factors: describe how much the hazard could be attenuated or 
increased due to factors such as flashing liquids, and environmental chemical 
persistency. The effect of the modifiers is given by the evaluation of flammable 
limits, vapor density, waste and by-products, odor and color, and viscosity. The 
scores calculated for each modifier are added to obtain the overall effect of the 
multipliers.   
 
The final procedure includes sixteen steps. The first two steps require the division of 
the route into individual steps (i.e., single reactions) and calculate the flowrates for each 
chemical. Then inventory volumes are calculated for storage steps, reaction steps, and 
purification steps. For each type of inventory, the consequences are assessed by 
estimating the potential number of fatalities due to fire, explosion, and toxicity. Finally 
the results are multiplied by the value of release probabilities, and are modified by 
multiplying by the factors calculated for the effect of the modifiers. 
 
2.2.2.2 Inherent safety index for process synthesis 
An inherent safety index for process synthesis was developed by Heikkila et al, 
(1996) and then published by the Technical Research Center of Finland [Heikkila, 1999]. 
The index aims at the conceptual design stage and process synthesis, which are the 
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earliest engineering stages in the life-cycle of a chemical plant after the selection of the 
chemical route. While the inherent safety index for chemical route selection [Lawrence, 
1996] proposes a methodology to select the inherently safest reaction pathway, Heikkila 
et al. (1996) extended it towards chemical plant design by including other parameters to 
describe the effect of processing characteristics.  
The inherent safety index for process synthesis is divided into two parts, chemical 
inherent safety and process inherent safety. Both sub-indices are also divided into two 
subparts, which are described by several parameters as follows: 
1) Chemical inherent safety: describes how the raw materials, products, sub-products, 
and intermediates affect the overall safety level:  
a) Reaction hazards: the following parameters are included: 
- Heat of main reaction 
- Heat of side reactions 
- Incompatibility of chemicals (chemical interactions) 
b) Hazardous substances: the following parameters are included: 
- Flammability 
- Explosivity 
- Toxicity 
- Corrosivity 
1) Process inherent safety: describes how the type of unit operations, type of equipment, 
and operation conditions affect the overall safety level. 
a) Process conditions: the following parameters are included: 
- Inventory of chemicals 
- Process temperature  
- Process pressure 
b) Process conditions: the following parameters are included: 
- Equipment safety: inside battery limits 
- Equipment safety: outside the battery limits 
- Process structure 
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The range of interest of each parameter is divided into sub-ranges that receive a 
score, which represents the positive or negative contribution on the inherent safety level. 
The minimum score for each parameter is set to zero, while the maximum scores are set 
in order to represent a weighting effect according to the work done and expert judgment 
collected by Lawrence (1996). It is assumed that a wider range (i.e., 0 to 6) implies a 
greater impact for the overall safety evaluation. Inventory and toxicity are identified as 
the aspects with the most important impact on inherent safety, hence their maximum 
score is set, respectively, to 5 and 6. Process structure is also assigned with a maximum 
score of 5. Corrosivity is assumed to be the least important of the parameters and 
receives a maximum score of 2, while the parameter for equipment safety outside the 
battery limits is assigned a maximum score of 3. The rest of the parameters are assumed 
to have the same importance and receive a maximum score of 4.  
The parameters for heat of main and side reactions describe the hazards associated 
with fast exothermic reactions able to release large amounts of heat that can start violent 
chemical reactions or can release gases and vapors. The parameter has been selected 
because the reaction rate and the presence of specific unstable chemical groups cannot be 
easy related to the hazard of a reaction. The range of the parameter goes from thermally 
neutral reactions with heat of reaction ≤ 200 J/g up to extremely exothermic reactions 
with heat generation ≥ 3,000 J/g.  
The parameter for chemical interaction evaluates the hazards associated with the 
consequences of chemical incompatibility among chemical substances and is based on 
the EPA matrix [Hatayama et al, 1980 as cited by Heikkila, 1999]. Fire and explosions 
are assumed to be the worst possible outcomes of an unintended interaction and receive 
the highest score (i.e., four) while the formation of nontoxic nonflammable gasses are 
classified as the least hazardous consequences and receive a low score (i.e., one).  
Flammability is described by the value of the flash point and the range goes from 
combustible substances (i.e., flash point > 55 °C) up to very flammable (i.e., flash point 
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< 0 °C and boiling point ≤ 35 °C). The classification is based on the European Union 
directives as indicated by Heikkila (1999). The explosiveness parameter is based on the 
difference between the upper and lower flammability limits expressed as % by volume. 
The basic idea is that a substance flammable over a wide range of concentrations 
represents a higher hazard.  
Toxicity is described by the threshold limit value (TLV) expressed in ppm and the 
range goes from TLV > 10,000 for low toxicity up to TLV ≤ 0.1 for highly toxic 
chemicals. The hazard associated with corrosivity is evaluated indirectly by assigning a 
score to the construction material required to manage the chemical. It is assumed that 
carbon steel is suitable for low-hazard chemicals hence receives a score of 0, while 
stainless steel receives a score of 1. Any other material receives a score of 2.  
The score for the evaluation of the impact of inventory on the hazard level is divided 
into two parts: inside the battery limits (e.g., process vessels) and outside the battery 
limits (e.g., storage tanks). The sub-ranges for process vessels go from volumes between 
0-1 ton up to volumes larger than 1,000 ton; the sub-ranges for storage vessels go from 
volumes between 0-1 ton up to volumes larger than 10,000 ton. In both cases 
information from Lawrence (1996) and the Mond Index [AIChE, 1994a] is used.  
The range for process temperature goes from temperature < 0 °C up to 600 °C. The 
sub-range with the lowest score is between 0-70 °C which is harmless to people, while 
temperatures below zero receive a score of 1 indicating the mechanical hazards 
associated to this condition. For pressure, the range between 0.5 to 5 bars receive a score 
of 0 while pressures between 200-1,000 bars receive a score of 4. These ranges are based 
on the Dow Fire and Explosion Index [AIChE, 1994b].  
The overall score for process hazard is calculated by adding the sub-indices for 
flammability, explosiveness, and toxicity.  The chemical with the highest score is 
selected as the most hazardous chemical of the process. This score is then added to the 
four sub-indices for reaction hazard (i.e., heat of main reaction, heat of side reactions, 
incompatibility, and corrosivity).  
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The evaluation of the index for process inherent safety is developed in a similar way; 
each parameter receives a score, which is added to the other scores to calculate the index 
for the process evaluation. For the evaluation of equipment safety inside the battery 
limits, the suggested distances required between equipment are taken into account and 
several sources were analyzed by Hekikila (1999). Equipment that handle nontoxic and 
nonflammable chemicals receive the lowest score (i.e., zero), while furnaces and fired 
heaters receive the highest penalty (i.e., four). In a similar fashion, the scores for 
equipment outside the battery limits go from zero, for equipment handling non-
hazardous chemicals, to three for flares, boilers, and furnaces.   
The evaluation of the process configuration is based on several sources of 
information and expert knowledge as well as incident reports, sound engineering practice 
and accepted engineering standards. The parameter is formed by six groups of equipment 
and systems characterized by the type of information available for their safe operation. 
The first group receives a score of zero and is for equipment recommended by safety 
standards; the second group is for equipment selected with basis in sound engineering 
practice, and known reliable systems. Equipment that lacks information regarding 
hazardous operation receives a score of two, while the fourth group includes equipment 
of which safe operation is questionable. For equipment for which minor incidents have 
occurred are included in the fifth group, while the sixth group receives the highest score 
(i.e., five) and is for equipment with documented major incidents.  
 The final overall inherent safety index is then obtained by addition of the chemical 
and process inherent safety indices.  
 
2.2.2.3 INSIDE Project and the INSET Toolkit 
The INherent Safety health and environment Evaluation Tool (INSET) was 
developed in Europe between 1994 and 1997 by the INSIDE Project Team; an integral 
version of the report and the Toolkit were released in 2001 [Mansfield, 2001]. The 
toolkit presents the results of a three-year research effort co-founded by the European 
Union and industrial and research partners. The main goal of the project was to develop a 
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systematic tool to increase awareness toward inherent safety principles among engineers 
and chemists and to encourage the application of inherent safety to process and plant 
design.  
During the first stage of the project a survey was performed across the European 
chemical industry to assess awareness, acceptance, and application of the inherent safety 
approach. The results indicated a general lack of recognition of the concept and 
application of the principles driven by economic pressure or incidents and near-miss 
experience. The need for a methodology to analyze the application of inherent safety 
through the life-cycle of a processing plant was recognized as well as the need for case 
studies to demonstrate the benefits of the approach. The INSET Toolkit was developed 
to address the lack of analytical methods and focused on raising the awareness toward 
inherent safety during the early stages of the selection of a chemical route and during the 
following engineering stages for the design of the chemical process and plant.  
The INSET Toolkit is a collection of thirty-one tools and methods divided into four 
stages that cover the early stages of the plant life-cycle, assuming that most of the 
decisions that affect the safety, health, and environmental hazards (SHE) of a plant are 
taken during these stages: 
Stage I:  chemistry route selection: a simple screening methodology proposed is useful 
to identify the few routes that should be further analyzed. 
Stage II:  Chemistry route detailed evaluation: evaluation of detailed relevant chemical 
information about the selected potential chemical routes. One or two routes are 
selected for optimization during the next stage. 
Stage III: Process design optimization: The operation conditions are optimized and the 
implications of a large-scale industrial operation are analyzed. 
Stage IV: Process plant design: The preliminary process design is developed and 
optimized in order to identify potential flowsheet, conditions, and equipment to 
maximize the plant performance. 
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The tools allow the systematic identification and evaluation of potential hazards, and 
the whole approach is designed to be flexible enough to be applied to plant optimization 
based on SHE constraints or other aspects such as process feasibility and economics. The 
tools are the following: 
− Tool A: Detailed constraints and objective analysis:  
A.1: Detailed constraint analysis 
A.2: Detailed objective analysis 
− Tool B: Process option generation (including process waste minimization) 
− Tool C: Preliminary chemistry route option records 
− Tool D: Preliminary chemistry route rapid ISHE evaluation method 
− Tool E: Preliminary chemistry route detailed ISHE evaluation method 
− Tool F: Chemistry route block diagram record 
− Tool G: Chemical hazard classification method 
− Tool H: Record of foreseeable hazards 
− Tool I: ISHE performance indices 
I.1: Fire and explosion hazard index 
I.2: Acute toxic hazard index 
I.3: Health hazard index 
I.4: Acute environmental incident index 
I.5: Transport hazard index 
I.6: Gaseous emission index 
I.7: Aqueous emission index 
I.8: Solid waste index 
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I.9: Energy consumption index 
I.10: Reaction hazard index 
I.11: Process complexity index 
− Tool J: Multiple-attribute ISHE comparative index 
− Tool K: Rapid ISHE screening method 
− Tool L: Chemical reaction reactivity: stability evaluation 
− Tool M: Process SHE analysis/process hazard analysis and ranking 
− Tool N: Equipment inventory functional analysis method 
− Tool O: Equipment simplification guide 
− Tool P: Hazard range assessment for gaseous releases 
− Tool Q: Siting and plant layout assessment 
− Tool R: Designing for operation 
 
The Toolkit is a paper-based method and has been designed to address safety, health, 
and environmental aspects (i.e., SHE) during the decision-making process at the early 
design and engineering stages. However, it does not focus on the overall framework of 
safety, health, and environmental hazards. Stage I requires the evaluation of Tools A.1, 
A.2, B, C, D, and E. Stage II requires Tools B, F, G, H, I.1 to I.11, J, and K. Stage III 
requires Tools B, L, M, I.1 to I.11, and J. Stage IV requires Tools B, I.1 to I.11, J, N, O, 
P, Q, and R. 
The flexibility of the INSET Toolkit is given by the independence of the tools and by 
the fact that the applied methods depend on the type of plant and the stage of process 
design. While for completely new processes without a selected chemical route, the 
analysis can start from the tools developed for Stage I, but if a potential route is already 
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available, then the analysis can start with the Stage II tools. When the chemistry of the 
process has been selected but it is still possible to make changes to increase the process 
inherent safety level and its performance, the analysis starts with tools for Stage III. 
When the flowsheet has been developed but decisions must be made on equipment and 
configuration as well as pipework-sizing, tools for Stage IV can be used.  
For each stage the report presents extensive information regarding suggested tool 
application flowsheet as well as a detailed description of each tool, information required, 
and outputs. For each tool, background information is presented with detailed 
instructions to apply the method and templates for the forms that must be completed.  
Zwetsloot and Askounes-Ashford (1999) published a report on the application of the 
INSET Toolkit by several European chemical companies. The results were encouraging 
and the general problems associated with the implementation of inherent safety were 
highlighted. 
 
2.2.3 Limitations of the current methodologies for inherent safety analysis 
The low level of industrial application of the inherent safety principles shows that 
more development is required in terms of analytical approaches. The methodologies 
proposed so far constitute good starting points and present a diverse spectrum of 
techniques and approaches upon which new analytical tools can be built.  
The limitations of these methodologies are based on their own nature. For instance, it 
is well known that inherent safety principles can be more efficiently and easily applied 
during the earlier stages of the design, when changes are easier and cheaper. However, 
during these initial phases the technical information available is incomplete, which 
forces the quantification methodologies to be simplistic. The resultant oversimplification 
cannot capture the complexity and complications involved in the inherent safety 
evaluation of a chemical plant and might hinder detection of hazards created by 
combinations of hazard factors and hazards generated in other processing areas due to 
changes toward an inherently safer process.  
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Sometimes the limitations are implicit in the mathematical procedure. The division 
of a range into sub-intervals with certain assigned scores is a common approach for 
index development. However this division presents problems of low sensitivity along the 
sub-interval (i.e., if a temperature sub-interval is defined between 100 oC and 200 oC 
degrees, the variable will receive the same score for a temperature of 101 oC or 199 oC 
degrees).  
Oversensitivity is however present near the limits of the sub-ranges (e.g., if the next 
range is defined between 201 oC and 300 oC, a temperature of 200 oC will receive a lower 
score than a temperature of 201 oC). These over/low sensitivity effects could balance 
each other, but there is no guarantee that it will not affect the analysis. This effect can be 
interpreted as lack of continuity in the evaluation caused by a discrete function (e.g., 
intervals with assigned scores) rather than a continuous one.  
In some cases, the tools are based on the identification and evaluation of the worst 
sources of hazard without taking into consideration the magnitude and frequency of other 
less hazardous conditions. In other cases, the tools require subjective judgment and do 
not propose a methodology to assess the effect of those personal evaluations. Industrial 
skepticism with respect to inherent safety is also based on the fact that inherent safety is 
a good approach for hazard reduction; however it is not proven that inherently safer 
plants are cheaper and easier to operate [Lawrence, 1996]. Additionally, when the 
approach is applied to existing plants there are few opportunities to improve the design 
without incurring significant expenses, and the application of Inherent Safety may 
require tradeoffs with other environmental and economic aspects. An additional 
restriction of the methodologies presented so far is that they require tedious and time-
consuming manual work not welcomed by design engineers who usually work under 
project time and cost constraints.  
All these indices are based on classical analytical statistics and mathematics and uses 
rigorous methodologies to analyze data that in some cases are little more than guesses, 
since some events are too rare to allow the collection of statistically meaningful 
information. Combining data with a high degree of uncertainty will increase the overall 
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uncertainty of the analysis [Bowles and Pelaez, 1995]. Other authors have recognized 
limitations such as conflicts and tradeoffs between inherently safer design and 
environmental, technological, and economic considerations [Palaniappan et al, 2002; 
Snyder, 1996; Hendershot, 1997].  
Koller et al. (2001) developed a comparison of fourteen methods proposed for the 
evaluation of inherent safety. Process aspects as well as release, safety, and human health 
aspects were compared for each method. Other characteristics of the methods such as 
type of scale used for input data and results, aggregation procedure of different hazards, 
were analyzed. The analysis required the application of the methods to a selected case 
study. The comparison of the results showed the tendency of most of the methods to 
classify very hazardous or very low hazard processes in a similar way. In general, it was 
found that a rather low degree of agreement exists among the methods, and this is 
attributed to the different approaches to treat variables such as toxicity. In other cases it 
was found that a single variable dominates over the others (e.g., volume, temperature).  
Based on the requirements of the industry and environmental protection, it is 
important for the methodologies to be able to capture and measure different type of 
hazards. Due to the complexity and variety of industrial plant operations, these hazards 
can be classified into process hazards, environmental hazards, and transportation 
hazards. Transportation hazards must be taken intoaccount in order to analyze the 
chemical plant from an overall view point. 
This research proposes the application of fuzzy logic to deal with the uncertainty and 
subjectivity of factors that must be analyzed to assess the process hazard and 
environmental hazards. The analysis of inherent safety for transportation hazard is 
introduced in Chapter X. 
Fuzzy modeling also allows the analysis of the interaction of the factors relevant for 
process safety because it works with simple IF-THEN rules that are easy to understand 
and apply. The rules can model numerical data as well linguistic and heuristic 
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knowledge. Because the approach proposed by this research is computer-oriented it is 
expected that its application is less time consuming then other methods. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INTRODUCTION TO EXTRINSIC SAFETY 
 
As explained in Chapter II, the topic of the present dissertation is “inherent safety” 
that aims to reduce the hazards rather than control them. However, in order to understand 
the limitations associated with the application and evaluation of inherent safety, it is 
important to gain an overview of what process safety is today and how we reached the 
current state-of-the-art. In the present chapter the word “safety” refers to “extrinsic 
safety” or traditional safety, understood as “low risk” achieved through the application of 
protective layers that reduce the likelihood and the magnitude of the expected 
consequences.  
In this chapter, the history of loss prevention is briefly summarized in order to 
understand how and why chemical engineers became concerned about process safety, 
and why the present safety state-of-the-art can be improved by looking at the problem 
from a different perspective. 
 
3.1 HISTORY OF PROCESS SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION 
 
Process safety is a relatively new concept that grew and developed with the chemical 
industry and its tragedies. It is also a thankless issue whose importance is minimized 
when nothing wrong happens and is blamed when incidents do occur. One of the classic 
fallacies is that if an incident has not occurred before, it is not likely to happen. These 
events are not recognized as “incidents waiting to happen” and a false sense of safety is 
taken for granted. 
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3.1.1 Process safety and loss prevention  
The modern conceptual and methodological framework for process safety was 
developed during the last fifty years in response to the driving force created from 
incidents and cross-learning from the nuclear industry. The three major development 
stages of process safety are [Brown, 1999; Kletz, 1999a]:  
1) Technical non-systematic approach (bottom-up): During the 1950s process safety 
was not a technical and systematic issue and a simplistic view was pursued: if each 
element of the plant was designed according to technical standards then it was 
inferred that the whole plant should be safe enough. The older and more experienced 
maintenance personnel were responsible for taking care of process safety issues. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, new larger and more complex plants were developed 
and built and it became clear that the previous bottom-up practice was not enough. 
The Flixborough disaster, which occurred in UK in 1974, was the precursor of a 
series of European and American regulations, and an increasing interest was 
developed to model and understand the consequences of incidents. 
2) Quantitative risk analysis development: During the 1970s and early 1980s, methods 
for consequence analysis, and calculation of incident likelihood and probability were 
adopted by the chemical industry after the nuclear industry recognized the potential 
magnitude of incidents. Methods such as reliability analysis and fault tree analysis 
were developed and applied to the chemical and nuclear industry. This stage of 
development required scientific research in order to develop fundamental 
understanding of the physical systems, to model and understand their behavior and 
the hazard implications. Until the late 1980s between 60 and 90% of the papers 
published on safety were related to technical and scientific issues [Gibson, 1999]. 
3) Regulation and process safety management: According to Gibson (1999) during the 
1990s the percentage of safety-related papers declined by 75% while regulatory and 
management issues became popular. Due to the increasing availability of computer 
power the interest switched toward information technology, control systems, and 
management, however as reported by Gibson (1999) Kletz said “...There is an 
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epidemic of papers and books on safety management but they are no substitute for 
knowledge and experience. All they can do is ensure that knowledge and experience 
are applied in a systematic way.” 
 
The needs of each stage of development of process safety were different, and several 
analytical methods for the evaluation of risk were proposed. Some of these procedures 
have been accepted and improved, and today they form the “toolbox” of loss prevention.   
 
 
3.2 ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR PROCESS SAFETY AND LOSS 
PREVENTION 
 
Regardless of the complexity and uncertainty associated with chemical processes, 
decisions must be taken in order to identify and reduce the risks. The methodologies 
developed during the first two stages of the history of process safety reflect the 
mathematical and computational tools available in the past. In general, they can be 
divided into qualitative and quantitative methods; while qualitative approaches are 
simple to use, quantitative methods such as quantitative risk assessment are extremely 
complex and demanding, which reduces their applicability. However, in both cases, 
these approaches have set the standards for the modern way of thinking and approaching 
the problem of safety analysis.  
The general concept of safety is related to low risk, where risk is understood as the 
multiplication of event likelihood and magnitude of the potential consequences. The 
questions that are sought to be answered are: 
- How frequent is the scenario? 
- How bad are the consequences? 
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Therefore, after hazard identification methods have been applied, the types of 
incidents that can be caused by each specific hazard are identified and risk evaluation 
(through qualitative or quantitative methods) is developed.  
 
3.2.1 Well-known and accepted methods for process safety analysis and loss 
prevention 
Kletz (1999a) has compiled a review of the most important papers published during 
the last forty years of the history of loss prevention. The paper also includes original 
references on safety and risk quantification analysis. Among the methodologies reported 
as the most important for loss prevention are Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), 
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), Checklists and Safety Audits, Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), What If Analysis, the Dow Fire and 
Explosion Index (F&EI), and the Mond Index. 
 
3.2.1.1 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
The HAZOP methodology was developed by ICI in 1963 [Kletz, 1999a] and 
published in 1974 by Lawley (as cited by Kletz, 1999a). It is the most commonly used 
methodology to identify potential hazards and it is comprehensively described elsewhere 
[Lees, 1996a; Kletz, 1999b]. It is based on guide words (i.e., MORE, LESS, NO, 
REVERSE) that are associated with variables (e.g., MORE flow, LESS flow, NO flow, 
REVERSE flow) and the resultant condition is assessed in terms of potential negative 
safety consequences. The method is applied to each individual equipment or system for 
the unit or plant being analyzed. The methodology is simple and powerful but it is time 
and resource-intensive since a multidisciplinary team is required to develop a meaningful 
analysis. Since its introduction, the method has not changed, however its application is 
nowadays abused by users who claim to perform Hazard and Operability Analysis but 
only do simple line diagram revisions [Kletz, 1999]. 
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3.2.1.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
The method of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been accepted by the 
chemical industry as a method useful for the systematic identification of priorities based 
on numerical estimation of incident frequency and consequences. Hazard sources that 
involve probable large risk must be addressed before other less frequent sources or with 
less severe consequences. When a high risk is identified, it can be reduced by either 
reducing the probability of the event by using layers of protection, or by controlling the 
consequences. The methodology, is described elsewhere [AIChE, 1996; Hendershot, 
1996] and it is usually applied in three formats depending on the scope of the study. The 
qualitative QRA is the simplest, while the quantitative version of the QRA requires 
failure frequency data and consequence quantification as well as calculation of 
probabilities of each event.  
 
3.2.1.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed for the chemical industry in the late 1970s 
by Lapp and Powers (as reported by Khan and Abbasi, 1998b). It is a powerful 
methodology able to identify hazardous combination of events, by using AND and OR 
gates, as well as chains of events that can cause an established scenario (e.g., release of a 
toxic substance). Starting from the frequency of the initiating events it is possible to 
calculate the frequency of the top event or scenario. The methodology is comprehensive 
but very demanding and it is rarely applied to large plants or units unless computerized 
systems are used. However, the generation of the tree by automated means is still subject 
of research [Wang et al., 2001] and fault tree generation is one of the main disadvantages 
of the method. The generation of the tree is the most important and time-consuming step 
and must be performed by experts who know the methodology but also are familiar with 
the process under analysis. Furthermore, the method requires the use of incident 
probabilities and failure frequency data under specific conditions. This type of data is not 
always available and often must be estimated, increasing the uncertainty of the analysis 
[Khan and Abbasi, 1998b; AIChE, 1993].  
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3.2.1.4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to analyze possible equipment 
failure modes and event sequences. This is a qualitative method, which does not work 
well for systems where complex logic is need to explain the failure. Furthermore FMEA 
cannot describe the interaction of several components [AIChE, 1993].  
 
3.2.1.5 What If analysis 
The What If analysis is one of the oldest methods and is based on simple questions 
such as “What if the pump fails?” The method is straightforward and does not require a 
safety expert; however it is not systematic, requires a multidisciplinary team and relies 
mainly on their expertise and experience [AIChE, 1993]. 
 
3.2.1.6 Dow Fire and Explosion Index (DF&EI) 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (DF&EI) was published by Dow Chemical in 
1964 and is probably the most frequently used hazard evaluation index [AIChE, 1994b; 
Scheffler, 1994; Brasie, 1976]. This method requires dividing the plant into units and 
then calculating the hazards due to chemical substances (i.e., material factor which is 
then modified by established penalty factors for specific process hazards. Credit factors 
are also applied for loss control measures and devices, and the cost of safety features is 
analyzed. This method summarizes expert knowledge and empirical experience into 
simple steps and penalty/credit factors, however when applied mechanically without 
taking into consideration the specific situation of the plant, it can lead to 
oversimplification and misjudgment [King, 1999]. A special case of adjustments needed 
for to the specific characteristics of the plant or the location is reported by Gupta (1997) 
who proposed to increase some penalty factors for plants located in developing countries. 
The adjustments have the objective to take into account situations such as possible lack 
of appropriate control systems and lack of maintenance capability, inadequate training 
and equipment availability for emergency response, limitations associated with corrosion 
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control, leak prevention, and inadequate operation procedures (i.e., instructions not 
properly translated to the local language). The hazard ranking has also been modified.  
While the F&EI is easy to understand and apply, the limitations include controversy 
about the value of the weighting factors required to combine the sub-indices. As Kletz 
recommends (1980, Loss prevention) the methodology should be used keeping in mind 
that some of the numbers are arbitrary. 
 
3.2.1.7 Mond Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Index 
The Mond Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Index was developed by ICI [AIChE, 
1994a], in 1979 and it is based on the Dow F&EI. For the Mond Index, toxicity is 
included as an additional factor and the overall index is calculated by combining indices 
for general and special process hazards, quantity hazards, layout hazards, and acute 
health hazards. This index requires also information on cost for equipment and pipework 
[King, 1999; Khan and Abbasi, 1998b; Lewis, 1980].  
 
3.2.1.8 Checklists and safety audits 
Other methodologies such as checklists and safety audits were the first 
methodologies applied for hazard identification and management. These methods are 
simple; however the inherent danger is the tendency to apply them in a mechanical 
manner and thus over time losing their capacity for detection of potential problems 
[Kletz, 1999a]. 
During the last decade the limitations and problems of the previous methods have 
been addressed and new tools have been developed. In several cases they represent 
improved or modified version of the Dow F&EI and the Mond Index. In other cases 
some of the risk assessment concepts have been applied to hazard identification 
techniques is an attempt to include both tools under a single method. There is a general 
trend towards automation by using computer interfaces, however in general the methods 
have not been well received.  
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3.2.2  Not well-known and accepted methods for process safety analysis and loss 
prevention 
The technical literature includes a large number of other methodologies that have 
been proposed but have not been fully recognized or used by the industry. Some 
examples are the following: 
− Quantitative multi-attribute approach for risk analysis [Christen, et al, 1994] 
− Focused What If analysis [Goodman, 1996] 
− Generalized model of hazard systems [Marshall and Ruhemann, 1997] 
− Hazard Identification and Ranking (HIRA) proposed by Khan and Abbasi 
(1998c) 
− Computer-based Hazard Identification (HAZID) developed by McCoy et al. 
(2000) 
− Optimum risk analysis [Khan and Abbasi, 2001] 
− Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) proposed by Khan et al. (2002) 
− Hybrid hazard identification [Viswanathan t al., 2002].   
 
Due to the large number of new methodologies proposed, other papers have been 
published comparing the new safety and risk analysis methodologies. Tixier et al. (2002) 
reviewed 62 methods and classified them based on the type of input, type of output, data 
required, type of method (i.e., deterministic, probabilistic, qualitative, quantitative), 
relation between input and output data, and risk hierarchy. The conclusion reached by the 
authors indicates that it is required to apply several methods to get a better understanding 
of the risk, but in order to get meaningful results the user needs experience and expert 
knowledge.  
Another study developed by Rouvroye and Van den Bliek (2002) focused on the 
comparison of risk analysis techniques that could be used for standards related to Safety 
Instrumented Systems (SIS) and Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD). The authors 
analyzed eight techniques including Hybrid methods, Markov analysis, Reliability block 
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diagrams (RBD), and fault trees (FTA). Kirchsteiger (1999) presented a review on the 
current practice and use of deterministic and probabilistic risk assessment methods in 
Europe, United Sates, and Korea. 
 
 
3.3 APPLICATION OF PROCESS SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION 
 
The large number of methodologies proposed to analyze traditional safety, risk, and 
inherent safety implies that there are safety problems that cannot be analyzed with the 
methodologies available so far, therefore there is a driving force to propose other 
approaches. However, in general the methods for safety assessment can be broadly 
classified into three main categories: 
1. Risk-based methodologies that identify hazards and then combine them in different 
ways with the likelihood of the event and the potential consequences. Another 
classification of risk analysis is given by Kirchsteiger (1999) and is based on 
probabilistic and deterministic approaches. The deterministic risk analysis takes into 
account only “worst case scenarios” and it includes an element of subjectivity 
because the analyst selects the reasonable scenarios. In the probabilistic approach, all 
possible sources of hazard are analyzed by using probability distributions and 
uncertainty ranges. 
2. Methods based on indices and the Dow F&EI that represent extension, modification, 
or improvements of the well-accepted index. These methods are based on arbitrary 
scales representing different variables, and usually are based on scoring systems 
assigned to specific discrete intervals. The results are then aggregated by 
multiplication or addition and then corrected by weighting factors.  
3. Other methods based on a variety of approaches such as ranking matrices [Moore, 
1997], qualitative approaches, checklists, and other safety measures. 
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The models in the first category require statistical information about incident 
frequency and probability, and often the information is not available or has to be inferred 
through approximations to adapt the data to the analyzed case. In general the data are 
characterized by high uncertainty degree but it is rarely taken into account due to the 
complexity of such problems. These models tend to be detailed and able to calculate 
societal and individual risk, however they are complex and time-intensive requiring the 
participation of specialized technical expertise.  
The second category includes a qualitative and a quantitative index and presents a 
compromise between simplicity and descriptive capability. In general, the application of 
this type of models does not require the participation of highly technically skilled 
personnel and can be applied quickly. The numerical results are calculated by applying a 
well-defined procedure that allows fast identification of potential hazards. Usually the 
results are in the form of numerical scores that can be interpreted as the representation of 
certain level of risk [Khan et al., 2001]. In general, these methods are based on 
assumptions usually not well explained or justified that can lead to oversimplification of 
the problem.  
All the available methodologies offer different innovative concepts, capabilities, and 
advantages, however some seem to be better accepted and used than others. Kletz 
(1999a) suggests that the acceptance is a function of the organization level targeted by 
the method. Methods that demand time and economic resources (i.e., by requiring large 
teams of experts) require the commitment from higher management level and this may 
represent an obstacle for the implementation of the methodology. When safety analytical 
approaches target the lower levels of the organization and can be implemented by 
designer and project managers the possibility of acceptance increases.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NOVEL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR INHERENT SAFETY ANALYSIS* 
 
This chapter introduces the problem of safety and explains the philosophy upon 
which the present project is built. Because the approach proposed here does not follow 
the conventional thinking path for safety analysis and applies an unusual mathematical 
framework, it is fundamental to keep in mind the ultimate goal of the project. This goal 
is the development of a tool useful to process and design engineers for identifying 
potential hazardous characteristics of materials, operating conditions, and process 
equipment without the intervention of safety experts. 
As explained latter, safety is by itself a complicated issue affected by a large number 
of aspects and parameters, hence the natural complexity of the problem should not be 
overlooked or ignored. On the contrary, it is assumed here that complexity is derived 
from the interaction of several simpler systems and the model developed attempts to 
capture this fundamental assumption. Because of the intrinsic complex nature of 
“safety”, considerable of time has been dedicated to the development of a conceptual 
framework to bridge the academic theory and potential “real world” needs.  
The history of loss prevention was briefly summarized in Chapter III in order to 
understand the limitations and problems associated with the conventional “extrinsic” 
safety approach while the limitations of the methodologies so far developed for inherent 
safety analysis were explained in Chapter II. The present chapter questions and 
challenges conventional approaches for process safety and analyzes the reasons why  
 
______________ 
*This chapter contains material reprinted from: Gentile M., Williams J.R., Mannan S., 2003, Development 
of a fuzzy logic-based Inherent Safety Index, Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental 
protection Vol. 81, Part B. Copyright 2003. 
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safety in general, and specifically inherent safety, is so difficult to quantify. The analysis 
is based on ideas borrowed from non-engineering disciplines. The last part of the chapter 
introduces the technical ideology of the project, main objectives, and the mathematical 
methodology (explained in detail in Chapters V and VI). 
 
 
4.1 QUESTIONING THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO 
EXTRINSIC AND INHERENT SAFETY 
 
From the information presented in Chapter II and III some intriguing questions arise 
and their answer establish the theoretical basis for the present dissertation.  
 
4.1.1 Why so many methods? 
From the previous Chapters II and III it is clear that nowadays a large number of 
methods are available to analyze intrinsic and extrinsic “safety”, and each one of them 
presents advantages and disadvantages. Most of the new methodologies proposed are 
based on usual and traditional safety and risk concepts, which are bounded by the 
historic development of the chemical and nuclear industry. The mathematical 
methodologies used are also bounded by the historical background and the tools 
developed in the past such as statistical and probabilistic theory.  
Nevertheless, the continuous proposal of new tools for process safety highlights the 
fact that we are still not able to understand what safety is. The answer to the question 
“How safe is a chemical plant?” has become a circular problem. The more recent 
methodologies have been shaped around the early and now well-accepted ideas and 
techniques for safety and risk assessment, hence innovation is itself bounded by the 
limitations of the original now well-accepted methods. This problem is defined by 
Walker (1998) as “conceptual inertia”.  
A different type of innovation requires to “reinvent the details” of the solution by 
looking at the problem from a different viewpoint. It also requires breaking the usual 
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thinking patterns to explore other approaches. Human history is full of examples on both 
types of innovation, from the development of the written language to the controversy 
about how Russia built its atomic bomb [Diamond, 1997]. 
 
4.1.2  Why the general safety approach is based on extrinsic safety? 
Before the introduction of the inherent safety principles by Kletz, a safe plant could 
only be achieved through protective layers added after the hazards were detected. This 
solution to improve the safety level of a plant has historical roots in the limitations and 
difficulties faced by design engineers such as limited computing power, limited technical 
information, slow communication with equipment suppliers and very slow drawing 
capability.  
Methodologies for hazard identification and risk analysis require detailed 
information on chemicals, equipment, and operating procedures (Figure 4.1). This large 
amount of data was only available at advanced design stages when opportunities for 
changes were limited, forcing engineers to rely on protective add-on barriers rather than 
hazard elimination [Mansfield and Cassidy, 1991]. These technical limitations 
established the modern thinking pattern and plant design systems that rely on protective 
barriers. Therefore, inherent safety implies not only a paradigm change but also a 
systematic modification of the design framework.  
 
4.1.3  Risk assessment and data uncertainty 
Besides the model complexity associated with quantitative risk assessment, the data 
requirements regarding failure rates and scenario likelihood constitute a systematic 
limitation of methodologies based on risk quantification. These indices are based on 
classical analytical statistics and mathematics and use rigorous methodologies to analyze 
data that in some cases are little more than guesses, since some events are too rare to 
allow the collection of statistically meaningful information. Combining data with a high 
degree of uncertainty will increase the overall uncertainty of the analysis [Bowles and 
Pelaez, 1995].  
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Failure data for equipment is reported in databases and specialized literature but are 
rarely available for the required specific operating condition. Hence, the data must be 
subjectively adjusted based on expert and technical judgment. While for the nuclear 
industry the number of equipment, operating conditions and potential scenarios is 
relatively well defined and limited, the complexity and variety of processes, chemicals, 
and unit operations make impossible the collection of enough data to describe each 
situation with a low degree of uncertainty. The problem is further accentuated when the 
methodology for risk assessment for fixed sites is applied to transportation of chemical 
substances. In this case the environment around the vehicle (e.g., truck, railcar, and 
barge) or pipeline is dynamic, non-controllable, and in general non-predictable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Current application of extrinsic safety methodologies during plant design  
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assumptions must be made. For instance, weather conditions and wind velocity, 
population type and density, affect the results of the analysis. Depending on the expected 
magnitude of the risk, the scope of the study can be selected as a simple qualitative risk 
analysis or a fully quantitative one. For simple QRA only, few scenarios are analyzed 
while for more complex problems the complexity of the models and number of analyzed 
scenarios increases significantly.   
The uncertainty associated with the data used as well as the procedure for selection 
of scenarios and analytical assumptions is not taken into account by the mathematical 
procedure therefore the results of the risk analysis should then be interpreted on the basis 
of the quality of information and assumption used.  
 
4.1.4  Is safety a subjective issue? 
One of the most important aspects with regard to safety is the subjectivity present in 
risk evaluation. Risk perception can be biased by economic factors, experience, and 
knowledge (or lack of them), environmental factors, public perception of the risk, 
generic technical standards, and lack of specific regulations. Because of the complexity 
of issues covered under the concept of safety the generally accepted idea is that safety is 
subject to interpretation, hence it is a subjective matter that can be understood in 
different ways depending on the situation and the experience of the analyst. Situations 
that can appear to be safe to somebody may appear to be unsafe to another more 
experienced person; therefore safety becomes a matter of opinion where event experts 
can interpret a scenario as safe or unsafe according to their own personal knowledge. For 
instance, an arbitrarily hazardous chemical can be perceived as less hazardous by 
somebody used to deal with it; the nuclear industry is perceived as relatively not 
hazardous by nuclear engineers trained on the matter; however the general public 
perceives a nuclear plant as great source of hazard even though risk analysis indicates 
low likelihood of an incident.    
Depending on the focus of the problem the definition of safety can acquire different 
meanings. While risk-based analysis understands safety as low risk to humans and 
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equipment, due to reduced consequences or low likelihood, other methods for extrinsic 
safety focus on thresholds assuming that if a certain parameter is below a certain value 
(which can be arbitrary or can have physical meaning) then the hazard is not present, 
hence a safe state is established. Index-based methods extend the interpretation of safety 
based on thresholds by establishing arbitrary scales for each source of hazard (e.g., 
temperature, pressure, toxicity) and assigning scores representative of the implicit 
danger.  
 
4.1.5  Safety as a simplified problem? 
Safety is a complex problem formed by various aspects, and this is one of the reasons 
why several methodologies looking at different aspects of the same problem are usually 
required. However, except for Fault Tree Analysis, the rest of the methods tend to 
oversimplify the analysis by assuming that each variable is an independent source of 
hazard. For example, a medium reactor working at low pressure and temperature may 
represent higher hazard than a smaller reactor working at higher pressure and 
temperature if the volume is sufficiently small. Hence, the amount of material is not 
enough to generate a serious fire or explosion [Kletz, 1998].  
This type of interaction among the significant parameters is difficult to capture when 
the analytical methods have not been designed with the purpose in mind. Score-based 
approaches are less likely to identify the interaction because the scores are not 
proportional to the physical consequences.  
 
4.1.6  On score aggregation and scaling theory 
The use of scales and score is common in the field of process safety. One of the more 
frequently used scales is the National Fire Protection Association standard NFPA 704 
(2001) for the evaluation of flammability, toxicity, and reactivity hazards of chemical 
substances. Depending on certain properties each chemical receives a set of three scores 
(one per each hazard) on a discrete scale from zero, for no hazard, up to four for 
maximum danger. This is an ordinal scale able to give an indication of relative hazards 
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but does not provide any information about the proportional threat posed by different 
chemicals. For instance, if a chemical A has a toxicity score of one and chemical B has a 
toxicity score of three, then it is possible to conclude that B is more toxic than A, but it is 
not possible to know how much more toxic.  
The type of scale used affects the mathematical operations allowed, however this 
aspect is in general overlooked and results from different type of scales are combined 
and aggregated by using addition and weighted multiplication violating the mathematical 
theory. Koller et al. (2001) noticed the problem for methodologies such as the INSET 
Toolbox, Dow F&EI, and several other methods. The issue is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter VII. 
 
 
4.2 THE PROBLEM OF INHERENT SAFETY 
 
4.2.1 Inherent safety: the issue nobody wants to talk about 
Inherent safety is nowadays a controversial topic, and the initial enthusiasm went 
from efforts to understand and measure it to an unpleasant topic for the industry. In the 
US the threat of possible regulation due to the proposed Corzine Bill (2001) forced the 
industry to take a defensive position and focus efforts to highlight the limitations of 
inherent safety. This position can be misunderstood and can be interpreted as a 
demonstration that inherent safety is not a reasonable approach to safety. Because of the 
governmental pressure on inherent safety regulation without a deep understanding of the 
real technical challenges and limitations for existing plants, inherent safety is becoming 
the issue many know about but do not want to talk about. The truth is that the present 
status of inherent safety is not mature enough to be regulated, and a stronger theoretical 
background as well an analytical framework and new and better processing technologies 
must be developed. The only plausible regulatory action that can be undertaken at 
present is the encouragement to consider the application of inherent safety principles 
whenever it is possible, as done in Europe by the Seveso II Directive. 
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An example of the effort to show the apparent limitations of inherent safety is the 
case presented by Hendershot (2002), about the detrimental effects on the stability of a 
distillation column due to the reduction of bottom liquid inventory. This intensification 
approach was proposed by Kletz (1998) as an option to reduce the quantity of hazardous 
materials in a plant. Although the problem presented by Hendershot is a real one it is not 
a surprise since it is known that large inventories offer increased stability to the process 
by adding inertia able to buffer control limitations and process upsets. While the target 
message was “be careful when you apply the inherent safety principles without 
understanding the behavior of the system because you may get something different from 
what you expect” it could also be interpreted in a more negative way. 
 
4.2.2 Inherent safety: an approach that can be misunderstood due to hazard 
migration 
The application of inherently safer design requires a holistic approach and a complete 
understanding of the implications of the changes within the whole plant. When the 
design of equipment is modified towards an inherently safer option, the achieved local 
hazard reduction may cause more hazardous conditions in other parts of the plant. When 
inherent safety is applied only to one single element (e.g., distillation column by 
reducing liquid space volume) while the other aspects are not improved accordingly 
(e.g., control system strategy) the expected results probably will not increase the overall 
safety level (e.g., increased control instability).  
This example highlights the fact that not only is it required to analyze variable 
interactions within the same equipment but also among interrelated units. Furthermore, 
the normal approach followed by the proposed methodologies for inherent safety analysis 
usually focuses on “worst hazards” (e.g., largest tank, or most toxic chemical) that 
cannot capture the complexity associated with hazard migration and hazard interaction.  
It is often said that the inherently safest plant is the one that has not being built or is 
not in operation. However, this is not a correct interpretation of inherent safety because it 
must be evaluated according to the goal of the plant. The purpose of a chemical plant is 
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to produce certain chemicals with the restriction that the plant must operate in a 
competitive (i.e., economic) and safe way. The whole plant must be analyzed not only 
from the processing viewpoint but also from the capital and operating cost, to understand 
where and how the hazards have been removed (or created) and the economic impact of 
the proposed changes. Process hazard migration, capital cost, and operation cost change 
due to plant modification toward inherent safety. 
 
4.2.3 Inherent safety: a paradigm change 
While the lack of proven analytical tools for inherent safety analysis represents a 
strong limitation in practical terms and allows subjectivity to control the design efforts, 
the true problem of inherent safety is the paradigm change that is required. This change 
requires the identification of alternative processing options (including chemicals and 
equipment) with low intrinsic hazard, and the integration of these ideas into design 
activities during early stages of development. This requires the availability of analytical 
tools that can be integrated into process simulators in order to reduce the time and effort 
required for hazard identification and quantification. 
Another important paradigm change imposed by inherent safety is the difference 
between “safety” and “inherent safety”. As explained above, two aspects define the 
present understanding of safety: 
− Reduced consequences  
− Low risk 
 
It is possible to see that these two aspects have their roots in the second phases of the 
historic development of safety and the technical limitations of the past when safety 
analysis had to be developed at the end of the detailed engineering phase, when only 
hazard control was possible. However, recent approaches such as Layers of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) [AIChE, 2001] follow a similar basic ideology, but mention inherent 
safety and hazard reduction as the first line of defense and incident prevention. By 
adding protective barriers the likelihood and consequences of an incident is reduced by 
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ensuring that there are sufficient elements (e.g., relief valves, control systems, alarms, 
safety instrumented systems) able to stop the sequence of events before they can produce 
an incident. This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.2a. The width of the arrows at the top 
indicates the risk without layers of protection while the last arrow is a schematic 
representation of the amount of risk after the layers of protection. This indicates that 
without protective barriers the process risk is high however a low risk level can be 
reached by installing sufficient add-on layers. 
Inherent safety, proposes to reduce or eliminate the sources of hazard eliminating or 
reducing the need for protective barriers, as illustrated in Figure 4.2b. Because the 
hazards have been eliminated or reduced, the initial arrow is thinner and low risk can be 
reached with fewer layers of protection. It is important to recognize that absolute 
inherent safety cannot be reached hence the term “inherently safer” must be used. 
From the previous discussion the following conclusions are reached: 
- Low risk does not imply low hazard level, but “low risk” is a necessary condition for 
“low hazard” and hence inherent safety. 
- Inherent safety implies low hazard therefore implies low risk, then “low hazard” is a 
necessary and sufficient condition to ensure “low risk”. 
Quantifying inherent safety through risk assessment is conceptually inappropriate, 
since low risk is achieved by using protective layers, unless the barriers are not taken into 
consideration. However, this option violates the fundamental goal of risk assessment. On 
the other hand, in order for the second conclusion to be true, it is important to: 
- Identify issues related to hazard migration (e.g., distillation column control 
instability) as explained above. 
- Analyze the process against a goal in order to avoid misleading issues as presented in 
Chapter II (e.g., car transportation vs. air travel). 
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Figure 4.2: Difference between safety achieved through layers of protection (a) and 
inherent safety (b) [Hendershot, 1998] 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Inherently safer design is not inherently safe design 
Inherent safety is not the absolute panacea for achieving hazard and risk elimination. 
A characteristic of inherent safety is that “absolute” elimination of hazards is not 
possible hence a plant cannot be “inherently safe” but only “inherently safer”. From the 
modeling viewpoint this aspect is similar to the mathematical concept of limit: 
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infinity. If we assume that inherent safety is a function of hazard and is defined in Figure 
4.3. Then by applying the concept of mathematical limit: 
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This concept is in agreement with the idea that only “inherently safer” design can be 
reached while “inherently safest” design is the practically unachievable limit when 
hazard tends to zero. As shown in Figure 4.3, and as indicated here, because hazards 
cannot be totally eliminated, in some cases after applying inherent safety principles, 
extrinsic safety must be applied by adding protective barriers in order to further reduce 
the overall risk. Because of this requirement, inherent safety and extrinsic safety are not 
contradictory but they are complementary and are indicated for different type of 
situations and processing objectives. For example, a gasoline tank farm has the objective 
to store large volumes of highly flammable substances, hence inherent safety can be 
applied only in a limited form (i.e., by simplifying the design to avoid human errors, and 
to reduce the possible domino effects). In this case, extrinsic safety is indicated instead 
of inherent safety.  
 
4.2.5 Inherent safety as a tangible activity 
Mansfield (1991) suggests that another reason for the preference towards 
methodologies such as QRA and HAZOP is that these methods require a specific set of 
activities that can be planned, scheduled, and evaluated. On the other hand, inherent 
safety as it is used today is understood as a conceptual effort rather than an analytical 
activity hence cannot be systematically applied and used as a technical decision tool.   
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Figure 4.3: As hazard tends to zero, inherent safety increases 
 
 
 
4.3 TOWARDS A THEORY FOR SAFETY AND INHERENT SAFETY 
 
A chemical process plant is a facility composed of a large number of different 
elements and aspects whose relations are complex and include technical, economic, 
human, and environmental factors. Several authors have recognized limitations such as 
conflicts and tradeoffs between inherently safer design and environmental, technological, 
and economic requirements. Therefore the attempt to develop a rigorous and systematic 
quantitative measurement of the inherent safety is a challenging problem. 
From the previous discussion, it is evident that a measure of safety and inherent 
safety is required and one of the questions that must be answered is “why is it so difficult 
to understand, model, and measure safety? 
 
4.3.1 Safety as a non-well-defined science 
According to Torgerson (1958) a well-defined science consists of theory and 
empirical evidence that are connected by rules, logical relationships, and interpretations. 
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For instance, physics has many constructs (i.e., theory, hypothesis, theorems, ideas, 
concepts, paradigms), which are connected by quantitative relations such as 
mathematical equations. The multiple connections of the constructs allow progress from 
observable data to the theoretical space by means of mathematical equations (Figure 
4.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Difference between a well-developed science and a less developed science 
[Margenau, (1950) as cited by Torgerson 1958] 
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However, for a not-well-developed science, such as social and behavioral sciences, 
the situation is less developed, and there are plenty of observable data but a severe lack 
of connections such as quantitative models. In some cases there is no universally 
accepted definition for some concepts or in other cases the concepts are well defined but 
a measurement method is lacking. Some terms are vague and usually complex 
[Torgerson, 1958]. Safety is in a very similar situation. Some concepts cannot be 
defined, others cannot be measured, and in some cases there are enough constructs but 
no established quantitative connection among them. 
From these ideas of not-well-developed science we can take some useful concepts 
such as property, system, and their interrelation. Properties are the observable aspects 
and characteristics of the real world and they occur as characteristics of a system, which 
is formed by elements [Torgerson, 1958]. In the case of safety a system can be a 
chemical plant composed of equipment, chemicals, instruments, the environment, and 
people. These elements have observable properties and in our case they must be relevant 
to inherent safety. For instance, properties of a chemical can be toxicity, volume, and 
explosiveness. Properties for a vessel can be volume, operating conditions such a 
pressure and temperature, location, contained chemicals and its own properties. For a 
pipeline the volume can be substituted by diameter and length, and other factors such as 
number and type of instruments can be used.  
Properties have to be measurable but for not-well-developed sciences the concepts 
are classificatory (e.g., X is warm, Y is safe) and they use fuzzy terms. When a science is 
well developed the classificatory terms tend to be replaced by quantitative parameters 
[Torgerson, 1958]. Classificatory terms are commonly used in process safety, for 
instance the NFPA scoring system and other score-based methodologies. Type of scales 
and theory of scaling will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
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4.3.2 An example of non-developed science to developed science 
Thermodynamics allows understanding the transition between the two science 
development states and can be useful for our case because inherent safety shares several 
aspects with temperature and enthalpy. Inherent Safety is based on rules (e.g., principles) 
and fuzzy linguistic terms (e.g., safe, unsafe). In general we can sense situations that are 
extremely safe or extremely unsafe; similarly we can say if an object is very hot or very 
cold. However, a temperature scale is needed in order to quantify temperature and to 
decide how hot or cold an object is. In the case of safety we do not have such a 
standardized scale yet, but several methodologies, approaches, and concepts have been 
proposed as measurement means. This situation is very similar to the early history of 
temperature, when there was a general lack of understanding about the nature of 
“temperature” and several diverse measurement methodologies were used. 
By definition inherent safety involves the reduction or elimination of hazards. And 
hazards are generated from intrinsic properties of the chemicals, factors related to the 
plant and also from the interaction of these properties and factors. For instance, a high 
toxicity may be meaningless by itself in terms of incident possibility (except in very 
special cases such as toxins or infectious substances), but when combined with large 
volume the hazardous potential of the scenario becomes evident. If a plant presents a 
high concentration of hazardous properties and factors, then intuitively the possibility of 
incident occurrence should be higher compared to plants with fewer hazards.  
Intuitively, if temperature is a mathematical variable that provides a measure of 
hotness or coldness, inherent safety could be understood as a mathematical variable that 
provides a measure of “safetiness” or “unsafetiness.” And, if energy (heat) can be 
transferred from a body to another changing their temperature, then hazards (represented 
by the possibility of expressing themselves into an incident) can be removed or added to 
a process to change the “safetiness” degree of a plant. Heat flows, but hazards also flow 
because when a modification is made to a part of the plant to increase its inherent safety 
level, other units could be affected and become inherently unsafer. As the enthalpy 
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function depends on pressure and volume, safety should have some kind of functionality 
with some parameters (i.e., chemical and physical properties of substances and 
equipment). The possibility of an incident depends on the type and magnitude of the 
involved hazards but also on their interaction. Hence a possibility model could be a 
measure of safety as enthalpy is a measure related to temperature.  
 
4.3.3 Safety as a complex system 
When a system is so complex that it cannot be understood it is reduced to more 
manageable systems that can be modeled with standard mathematical approaches. 
Complexity, when analyzed from a broad viewpoint, is usually understood as 
randomness and modeled through a statistical approach. An example of this is flow 
dynamics where turbulence produces swirls that can appear to behave in an 
unpredictable form. However, we now know that turbulence swirls result from the fluid 
and flow properties and can be predicted by fluid flow equations and models. However, 
the new understanding of turbulence requires approaching the problem from a detailed 
viewpoint and analyzing the physical phenomena not only at the macroscopic level but 
also at the microscopic level [Auyang, 2003]. 
A complex system is formed by a set of subsystems that individually can be simpler 
but when functioning together establish multiple interrelations and complicate networks 
of properties and behaviors. Each subsystem may be described by a theory while the 
whole system may be described by another theory. The connection between the two 
levels of theory is by itself a complicate issue and may require new ideas. For instance, 
thermodynamics is connected to mechanics through the theory of statistical mechanics 
[Auyang, 2003]. 
When these ideas are applied to safety it can be assumed that safety is by itself a 
complex system resulting from the interaction of subsystems such as the chemical plant, 
chemical substances, the natural environment and human beings, and the society. While 
each one of the subsystems may be more or less understood (i.e., availability of 
descriptive and predictive models) and can present different hazard sources or be 
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sensitive to hazards in different ways, the overall system lacks a general theory able to 
describe and analyze “safety”. If we look at safety as a non-well defined science (as 
described in Section 3.1) with availability of local models, theories and constructs, but 
with a lack of theories to interconnect the local systems, it appears that safety may be a 
complex system. 
The synthetic analysis required to establish the connections among the subsystems 
first analyze the overall complex systems in order to identify its main parts and models 
that independently describe each subsystem. Then interactions among the subsystems are 
evaluated and the final solution to the original complex problem is finally synthesized. 
The synthetic analysis is focused on the overall system but it is based on the single parts. 
On the other hand, a reductionism approach looks only at the single parts [Auyang, 
2003].  
Looking at the problem of safety it seems that the present state-of-the-art resembles 
the first stage of a synthetic analysis with a tendency towards a reductionism approach. 
While some individual systems have been thoroughly analyzed (e.g., gas dispersion for 
hazard assessment) others have not reached such a predictive power due to lack of 
driving force or lack of understanding because of high complexity (e.g., environmental 
modeling). However, the general approach sought so far for safety and loss prevention 
tends to focus on single elements of the system (e.g., the plant). Due to analytical 
difficulties and the historical bounds, variable interaction is analyzed only by fault tree 
analysis while the general approach is to analyze variables independently and then 
aggregate them in some way. 
Several complex systems cannot be grouped into classes; however there are at least 
two types that can be recognized. Nonlinear dynamic systems are governed by simple 
rules that can induce chaos when a very small difference of the initial condition produces 
a large difference in the response. The work of Wolfram (2000) is an example of this 
behavior. In safety, chaos could be understood as the occurrence of an incident due to the 
interaction of several factors that form the “right” chain of events. When this type of 
systems is related to physical quantities that are continuous, a real number cannot 
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represent an exact input condition, since each real number represents an infinite cluster 
of inputs within a certain error [Auyang, 2003]. This same idea reappears in Section 4.1 
regarding the discussion on vagueness as a type of uncertainty present when there is a 
lack of well-defined boundaries for a variable (i.e., it cannot be divided into crisp 
subintervals). 
Another type of complex systems is given by many-body systems. In this case the 
complex system is formed by a large number of interacting elements that belong to a 
reduced number of subsystems. An example of this type is a solid formed by atoms of 
one or two elements, such as gold [Auyang, 2003]. As explained by Auyang (2003) 
“…the central aim of many body problems is the micro explanation that relates typical 
macroscopic properties of the systems to the typical properties of the constituents. As it 
turns out, this is a very difficult problem, and often demands total reformulation of the 
problem, i.e., cast the typical properties of the constituents in different forms”. This is 
probably the best description of the ultimate goal of the present project which is directed 
at the reformulation of the approach to measure inherent safety by analyzing the 
interaction of the single hazards by starting from the properties of the subsystems (e.g., 
chemical and physical properties of the substances; physical properties of the plant). 
If a complex system is formed by only one type of constituent with property P 
interconnected by a single type of binary relation R, then each constituent Pi is related to 
another element Pj by a relation Rij. When all the possible relations are established a 
complicated network is formed. If one of the constituents P suffers a change, then the 
network transmits the effect of the change to the other constituents through the specific 
binary relations [Auyang, 2003]. In the case of safety, this phenomena was mentioned 
previously as “hazard migration” and constitutes an important property of the system, 
because it is important to ensure that a design change towards inherent safety does not 
increase the hazard in other units. 
As described by Wolfram (2000) the history of complexity has philosophical roots 
and can be followed through the development of mathematics and science. In the late 
1800s statistics arose as a scientific approach for the treatment of uncertainty in social 
 63 
science; then statistics was applied to explain microscopic physical phenomena in the 
new field of statistical mechanics. However, until early 1900s the advances of physics 
focused on simple systems that could be described by mathematical formulas, thus 
avoiding complexity. Other scientific fields followed the same approach focusing on the 
development of mathematical formulas for simpler systems. During the last sixty years, 
computational advances as well as the development of new fields such as artificial 
intelligence, chaos and fractals, and game theory, and new problems in biology, 
economics, and mathematics have allowed us to look at problems in a different way even 
though the tendency to try to develop descriptive mathematical equations remains. In the 
early 1980s the work on cellular automata [Wolfram, 2000] suggested that complex 
behavior of a system could be described by general rules that can be very simple.  
 
 
4.4 APPROACH AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INHERENT 
SAFETY MEASUREMENT 
 
The development of a new approach to measure and analyze inherent safety must 
address the issues identified in the previous discussion. Another methodology that 
follows the same guidelines already explored by the approaches described in Chapters II 
and III would not give process engineers an efficient tool to evaluate new designs 
(assumed to be inherently safer). This practicality describes the objective of the project 
and establishes the basis upon which the mathematical methodology and technical 
approach were selected in order to address the problem discussed in Sections 1, 2 and 3 
of this chapter.   
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4.4.1 Question to be answered and definitions 
Before starting any project it is important to define which questions should be 
answered. As noted by Mansfield (1991) in order to measure inherent safety it is 
necessary to develop an index capable of measuring a “degree” of “inherent safetiness.” 
In other words, the question that should be asked is “How inherently safer is the plant?” 
rather than “Is the plant inherently safer?” The difference implicit in these two questions 
is more evident when the concept “inherent safety” is recognized as an uncertain idea 
without defined boundaries.  
For this project safety is understood as “inherent safety” which is defined as “lack of 
hazards” therefore as the quantity of hazards of a chemical plant tends to zero the level 
of safety increases:  
Inherent safety level=f(hazards) 
 
Hazard is defined as the potential to produce an incident and is function of physical 
properties of the equipment and chemical/physical properties of the substances: 
 
Hazard = f (physical properties of equipment, physicochemical properties of 
substances) 
Physical properties of equipment = f(design, operating conditions, task) 
 
Physicochemical properties of substances such as toxicity, reactivity, and phase at 
environmental conditions are inherent only to the nature of the substance; however these 
properties are affected by other factors such as operating conditions and concentration. 
The modeling of hazards is therefore based only on measurable (non subjective) 
parameters, that are however subject to uncertainty (i.e., vagueness) due to their 
continuous nature (i.e., not describable by discrete intervals) or the experimental 
variability of their measurement.  
The “magnitude of the hazard” is defined in relation to certain values identified as 
“inherently safer” in terms of the low consequences that could derive from such values. 
 65 
Because the consequences are physical measurable factors, they are not subjective but 
remain uncertain and vague since no strict thresholds can be established. 
 
4.4.2 On safety’s uncertainty 
Safety evaluation is characterized by the presence of uncertainty implicit in the 
variables and due to subjective evaluations. In order to choose an appropriate 
mathematical model to work with uncertain variables, it is important to understand the 
source and type of uncertainty.  
In general, uncertainty can be classified into randomness, vagueness, and ambiguity 
(Lootsma, 1997). The uncertainty for an experiment with several possible outcomes 
(e.g., casting dice) that can be properly observed is called randomness and can be 
reduced by performing additional trials and developing a probability density function. 
This type of uncertainty is associated with the likelihood of stochastic events (ie., non-
deterministic events) and can be described by a probabilistic approach. In this case the 
events are crisp (i.e., well defined) and it is possible to establish sharp and well-defined 
limits (e.g., “yes/no”, numerical values such as x = a).  
When the events cannot be properly observed vagueness occurs, and additional 
experimentation will not reduce this type of uncertainty. An example is casting dice that 
instead of a specified number of marks have colored faces. If the light is not good 
enough to allow a clear distinction between colors, uncertainty due to vagueness arises 
and will not be reduced by performing additional experiments under similar conditions 
(no better light available) (Lootsma, 1997). The same type of uncertainty arises when 
either the events are not sharply defined (e.g., “more or less” rather than “yes/no”, “x has 
a value around a” rather than x = a) or the classification intervals are not well defined 
(i.e., continuous scale rather than discrete scale). The imprecise meaning of words such 
as “good”, “safe”, and “reddish” are examples of uncertainty based on linguistic 
vagueness.  
Ambiguity arises when a word has a meaning that depends on the context of the 
statement. For instance, the expression “the bridge is open” presents uncertainty because 
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it is not possible to understand if the draw-bridge is open to road traffic or to ships 
(Lootsma, 1997). In this sense, safety is also an ambiguous concept because it is context 
dependent. For instance, chlorofluorocarbons are inherently safer with respect to 
ammonia as refrigerant gases because they are not explosive or flammable, however in 
terms of environmental impact are inherently unsafer due to effects on the Earth’s ozone 
layer. 
Fuzziness originates from the imprecise nature of abstract concepts and thoughts 
rather than from the random properties of an event. Fuzzy logic does not deal with the 
likelihood that a specific outcome will be observed but deals with the degree of how 
much the outcome is similar to a particular category. As indicated by Almond (1995), 
fuzzy logic allows working with imprecision and real-world, vague engineering 
problems that would otherwise be rejected by the traditional statistical methodologies. 
Safety is a fuzzy concept because it defies exact definition. Furthermore, “safety” 
cannot strictly be classified into the dichotomy safe/unsafe (e.g., Is the plant safe?). A 
chemical plant is not safe or unsafe on an absolute basis; hazards cannot be totally 
eliminated, hence a plant will always have a certain quantity of hazards or a certain 
degree of “unsafeness” that cannot be described by a Boolean (i.e., yes/no, safe/unsafe) 
approach. A methodology with gradual non-discrete transitions is required (e.g., How 
safe is the plant?). Safety hazards should not be modeled by a statistical approach, 
because their uncertainty is not caused by randomness but by fuzziness, vagueness, and 
ambiguity. Additionally, some events are rare and it is not possible to calculate reliable 
incident probabilities.  
Fuzzy Set Theory and fuzzy logic offer an alternative mathematical framework where 
vague and imprecise concepts and phenomena can be rigorously modeled and analyzed 
by allowing an element to belong simultaneously to more than one category or set. A 
chemical plant that is “more or less” safe belongs to the “safe plants” set and to the 
“unsafe plants” set with different degrees of membership, which is in contrast with the 
common Boolean approach where partial membership in a set is not allowed. 
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4.4.3 Possibility rather than probability 
Fuzzy logic is often confused with the traditional probability theory. This controversy 
is exemplified by a series of seven papers; three are against fuzzy logic (Laviolette et al, 
1995a and 1995b; Cheeseman, 1995) while the others (Almond, 1995; Bonissone, 1995; 
Kandel et al, 1995; Almond, 1995; Zadeh, 1995) recognize that the two approaches, 
fuzzy logic and probability, are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Other 
authors suggest that a possibility distribution can be interpreted as a family of 
probabilities (Natvig, 1983). However, it is important to recognize that probability theory 
and possibility theory aim to solve different problems whose fundamental distinction is 
the type of uncertainty involved. 
Regardless of the mathematical controversy between statistics and fuzzy logic, the 
application of fuzzy set theory to inherent safety quantification, offers the opportunity to 
solve problems and limitation of the indices based on traditional Boolean logic, and at 
the same time it offers a systematic methodology to take into account the uncertainty 
typical of inherent safety evaluation. As noted by Mansfield and Cassidy (1991), in order 
to measure inherent safety, we must develop an index capable of measuring a “degree” 
of “inherent safeness.” Fuzzy logic offers the opportunity to rank plants according to 
their degree of inherent safeness through the concept of membership degree (explained 
in Chapters V and VI). This ranking ability is congruent with the idea that that the 
concept of inherent safety is a relative state and a plant can only be evaluated with 
respect to another plant.  
Inherent safety aims to eliminate the hazards rather than to control them. This 
approach is based on the fact that if a hazard is present, the incident could still occur if 
the protective layers fail during an abnormal situation. In other words, the presence and 
magnitude of the hazard makes the incident possible; obviously if the hazard is 
eliminated, the incident cannot occur. This idea is parallel to the relation between 
probability and possibility: in order for an event to be probable, it has to be possible. 
Although linguistically the two words can be synonyms, mathematically they have 
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different meanings. While probability is associated with statistics and stochastic 
uncertainty, possibility is modeled by fuzzy logic (i.e., possibility theory) and deals with 
vagueness. Human decisions and evaluations are based mainly on possibilistic 
information rather than probabilistic knowledge and this fact shows the importance of 
possibilistic theory (Zadeh, 1999). It is interesting to observe that, except when 
specifically discussing risk assessment or fault tree analysis, the word “possible” is much 
more common than “probable” in “safety discussions.” Ashford and Zwetsloot (2000) 
also recognize the relation between inherent safety and the reduction of incident 
possibility while traditional safety can only prevent incidents hence reducing the 
probability. 
If an event is impossible it is also bounded to be improbable. This heuristic rule is 
known as the possibility/probability consistency principle according to which a 
possibility distribution acts as an upper limit for the probability distribution. While low 
possibility implies low probability, high possibility does not imply high probability nor 
does low probability imply low possibility (Zadeh, 1999). Catastrophic incidents (i.e., 
high consequences but low probability events) are well described by this characteristic of 
the possibility theory. It is often assumed that these incidents are almost impossible 
because they have low probability. However, a measure of the possibility degree can 
only be developed based on the properties of the systems. For instance, an “incident 
waiting to happen” (due to a specific combination of factors) is perceived as a very 
possible event even though it may have low probability.  
Possibility theory and fuzzy logic open a new, and apparently natural, approach to 
inherent safety quantification due to the following properties: 
- Inherent safety is a fuzzy concept that can be modeled with fuzzy logic. 
- The membership function offers the opportunity to rank plants according to their 
degree of safetiness, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
- High hazard implies high incident possibility, but low risk does not necessarily imply 
low possibility, as commonly assumed.  
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Figure 4.5: Unsafe plant cannot belong to the Boolean set of “safe plants”, however 
according to the fuzzy logic approach plants are ranked in the set according to their 
degree of inherent safety measured through the membership function in the fuzzy set 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Applicability of the methodology 
From the history of process safety and from the limitations of inherent safety it 
follows that what is needed is a methodology that could be applied during the early 
stages of plant design by process engineers rather than safety experts (Figure 4.6) as well 
as for existing plants. 
The approach proposed here is derived from knowledge, problems, and limitations 
reported by other researchers. The main ideas upon which the proposed index is built 
are: 
- The inherent safety index proposed here is based on the quantification of the 
magnitude of hazards present in a plant due to the chemicals, operating conditions, 
and  type  of  unit  operations.  This  approach  is  preferred  over a risk minimization  
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approach, because, while low risk can be achieved by protective add-on barriers, low 
hazards imply low risk as well. To simplify the procedure, the inherent safety 
principles are not evaluated individually.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Targeted application of the proposed inherent safety index based on 
fuzzy logic 
 
 
- The inherent safety index should include enough variables and parameters to describe 
the possible hazardous situations and interactions that cannot be detected by more 
simplistic approaches. This index should be useful for the inherent safety analysis of 
plants in advanced design stages or plants in operation. For designs during early 
design stages when the information is incomplete, the index uses default values for 
the required input, which will show high hazard scores to indicate the presence of 
missing information. 
- It is assumed that each piece of equipment contributes an inherent degree of hazard 
due to the interaction and combination of factors (e.g., chemical hazard, operating 
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conditions, and mechanical characteristics). The combination of all these 
contributions should be used, instead of only the worst hazards, to identify 
phenomena such as hazard migration. Chemicals, equipment, and operating 
conditions can be hazardous by themselves; however the hazards inherent in a 
chemical plant are derived from the interaction of hazardous factors. This approach is 
helpful for solving common controversies. For example, process A requires 
flammable but low toxicity chemicals, process B requires noncombustible but 
volatile and moderately toxic chemicals, and process C requires noncombustible 
nontoxic materials at high pressure. By considering single hazards it is evident that 
none of the three processes are hazard-free [Englund, 1995], but by analyzing 
combinations of conditions, process C could be the inherently safer if the vessels are 
designed to withstand the pressure and the vessels are small. This idea is analogous 
to the fact that any chemical is toxic if the dose is high enough. 
- The inherent safety assessment of existing plants requires the understanding of 
hazard migration due to changes performed on productive units. The whole plant 
must be analyzed not only from the processing viewpoint but also from the capital 
and operating cost viewpoint to understand where and how hazards have been 
removed (or created) and the economic impact of the changes. Hazard migration, 
capital cost and operation cost changes due to change toward inherent safety can be 
analyzed when the index is used with process simulation.  
 
4.4.5 Process simulation 
In order to facilitate the application of the proposed methodology during engineering 
design it is necessary to link the procedure to a process simulator. However, this is 
usually not pursued [Koller et al, 2001]. The development of an overall inherent safety 
index based on continuous functions will facilitate the application of inherent safety to 
process simulation and process synthesis. Process simulation is useful for evaluating the 
processing alternatives from the processing requirements. When process simulation is 
linked to cost estimation software, the capital and operating costs can be evaluated, and 
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the results of the analysis can be used by process synthesis to generate better processing 
alternatives based on the technical, environmental, and economic constraints, as shown 
in Figure 4.7. The inherent safety index evaluated during process simulation can be used 
as an additional constraint for the synthesis process, as shown by the dashed line in 
Figure 4.7. The expected advantages of this procedure are the following: 
1) Automated inherent safety evaluation and cost estimation that allow a rapid 
analysis and generation of processing alternatives when process synthesis is carried 
out with a systematic generation of design that follows the economic and safety 
constraints. 
2) Possible application to operative plants allowing the identification of processing 
alternatives according to the cost and environmental constraints. The optimization 
of a process with respect to environmental restrictions is more efficient when 
applied during earlier stages of the life-cycle of a plant. However, as demonstrated 
by El-Halwagi (1997) and Sikdar and El-Halwagi (2001) it is possible to apply the 
same optimization principles to existing plants to obtain more environmentally 
friendly processes. A similar application is expected for the inherent safety 
principles when an inherent safety quantification methodology is available. 
3) The application of process simulation presents the additional advantage of 
permitting analysis of the hazard level of processing areas interconnected to units 
or equipment modified toward an inherently safer design. 
 
4.4.6 Advantages and disadvantages 
The approach presented in this dissertation is expected to solve some of the 
problems and limitations described previously for more traditional inherent safety 
evaluation methods. These advantages can be summarized as: 
- Understanding of different type of uncertainties involved in inherent safety 
evaluation, which are then treated with an appropriate mathematical approach 
based on fuzzy logic and possibility theory. Fuzzy logic allows modeling of 
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uncertainty and subjectivity in a simpler and rigorous way, compared to claimed 
similar (but more complex) models based on traditional statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Application of the proposed inherent safety index for process 
simulation and process synthesis 
 
 
- Solution of the problem relative to lack and excess of sensitivity within and around 
the limits of subranges are eliminated by smooth and gradual transitions provided 
by the fuzzy sets. This approach also eliminates the subjective problem of deciding 
which score should be assigned (or into which adjacent subranges should an 
element be classified) in uncertain situations (e.g., element around the limits of 
subranges). 
- Combination of numerical information as well as subjective evaluations and 
heuristic knowledge into a single rigorous mathematical approach, which allows 
taking into account information that usually is too vague to be translated into 
accurate numerical indices, such as human factors and linguistic knowledge. 
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- Modeling of the factors interaction (described either by numerical data or 
subjective information) by means of IF-THEN rules able to describe general 
knowledge with respect to the relation between two or more variables, which is 
especially useful in process safety analysis because of the lack of numerical data. 
However by means of engineering and expert knowledge, it is possible to develop 
heuristic rules that can be used in a fuzzy inference system. 
- Development of a safety measure based on possibility theory, which is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 
However, the present methodology also presents some disadvantages: 
- Introduction of uncommon mathematical concepts with which most safety 
practitioners are not familiar. Nevertheless, the application of abstract concepts is 
translated into a simple and transparent methodology described in the next sections.  
- Limitations due to lack of numerical data to design the membership functions that 
defines the fuzzy sets. These functions represent the strength of fuzzy logic but at 
the same time they also are the Achilles’ heel when numerical data are not 
available to apply design methodologies that reduce the uncertainty of the 
functions. However, the introduction of technical information and expert 
knowledge is expected to reduce the limitation due to lack of data. Additionally, 
the modular structure of the approach will allow incorporation of updated data and 
knowledge when they become available. 
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4.5 SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
 The hypothesis investigated in this project is work to the evaluation of inherent 
safety based on a novel theoretical background based on concepts borrowed from 
complex systems and inspired by the analysis of the limitations and problems of the 
current process safety and loss prevention state-of-the-art. Inherent safety is explained in 
the context of a system formed by several subsystems characterized by certain properties 
capable of posing hazard to the plant, human beings, and the environment. The modeling 
of hazards and their interactions is based on IF-THEN rules modeled by a hierarchical 
net of fuzzy inference systems.  
The methodology proposed here is based on fuzzy logic and has the objective of 
establishing a bridge between the theory and the “real industrial world” that demands a 
tool easy to use and useful for evaluating processing alternatives to select the alternative 
that poses the lowest overall hazard at a competitive cost. The long-term vision for the 
methodology is the connection to a process simulator and the application to process 
synthesis in order to facilitate not only the design stage but also optimization of the plant 
in terms of safety.  
The methodology is based on a hierarchical structure that allows the combination of 
several factors and at the same time the calculation of sub-indices. For example, sub-
indices for process hazard, environmental hazard, and health hazard are combined to 
form an overall chemical hazard index. The hierarchical structure and the availability of 
sub-indices allow identification of the type of factors with highest impact on the overall 
safety (e.g., operation conditions, mechanical design, chemistry) increasing the flexibility 
of the methodology. Process/equipment changes can target the factors with highest 
hazard contribution and different technologies or different designs can be analyzed in 
terms of their specific and overall safety impact.  
The main goal of this work is the development of a systematic approach for inherent 
safety evaluation by measuring the quantity, type, and interaction of hazards inherent to 
the chemical plant. The specific objectives are: 
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1)  Inherent safety modeling: Identification of the main areas that should be considered 
by the analysis of inherent safety design and development of the structure of the 
index. 
2)  Fuzzy logic modeling: Development of the mathematical methodology based on 
fuzzy logic for inherent safety evaluation and focused on the integration with a 
process simulator. The expected future applications to process optimization also 
require establishing the basis upon which future research can be done. 
3)  Application and testing of the inherent safety index using a case study. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY LOGIC 
 
This section provides a brief introduction to the most important concepts of fuzzy 
logic necessary for understanding the methodology proposed in the next chapters. The 
following references should be consulted for additional information and examples on 
fuzzy logic, fuzzy measure, and possibility theory: Berkan and Trubatch (1997); Klir and 
Folger (1988); Klir and Yuan (1995); Lootsma (1997); Jang et al. (1997); Yen and 
Langari (1999); Tanaka (1996); Zimmermann (1996). 
In the past, the needs of science and classical mechanics forced the development of 
analytical models, to describe the relation of a small number of variables without taking 
into account the uncertainty. The development of statistical mechanics and the lack of 
computational power forced the development of statistical and probabilistic approaches 
which became useful for a wide variety of disciplines.  
Analytical models can be used for problems that have been described by Warren 
Weaver as “organized simplicity”; statistical models are useful for problems of 
disorganized complexity. However, these two types of problems represent only the 
extremes of all the possible situations, but nonlinear problems with a large number of 
correlated variables lie between the extremes and are described by Weaver as organized 
complexity as cited by Klir and Yuan (1995). 
The driving force behind the development and application of fuzzy logic and fuzzy 
models is the recognition that traditional bivalued logic along with crisp (Boolean) sets 
and probability theory are not sufficient to solve real-world problems characterized by 
high uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Several scientific fields are exploring 
fuzzification of otherwise unsolvable problems and by doing so they are gaining the 
flexibility of dealing with non-random uncertainty and imprecision originated from the 
complexity of the system (i.e., stress distribution in a body with complex geometry) as 
cited by Klir and Yuan (1995). 
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Inherent safety presents the characteristics of an organized complexity system where 
a large number of variables interact with each other in a non-linear fashion. Uncertainty 
is non-statistical in principle and is caused by a large number of factors and variables 
that characterize a specific design. One of the objectives of the present project is the 
fuzzification of the problem of inherent safety quantification through the application of 
the narrow sense of “fuzzy logic” or fuzzy modeling. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO CRISP SETS AND CRISP RELATIONS 
 
The theory of fuzzy logic is parallel to the theory of Boolean sets, which is more 
commonly used and known by the general public. Because of this familiarity, important 
concepts of set theory are introduced in this section for crisp sets, while in the next 
section they are expanded to fuzzy set theory. 
 
5.1.1 Introduction to crisp sets 
Boolean logic is based on the idea of classical sets that are characterized by a crisp 
(nonfuzzy) boundary and are represented as a collection of elements ai:  
 
A={a1, a2, ...,an} 
 
where all the elements a1, a2, ...,an within the set A are listed. Alternatively, a classical 
set is represented as: 
A = {x| P(x)} 
 
where the element x belongs to the set A only and only if the proposition P(x) is true. 
For crisp sets the proposition P(x) can only be true or false establishing the dichotomy 
associated with classical logic. This same dichotomy is expressed by the characteristic 
function χA  that indicates whether the element x belongs to the set or not:  
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                                                  χA  (x) =   
                  
 
and takes a value χA  (x)= 1 when P(x) is true and a value χA  (x)= 0 when the proposition 
P(x) is not satisfied. Hence the characteristic function maps elements x of the Universal 
set X to a two-element set {0, 1}: 
 
χA  : X → {0, 1}       where     x∈ X 
 
Some general sets commonly used are: 
- Set of all integers:    Z = {...,-2,-1,0,1,2,...} 
- Set of natural numbers:   N = {1,2,3,...} 
- Set of nonnegative integers:  N0 = {0,1,2,3,...} 
- Set of n nonnegative integers:  Nn = {0,1,2,3,...n} 
- Set of all real numbers:   R 
- Universal set:    X 
- Empty set:     φ 
- Ordered n-tuple of elements:  (x1, x2, x3, ..., xn} 
- Power set (family of all subsets of A):  P(A) 
 
For a set A with a finite number of elements, the cardinality is denoted by |A| and 
indicates the number of elements within A. For any two classical sets A and B the 
following definitions are established: 
- A ⊆ B   when all elements of A belong to B, hence A is a subset of B (A is included 
in B) 
- A = B   when both sets contain the same elements, hence A and B are equal sets 
- A  B when at least one element is contained in only one set 
- A ⊂ B   when B contains at least one element that does not belong to A (A  B), 
hence A is a proper subset of B. 
1 for x ∈ A 
0  for x ∉ A 
 80 
 
The operations possible on two classical sets A and B, and the Universal set X are 
defined as: 
- Relative complement of A with respect to B :      B – A ={x| x ∈ B and x ∉ A} 
- Absolute complement of A with respect to X:  A={x| x ∈ X and x ∉ A} 
- Union of two sets A and B:   B ∪ A ={x| x ∈ B or x ∈ A} 
- Intersection of two sets A and B:   B ∩ A ={x| x ∈ B and x ∈ A} 
 
For a family of sets {Ai|i ∈ I} the Union operation can be generalized as: 
 

I∈ i
Ai={x|x ∈ Ai for some Ai ∈ I} 
 
and the intersection operation is generalized by: 
 

I∈ i
Ai={x|x ∈ Ai for some Ai ∈ I} 
 
The properties of crisp sets are the following:     
- Involution:       A  =A 
- Commutativity:   A ∪ B = B ∪ A  A ∩ B = B ∩ A   
- Associativity:      (A ∪ B) ∪ C  = A ∪ (B ∪ C)         (A ∩ B) ∩ C  = A ∩ (B ∩ C) 
- Distributivity:       A ∩ (B ∪ C)= (A ∩ B) ∪ (A ∩ C)      A ∪ (B ∩ C)= (A ∪ B) ∩ (A ∪ C) 
- Idempotence:               A ∪ A = A       A ∩ A = A  
- Absorption:               A ∪ (A ∩ B) = A A n (A ∪ B) = A 
- Absorption of complement:       A ∪ ( ∩ B) = A ∪ B A n ( ∪ B) = A ∩ B 
- Absorption by X and φ:           A ∪ X = X  A ∩ φ = φ 
- Identity:                    A ∩ X = A       A ∪ φ = A 
- Law of contradiction:                                       A ∩  = φ 
- Law of the excluded middle:    A ∪  = X 
- DeMorgan’s laws:               A ∩ B = A ∪ B  A ∪ B = B ∩ A  
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5.1.2 Introduction to crisp relations 
The presence or absence of interaction between elements of two or more crisp sets is 
known as a crisp relation, which is a subset of a Cartesian product. If X and Y are two 
crisp sets, their Cartesian product X x Y is given by: 
 
X x Y ={(x, y)| x ∈ X and y ∈ Y} 
 
The crisp set X x Y is formed by all possible ordered pairs of elements x and y where 
the first element belongs to X and the second to Y. Additionally, if X  Y then the 
Cartesian products X x Y and Y x Y will be different. In general, for a family of crisp 
sets {X1, X2, ..., Xn} the Cartesian product among the sets is defined as: 
 
                  X Xi = X1 x X2 x ...x Xn = {(x1, x2,...,xn)| xi ∈ Xi for all I ∈ Nn} 
                                  i∈ Nn 
 
When a crisp relation exists among certain elements of the Cartesian product,          
X Xi∈Nn is indicated as R(Xi| I ∈ Nn) or: 
 
R(X1, X2, ..., Xn ) ⊂ X1 x X2 x ...x Xn 
 
As any other crisp set, the crisp relation R is defined by a characteristic function that 
describes whether an element (i.e., n-tuple) belongs to R or not: 
 
 
                                      µR  (x1, x2,...,xn) =    
      
 
When the membership of a tuple is one (e.g., µR  (x1, x2,...,xn)=1) the elements x1, 
x2,...,xn are mutually related. An example of a binary relation is given by the set of 
women (X) and men (Y). If the relation R(X x Y) = {(x,y)| x and y are married} is 
if and only if (x1, x2,...,xn) ∈ R  
0   otherwise 
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defined by the set of married persons, then among all the possible pairings xy only 
married couples belong to R where x is married to y and vice versa. If Mary is married to 
Bob and Cindy is married to Greg, then R(Mary, Bob)=1 and R(Cindy, Greg)=1, but 
R(Mary, Greg)=0 and R(Cindy, Bob)=0. When three, four, five or n sets are related, then 
the respective relations are called ternary, quaternary, quinary, or n-ary. The relations 
between n crisp sets are conveniently represented by n-dimensional arrays of zeros and 
ones. For example: 
 
X x R Y 
 Bob Greg 
X Mary 1 0 
 Cindy 0 1 
 
 
When the value of the membership function µR can receive values smaller than one, 
a fuzzy relation is established allowing partial membership [Klir and Juan, 1995]. 
 
 
5.2 INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY SETS  
 
This section introduces the basic concepts of fuzzy logic by extending and modifying 
the principles explained for crisp sets. 
 
5.2.1 Introduction to fuzzy sets 
 
As described above, a crisp set is defined by the characteristic function χA that takes 
values of one or zero when an element x respectively belongs or does not belong to the 
set A. The characteristic function can be generalized (i.e., µÂ) by assigning real values 
within the closed interval [0,1]. In this case when the function has a value of zero or one 
it is reduced to the specific limiting case where it is the characteristic function for crisp 
set, indicating respectively full non-membership into the set or complete membership. 
When the function takes any real value between zero and one, it indicates partial degrees 
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of membership of the element x into the set Â. This generalized characteristic function is 
known as membership function, µ
 Â defined a: 
 
 µ
 Â  : X → [0, 1]       where     x∈ X 
 
The membership is defined over the closed interval [0,1] and because it can be 
partial the set is known as Fuzzy set and is denoted by Â. It is important to note that 
while µ(x)
 Â indicates the membership of the element x into the fuzzy set Â,              
µ(xi)R = µ( x1, x2,...,xn )R  represents the crisp membership of an n-tuple into the crisp 
relation R. Alternatively, a fuzzy set Â is a set of ordered pairs represented as: 
 
Â ={(x, µ
 Â (x))| x ∈ X} 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, fuzzy sets are helpful to describe 
vague concepts. However the representation of the concepts in terms of a membership 
function depends not only on the definition of the concept by itself, but also on the 
context of the idea. An example of this is given by the idea of “high temperature” which 
can be interpreted in several contexts. High temperature for a human body is given by   
T > 40 °C, while high temperature for a chemical process plant could be as high as 
900°C. Thus the concept “high temperature” is defined by different membership 
functions specific for each context. 
The difference between a crisp and a fuzzy set is shown in Figure 5.1 where the 
characteristic functions are plotted. Set A, defined by its characteristic function χA, 
presents well defined boundaries while the fuzzy set Â, defined by its membership 
function µÂ, presents a gradual transition between regions of high membership (i.e.,       
µ
 Â (x) 1) and regions of low membership (i.e., µ Â (x)  0) or no membership (i.e.,       
µ
 Â (x)=0). 
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Figure 5.1: Difference between a crisp set and a fuzzy set 
 
 
 
Fuzzy sets can be classified in several types, the most common being the ordinary 
fuzzy sets (also known as Type 1), interval-valued fuzzy sets, and Type 2 fuzzy sets. For 
ordinary fuzzy sets, the definition is given by the function A: X → [0, 1] which assigns a 
precise membership value to each point on the universe of discourse. As shown in Figure 
5.2, for the input x=c the value of the membership function for a fuzzy set Type 1 is 
exactly µ
 Â (c).  
However, when rather than a precise value, the membership of the point varies 
between an upper and lower value, the membership function can be defined by a family 
of intervals over the universe of discourse described as A: X → [0, 1]. In Figure 5.2, for 
a fuzzy set Type 2, for each value x=a, the value of the membership function varies in 
the closed interval [µU(a), µL(a)]. The expressive potential offered by interval-valued and 
Type 2 fuzzy sets is higher with respect to Type 1 fuzzy sets, nevertheless the 
computational complexity increases, being highest for Type 2 sets; however the 
theoretical background for Type 2 fuzzy set is still limited. Type 1 fuzzy sets offer 
descriptive power and the low degree of computational complexity, therefore are used 
for this project. 
µΑ = 1 
Crisp set   A 
a b 
µÂ(c) = 1 
µÂ = 0 
Fuzzy set Â 
a b c 
Crisp 
boundary 
Fuzzy 
boundary 
µΑ = 0 
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Figure 5.2: Difference between a fuzzy set Type 1 and Type 2 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Terminology and basic definitions for fuzzy sets  
 
As defined above, a fuzzy set Â is a set of ordered pairs represented as: 
 
Â ={(x, µÂ (x))| x ∈ X} 
 
where µÂ (x) are the membership degrees of the elements x within the fuzzy set Â. X is 
the universe of discourse of the set or the numerical range that contains all the possible 
values taken by the elements x that belong to X. The universe of discourse can be 
classified into three types depending on the type of variable that describes: 
- Discrete non-ordered: this universe of discourse is used to model variables formed 
by unrelated objects or classes. For example, let X={x1,x2,x3}={water, steam, heat 
transfer fluid} and =”safe coolant for a specific application” hence, the set of 
ordered pairs is  ={(x, µ (x))| x ∈ X}={(water, 0.8), (steam, 0.7), (heat transfer 
fluid, 0.9)}, where the membership degrees µ (xi) are assigned according to some 
subjective expert evaluation. 
- Discrete ordered: the modeled variable For example, let 
X={x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6}={0,1,2,3,4,5,6}be the number of hazardous chemicals in a plant 
b x 
µÂ(b)=0.5 
a c 
µÂ(c)=1 
Fuzzy set Type 1  Fuzzy set Type 2  
µÂ(b)=[0.3 0.5] 
µÂ(x) µÂ(x) 
x 
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and  =”number of hazardous chemicals in a low hazard process.” The set of ordered 
pairs is ={(x, µ (x))| x ∈ X}={(0, 0.1),(1,0.4),(2,0.7),(3,1.0),(4,0.5), 
(5,0.2),(6,0.1)}, and the membership degrees µ
  (xi) are assigned according to some 
subjective expert evaluation. An alternative notation for this type of fuzzy set is 
 
 = xi∈X  µA(xi)/xi = µA(x1)/x1+ µA(x2)/x2+ µA(x3)/x3+. . . + µA(xn)/xn 
 
It must be noted that the summation symbol symbolizes the union of the discrete 
membership values, while the division symbol (i.e., /) separates the value of the 
variable from the value of its membership degree. 
- Continuous: For example, let X ={Set of possible ages of human beings} and            
 = “average age of petrochemical operators is about 56 years” The fuzzy set  is 
expressed as  = (x, µ
  (x))| x ∈ X} = 1/(1+((x-56)/10)4). An alternative notation for 
this type of fuzzy set is: 
 =X  µA(x)/x =X  f(x)/x 
 
Once again it should be noted that the integral sign symbolizes the union of the 
membership values and does not indicate a mathematical integration procedure. 
Similarly, the division symbol (i.e., /) separates the value of the variable from the 
value of its membership degree and does not indicate mathematical division [Jang et 
al, 1997]. 
 
For this research only continuous universe of discourse are used. The range covered 
by the universe of discourse X is partitioned into overlapping subranges delimited by the 
membership function µÂ, as shown in Figure 5.1. Each membership function defines a 
fuzzy set and receives a linguistic label (name) that assigns the linguistic value to the set. 
Therefore, the variable described by fuzzy sets and defined over a specific context-
dependent universe of discourse is known as “linguistic variable”. For instance, a 
continuous variable such as temperature, defined in the context of a living human being, 
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has a universe of discourse between 25 °C (lower survival limit) and 44 °C (upper 
survival limit). The universe of discourse of the linguistic variable “human body 
temperature” can be divided into seven fuzzy sets as shown in Figure 5.3, whose 
linguistic labels (or linguistic values) are “extreme hypothermia”, “severe hypothermia”, 
“light hypothermia”, ”normal”, “fever”, “hyperthermia”, and “severe hyperthermia”. 
Each range of abnormal temperature has medical significance and requires different 
treatment. 
Fuzzy sets must present some degree of overlap in order to establish a smooth 
transition between the partitions of the universe of discourse. Each linguistic variable is 
characterized by a quintuple (v, T, X, g, m) where v is the linguistic name of the variable; 
T represents the set of linguistic labels t ∈T of the fuzzy sets defined over the range of 
the universe of discourse X; g represents syntactic or grammar rules able to generate 
linguistic terms; and m represents semantic rules that assign a meaning (fuzzy set) to 
each linguistic label t [Klir and Yuan, 1995]. From the example shown in Figure 5.3,      
v = “human body temperature”, T = {“extreme hypothermia”, “severe hypothermia”, 
“light hypothermia”, ”normal”, “fever”, “hyperthermia”, “severe hyperthermia”},          
X = [25 44], g generates other linguistic labels such as “high fever” or “very high fever”, 
and m assigns a fuzzy set with a specific shape to each linguistic term t ∈T. 
Each fuzzy set Â is defined over a specific subrange of the universe of discourse and 
the set of points where the membership function µÂ (x) has a value larger than zero is 
known as support of the fuzzy set: 
 
support (Â) = {x| µÂ (x) > 0}  where  x ∈ X 
 
For example, the support for the fuzzy set “fever” is [38 42] over the centigrade 
temperature scale. Similarly, the core of a fuzzy set Â occurs where the value of µ
 Â (x) 
has a value of 1: 
core (Â) = {x| µÂ (x) = 1}  where  x ∈ X 
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Figure 5.3: Example of linguistic variable (human body temperature) and linguistic 
values (e.g., extreme hypothermia) 
 
 
 
For example, the core for the fuzzy set “fever” is [39] over the centigrade 
temperature scale while the core for the set “normal” is 37 °C. Depending on the shape 
of the fuzzy set, the core can be a range (e.g., for a trapezoidal set), a single point (hence 
the fuzzy set becomes a singleton or a triangular function), or nonexistent (e.g., for a 
subnormal set). 
A singleton is a fuzzy set with a support X containing a single element x               
(i.e., X = {x}) with a full membership µÂ(x) = 1. The height of a fuzzy set is given by 
the value of the largest membership degree within the set: 
 
Height(Â) = h(Â) = sup Â (x)  where  x ∈ X 
Thuman 
µ (T) = 1 
Extreme 
hypothermia 
µ (T) 
Severe 
hypothermia 
Light 
hypothermia 
NORMAL 
Fever 
Hyperthermia 
Severe 
hyperthermia 
HUMAN BODY 
TEMPERATURE 
25 °C 44 °C 37.4 
°C 39 °C 
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When a fuzzy set Â has a Height(Â) = 1 or, in other words has a non-empty core 
(i.e., there is at least one point x where µÂ(x) = 1), it is known as normal set. When 
Height(Â) < 1 then Core(Â) = 0 and the set is known as subnormal. Although a fuzzy set 
can be defined with maximum membership occurring at any value (e.g., Height(Â) = 8), 
by convention normalized sets are defined based on height values of one. The values x 
where Height(x) = 0.5 are known as crossover points or equilibrium points and are 
defined as: 
crossover (Â) = {x| µÂ (x) = 0.5}  where  x ∈ X 
 
Another property of the crossover point is that the membership value of the set Â is 
the same as the membership value of the complement Â  (i.e., Â (x) =1- Â(x)). 
When a fuzzy set Â defined on X is intersected by a horizontal line at            
Height(x) = α, where α∈ [0,1], the part of the set above the line is a crisp set known as 
strong α-cut, Â’α ,and is defined as: 
Â’α = {x| µÂ (x) > α}  where  x ∈ X 
 
A variant of the strong α-cut occurs when the line µÂ (x) = α is included into the crisp 
set, and the α-cut Â
 α is defined as: 
 
Â
 α = {x| µÂ (x)  α}  where  x ∈ X 
 
By applying the previous definition, the support of a fuzzy set Â is the same as the 
strong α-cut set when α=0 (i.e support (Â) = Â
 α=0 ={x| µ Â (x)  α = 0}  where  x ∈ X) 
while the core of Â is given by the α-cut when α = 1. Both types of α-set follow the 
inclusion property: 
Â
 α=1 ⊇ Â α=2 ⊇ Â α=3     where  α1<α2<α3 
Â’α=1 ⊇ Â’α=2 ⊇ Â’α=3     where  α1<α2<α3 
 
Another form of this property is given by the following equations: 
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Â
 α=1 ∩  Â α=2= Â α=2   and Â α=1∪ Â α=2= Â α=1  
Â’α=1 ∩  Â’α=2= Â’α=2   and Â’α=1 ∪  Â’α=2= Â’α=1  
 
An important requirement of fuzzy set is convexity defined by [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
 
µ
 Â (λx1+(1-λ)x2)  min{µA (x1), µA (x2)} 
 
where x1 and x2∈X and λ∈[0,1]. According to the previous definition, the convex 
combination (i.e., (λx1+(1-λ)x2)) of any two points x1 and x2 that belong to a set Â, 
should be part of the set. In other words, it is required that each crisp α-set Â
 α  is formed 
by a single line, implying that zones of low membership cannot be located between two 
zones of high membership. The definition of set convexity is less strict than the 
definition of convexity for a mathematical function f(x)  
 
f(λx1+(1-λ)x2)  λf(x1)+(1-λ)f(x2) 
 
hence a fuzzy set Â can be convex while its membership function µÂ could be non 
convex according to the conventional definition of function convexity.  
 
5.2.3  Relation between fuzzy sets and crisp sets 
The concepts of α-cuts (Âα) and strong α-cuts (Â’α) introduced above creates a 
connecting bridge between fuzzy and crisp sets [Klir and Yuan, 1995]. Any fuzzy set 
Â
 
can be generated either form the family of all α-cuts or strong α-cuts (which are crisp 
sets) hence the properties of crisp sets are extended to fuzzy sets. When the properties 
generalized from crisp to fuzzy sets are preserved in all α-cuts Â
 α  for α∈(0,1] they are 
called cutworthy while if they are preserved only in the strong α-cuts Â’α  for α∈[0,1] 
they are called strong cutworthy property.  
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5.2.4  Extension principle 
In order to generalize the concept of mathematical function to the fuzzy set domain, 
the extension principle is applied with the objective of extending the crisp one-to-one 
mapping to fuzzy sets. According to this principle, when a mathematical function is 
applied to fuzzy sets, it operates over each element of the set [Klir and Yuan, 1995]. If f 
is a function mapping the domain of X to Y, and if Â is a fuzzy set defined on X as       
Â = µÂ(x1)/x1 +  µÂ(x2)/x2 + ... + µÂ(xn)/xn  then a fuzzy set Ê defined on Y is the image 
of Â on Y and is obtained by Ê = µÊ (x1)/y1 +  µÊ (x2)/y2 + ... + µÊ (xn)/yn  where vi = f(xi) 
for   i = 1...n. N 
When f is a function mapping many-to-one then it is possible that there exist several 
elements xi with same image yi = f(xi). If for x1,x2∈X, f(x1) =  f(x2) = y*∈Y, then the 
degree of membership of Ê(y) defined on Y at y  =  y* is the same as the highest degree 
of membership of Â evaluated at x = x1 or x = x1. This is generally indicated as:       
µÊ(y) = max µÊ(x) where x  =  f -1(y). As an example, if Â = 0.1/-2+0.4/- 1 + 0.8/0 + 
0.9/1 + 0.3/2 and f(x) = x2-3, then Ê(y)  =  0.1/f(-2) + 0.4/ f(-1) + 0.8/ f(0) + 0.9/f(1) + 
0.3/f(2) or Ñ(y) = 0.1/1 + 0.4/-2 + 0.8/-3 + 0.9/-2 + 0.3/1. However, after applying the 
function to the membership degrees of the fuzzy set Â there are two different 
membership values for values of y = 1 and for y = -2. In this case the extension principle 
requires the choice of the highest membership value: Ê(y) = (0.1 V 0.3)/1 + (0.4 V 0.9)/-
2 + 0.8/-3 = 0.8/-3 + 0.9/-2 + 0.3/1. 
The extension principle can be applied also to continuous universes and 
membership functions, however when there is a many-to-one mapping the max operator 
(i.e., selecting the highest membership value) can cause discontinuities in the resultant 
membership function over Y. In general, if f is a crisp function f(x1, x2, x3, ... xn) = y 
mapping from an n-dimensional Cartesian product X = X1 x X2 x ... x Xn to a one-
dimensional universe Y, and if Â
 1... Â n are fuzzy sets defined respectively on X1...Xn 
then the resultant fuzzy set Ê(y) induced over Y is given by: 
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                   µÊ (y) =   
                                                              
 
 
In the previous definition the min operator is used because each element of the input 
vector (x1, x2,...,xn) occurs simultaneously implying an AND operation. 
 
 
5.3 INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND STANDARD OPERATIONS FOR 
FUZZY SETS 
 
The generalization of the classical set operations (i.e., complement, intersection, and 
union) result in the respective standard fuzzy operations, which behave as their crisp 
counterpart when the membership functions are restricted to the normalized set of two 
elements {0,1}. The generalization is possible because the characteristic functions for 
fuzzy and crisp sets are equivalent. The following definitions apply for fuzzy sets 
operations: 
- Standard fuzzy complement :  Â  (x)=1- Â(x)        for all x ∈ X 
- Standard fuzzy  union of two sets Â and Ê:   (Â ∪ Ê)(x) = max[Â(x), Ê(x)]    for 
all x ∈ X 
- Standard fuzzy intersection of two sets Â and Ê:     (Â ∩ Ê)(x) = min[Â (x), Ê(x)]    
for all x ∈ X 
    
The standard fuzzy intersection is represented by the logical AND and modeled by the 
min operator; the standard fuzzy union is represented by the logic OR and modeled by 
the max operator. However, contrary to the classical set operations, in the case of fuzzy 
sets the definitions of the operations are context-dependent and several functions for 
each fuzzy operation can qualify as a generalization of the related classical operation. 
The definition of the operations depends on its empirical justification based on intuitive 
arguments or axiomatic concepts.  The family of definitions for fuzzy intersection is 
     max[min(µÂ (x1),..., µ Â (xn)]      if   f -1(y)  0   otherwise 
      
 (x1, x2,...,xn)= f -1(y) 
 
     0                                                  if   f -1(y) = 0 
 93 
known as t-norms (triangular norms) while the family of functions for a fuzzy union is 
known as t-conorms or s-norms. In spite of the variety of functions, the standard 
definitions offer attractive properties being the only operations that follow the cutworthy 
and strong cutworthy properties [Klir and Yuan, 1995]. 
 
5.3.1 Fuzzy complement 
If Â is a fuzzy set for all x∈X, then µÂ(x) indicates the degree to which each element 
x belongs to the set Â. If c is a complement function and is applied to Â, then cÂ is the 
type c complement of Â, and µcÂ(x) indicates the membership degree of x into the 
complement set cÂ. Alternatively, µcÂ(x) indicates how much x does not belong to Â, 
while µÂ(x) indicates how much x does not belong to the set cÂ. The complement 
operator c is a continuous function c: [0,1]→[0,1] that for each element x in Â with 
membership degree µÂ(x) assigns a new membership degree µc Â(x) on the set cÂ (i.e., 
c(µÂ(x)) = µcÂ(x)). 
 
5.3.2 Introduction to the triangular norms  
The concept of triangular norms was developed from the theory of probabilistic 
metric spaces by Menger in 1942 as cited by Pedrycz and Gomide (1998) and then 
developed by several mathematicians during the decade of the ‘80s and early ‘90s. When 
applied to fuzzy logic, triangular norms form the basis for the general classes of fuzzy 
sets operations for intersection and union. A triangular norm, known as t-norm, is a 
binary operation defined by   t: [0,1]2 → [0,1]   and that satisfies the following 
requirements: 
i. Monotonicity:  for   x  y   and   w  z   then   x t w  y t z 
ii. Commutativity: x t y = y t x 
iii. Associativity:  x t (y t z) = (x t y) t z 
iv. Boundary conditions: (0 t 1) = 0 and  (1 t x) = x 
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Another construct associated with the triangular norm, is the triangular co-norm, 
known as s-norm, which is a binary operation defined by   s: [0,1]2 → [0,1]   and that 
satisfies the following requirements: 
i. Monotonicity:  for   x  y   and   w  z   then   x s w  y s z 
ii. Commutativity: x s y = y s x 
iii. Associativity:  x s (y s z) = (x s y) s z 
iv. Boundary conditions: (0 s1) = 1 and (1 s x) = 1 
 
From the properties of t-norms and s-norms it is clear that the standard fuzzy 
intersection operator, defined by the min operator, is a t-norm while the standard fuzzy 
union operation, defined by the max operator, is a s-norm. t-norms and s-norms are 
related by the fact that: 
 
x s y = 1-(1-x) t (1-y)     and      x t y = 1-(1-x) s (1-y) 
 
and when rewritten as: 
 
1-(x s y) = (1-x) t (1-y)     and      1-(x t y) = (1-x) s (1-y) 
 
the relations are recognized as the De Morgan’s laws which are followed by fuzzy sets in 
the form of the standard fuzzy complement (i.e Â (x) = 1-Â(x)) which is involutive, 
because the complement of the complement of a fuzzy set Â is the original set Pedrycz 
and Gomide (1998). 
 
5.3.3  Fuzzy intersections: t-norms 
If Â is a fuzzy set for all x ∈ X, then µÂ (x) indicates the degree to which each 
element x belongs to the set Â. If Ê is a fuzzy set for all x ∈ X, then µÊ (x) indicates the 
degree to which each element x belongs to the set Ê. The intersection of the two fuzzy 
sets Â and Ê is defined by a function i: [0,1]x[0,1]→[0,1] that for each element x ∈ X 
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takes the degrees of membership µÂ (x) and µÊ (x) and assigns a new degree of 
membership µÂ ∩ Ê (x)  into the set (Â ∩ Ê), or in other words:  
 
(Â ∩ Ê)(x) = i[(µÂ (x) ∩ µ Ê (x)] = µÂ ∩ Ê (x) 
 
 As in the case of the fuzzy complement, the functions for the fuzzy intersection 
must follow specific intuitive axioms in order to produce meaningful results. One of the 
most studied functions for fuzzy intersection is known as t-norm and has been accepted 
as equivalent to the class of fuzzy intersection. As mentioned previously only the 
membership values simplified as µÂ(x) = a and µÊ(x) = n where a,b,n ∈[0,1] will be 
used. The axioms for fuzzy intersection are the following: 
i. Boundary conditions: i(a,1) = a    
ii. Monotonicity:  for all a,b,d ∈ [0,1], if b  d then i(a,b)   i(a,d) 
iii. Commutativity: i(a,b) = i(b,a) 
iv. Associativity:  i(a,i(b,d)) = i(i(a,b),d) 
v. Continuity:  i is a continuous function 
vi. Subidempotency: i(a,a) < a 
vii. Strict monotonicity: a1 < a2 and b1 < b2 then i(a1,b1) < i(a2,b2) 
 
The first four axioms (i.e., (i) to (iv)) are known as the “axiomatic skeleton for fuzzy 
intersections/t-norms”. These axioms require that when the sets are crisp their 
intersection follows the classical definitions: i(0,1) = 0 and i(1,1) = 1 are implied by 
axiom (i). When the degree of membership of either fuzzy set Â or Ê increase, the result 
of the intersection of both sets cannot increase as indicated by axiom (ii) requires that 
i(0,0) = 0 and axiom (iii) that requires that i(1,0) = 0. Additionally, the commutativity 
axiom ensures that intersection is a symmetric operation hence independent on the 
combination order of the sets. Intuitively the intersection, when one of the elements 
shows full membership, should be equal to the other membership value. When the 
intersection operation occurs over more than two sets, axiom (iv) ensures that the 
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operation can be performed by pairwise grouping in any order. This axiom allows 
performing the intersection of several fuzzy sets in a recursive form. 
Axioms (v), (vi), and (vii) reduce the class of fuzzy intersection (t-norms) by setting 
additional requirements. Axiom (v) avoids discontinuities by ensuring that the result of 
the fuzzy intersection is not strongly affected by small variations in the membership 
degree of either one of the pair of fuzzy sets being intersected. Axiom (vi) is a weaker 
requirement compared to idempotency (i.e., i(a,a) = a) hence it is called subidempotency 
and implies that the intersection of two sets with the same membership degree cannot 
exceed that value. A stronger requirement for monotonicity is expressed by axiom (vii).  
The standard fuzzy intersection is the only idempotent t-norm (i.e., i(a,a) = a). Other 
commonly used t-norms for fuzzy intersections are [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
- Standard intersection: i(a,b) = min(a,b) 
- Algebraic product:  i(a,b) = ab 
- Bounded difference: i(a,b) = max(0,a+b-1) 
 
- Drastic product:  i(a,b) = 
 
 
 
Triangular norms cannot be linearly ordered, however fuzzy intersection t-norms are 
bounded between the drastic product and the min operator which is the standard 
definition for fuzzy intersection [Klir and Yuan, 1995]:  
 
imin(a,b)  max(0,a +  b-1)  ab  min(a,b) for all a,b ∈ [0,1]. 
 
In order to give the flexibility to adapt to different contexts, authors have developed 
parameterized families of t-norms. An example of this is the intersection operator 
proposed by Yager and defined by Klir and Yuan (1995). Other classes of parameterized 
functions for the fuzzy intersection have been reported in the literature and for additional 
information the reader is referred to Zimmerman (1996) and Klir and Yuan (1995). The 
a  if b = 1 
b  if a = 1  
0  otherwise 
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latter reference includes a discussion on increasing and decreasing generators for the 
construction of t-norms. It is important to recognize that although there exist several 
classes of operators for the fuzzy intersection, when the membership degrees are 
restricted to the range [0,1] they perform exactly in the same or similar form as for 
instance the algebraic product and the min-operator.  
 
5.3.4  Fuzzy unions: t-conorms or s-norms  
If Â is a fuzzy set for all x∈X, then µÂ(x) indicates the degree to which each element 
x belongs to the set Â, while for all x ∈ X, µÊ(x) indicates the degree to which each 
element x belongs to the fuzzy set Ê. The union of the two fuzzy sets Â  and Ê is defined 
by a function u: [0,1]x[0,1]→[0,1] that for each element x ∈ X takes the degrees of 
membership µÂ (x) and µÊ(x) and assigns a new degree of membership µÂ ∪Ñ (x) into the 
set (Â ∪ Ê), or in other words:  
 
(Â ∪ Ê)(x) = u[(µÂ (x) ∪ µÑ(x)] = µÂ ∪Ñ(x) 
 
As in the previous case axioms for the fuzzy union must be satisfied in order to 
guarantee meaningful results and t-conorms or s-norms u are used to model fuzzy union. 
The fuzzy union is a binary operation on the unit interval [0,1] that satisfies the 
following axioms for the membership values µÂ(x) = a and µÊ(x) = n where a, b,             
n ∈ [0,1]: 
i. Boundary conditions: u(a,0) = a    
ii. Monotonicity:  for all a,b,d ∈ [0,1], if b  d then u(a,b)  u(a,d) 
iii. Commutativity: u(a,b) = u(b,a) 
iv. Associativity:  u(a,u(b,d)) = u(u(a,b),d) 
v. Continuity:  u is a continuos function 
vi. Superidempotency: u(a,a) > a 
vii. Strict monotonicity: a1 < a2 and b1 < b2 then u(a1,b1) < u(a2,b2) 
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Axioms (i) to (iv) are known as the axiomatic skeleton for fuzzy unions/t-conorms, 
and when compared with the axiomatic skeleton for fuzzy intersection it is clear that the 
only difference is in the boundary condition (i.e., for fuzzy intersection i(a,1) = 1). 
Axioms (i) to (iii) require that the fuzzy union is reduced to the classical set union when 
the sets A and N are crisp (i.e., u(0,0) = 0, u(0,1) = u(1,0) = 0, and u(1,1) = 1). Axioms 
(v) to (vi) are analogous to the axioms for fuzzy intersection except by the requirement 
of superidempotency rather than subidempotency as in the case for intersection [Klir and 
Yuan, 1995]. Examples of t-conorms commonly used for fuzzy intersection are the 
following; however, the only idempotent t-conorm is the standard fuzzy union (i.e., 
u(a,a) = a): 
- Standard intersection: u(a,b) = max(a,b) 
- Algebraic sum:  u(a,b) = a + b - ab 
- Bounded sum:  u(a,b) = min(1,a + b) 
 
- Drastic union:  u(a,b) =  
 
 
5.3.5  Aggregations operations 
When several fuzzy sets must be combined into one single set, aggregation operators 
are used. An example of the problem is the calculation of the overall performance of a 
student expressed in terms of percentages by aggregating the grades obtained in three 
courses, expressed in terms of linguistic labels such as very high, high, average, low, and 
very low.   
The aggregation of n fuzzy sets Â1 , Â 2... Â i... Â n , where n ≥ 2 and each fuzzy set  
Â
 i is defined over X, is expressed by the function h;[0,1]n → [0,1] that operates over the 
membership degrees of each set for each x∈ X. In other words the aggregated set Â is 
obtained by: 
 
Â = h(Â
 1(x), Â 2(x),... Â i(x)... Â n(x))   for x ∈ X 
 
a  if b = 0 
b  if a = 0  
1  otherwise 
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As for the fuzzy intersection and fuzzy union, the aggregation operations must satisfy 
specific axioms that guarantee meaningful results [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
i. Boundary conditions: h(0,0,...,0) = 0  and  h(1,1,...,1) = 1 
ii. Monotonicity:  For any pair (a1, a2,..., an) and (b1, b2,..., bn) of n-tuples  
such that  ai,bi ∈ [0,1] for all I ∈ Nn if  ai ≤ bi  for all i∈Nn          
then h(a1, a2,..., an) ≤ h (b1, b2,..., bn) 
iii. Continuity:  h is a continuous function 
iv. Symmetricity:  h(a1, a2,..., an)  =  h (ap(1), a p(1),..., a p(n))   where p(i)  
  indicates any permutation p on Nn. 
v. Idempotency: h(a,a,...a) = a  for all a∈ [0,1]  
 
Axiom (ii) indicates that the aggregation function h is monotonically increasing in all 
the arguments; axiom (iv) indicates that h is symmetric in all its arguments or, in other 
words, that all the arguments are equally important. When equal fuzzy sets are 
aggregated the result should be the same set, as indicated by axiom (v) as well as by 
axiom (i).  
Fuzzy intersection and fuzzy union functions are aggregation operations, and despite 
they fact they have been defined only for two arguments, their associativity property 
allows the expansion to any number of arguments, hence qualifying the t-norms and t-
conorms as aggregation operators. However, only the standard min and max operations 
follow the idempotency axioms for aggregations. It is important to note that any 
aggregation function h that follows axioms (ii) and (v) satisfies the following inequality 
for all n-tuples a1, a2,...,an , ai∈[0,1]n: 
 
min(a1, a2,...,an) ≤  h(a1, a2,...,an) ≤ max(a1, a2,...,an) 
 
If the previous inequality is not violated, by axiom (v) the following is also satisfied: 
 
a = min(a,a,...,a) ≤ h(a,a,...,a) ≤ max(a,a,...,a) = a 
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implying that aggregation operators h constrained between the standard fuzzy 
intersection (i.e., min) and the standard fuzzy union (i.e., max) are idempotent and they 
are known as Averaging Operators. Two classes of Averaging Operators are the 
Generalized Means and the Ordered Weighted Averaging Operations [Klir and Yuan, 
1995]. The Generalized means operators are defined by: 
 
hα(a1, a2,...,an) = [( a1α + a2α +,...,+ anα)/n] 1/α 
 
When α= -1 the aggregation function is known as Harmonic Mean while when         
α = 1 the function becomes the arithmetic mean: 
 
                α = -1            h
−1(a1, a2,...,an) = [n/( 1/a1 + 1/a2 +,...,+ 1/an)]  
 α = 1             h1(a1, a2,...,an) = ( a1 + a2 +...+ an)/n 
 
When α→0 the aggregation function becomes the Geometric Mean, and if α→ −∞ 
or α→ +∞ the aggregation function respectively becomes the Minimum or Maximum 
aggregator: 
      α→ −∞             h
−∞ (a1, a2,...,an) = min(a1, a2,...,an)   
     α→ 0                h0(a1, a2,...,an) = ( a1 + a2+...+an)1/n 
      α→ +∞             h+∞ (a1, a2,...,an)= max(a1, a2,...,an)  
 
The Ordered Weighted Averaging operators (known as OWA) are defined by the 
following function: 
hw(a1, a2,...,an) = w1b1 + w2b2 +,...,+ wnbn = 
=
n
i 1
wibi 
w = w1, w2,...,wn  where wi ∈ [0,1]n for all i ∈ Nn       and   
=
n
i 1
wi = 1 
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where w is the weighting vector. This function requires the sorting of the element ai in a 
decreasing order. After the sorting is performed, b1, b2,...,bn  is a permutation vector 
of a1, a2,...,an  where bi∈[0,1]n for all i∈Nn represents the ith largest element in such 
a way that   bi  bj  when i < j. This operator satisfies axioms (i) through (v) and the 
upper (hw*) and lower (hw*) bounds are given by the max and min operators: 
 
hw*(a1, a2,...,an) =  min(a1, a2,...,an)   where   w* = w1, w2,...,wn  = 0,0,...,1  
hw*(a1, a2,...,an) =  max(a1, a2,...,an)  where   w* = w1, w2,...,wn  = 1,0,...,0  
 
If the weight vector w = 1/n, 1/n,...,1/n  the operator hw becomes the arithmetic 
mean. It is clear that by varying the values of the weights in the vector w between w* and 
w*, it is possible to cover the range of aggregation bounded by the max and min 
aggregation operators [Klir and Yuan, 1995].  
Other aggregation functions have been proposed; however, the selection of a specific 
aggregation function must be based on the characteristics of the problem and the 
requirements of the model. Hence, the selection of aggregation operation is context 
dependent and it is helpful to follow the following criteria [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
1) Axiomatic strength: when two operators show similar performance, the one that 
should be selected is the one that is less limited by the axioms and properties that 
must satisfy. 
2) Empirical fit: besides the mathematical requirements, the chosen operator must 
be able to model the behavior of the system that is being analyzed. Empirical 
testing is required in order to check the criterion. 
3) Adaptability: since every context and application is different a large number of 
operators should be used. Another possible approach is the utilization of 
adaptable parameterized operators able to model different situations by 
modifying the value of the parameter. For example, the max and min operators 
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are not adaptable but they are attractive in specific problems due to their 
mathematical simplicity.   
4) Numerical efficiency: operator’s mathematical complexity becomes important 
for large problems and the least mathematically complex operator able to model 
the problem should be used. While fuzzy max and min are numerically efficient, 
they are not adaptable and can only be applied in specific contexts.  
5) Compensation: if an aggregation operation is defined as:  µagg(xk) = f(µÂ(xk), 
µÊ(xk)) = k then the operator defined by the function f is compensatory when the 
result k can be obtained by modifying the value of µÊ(xk) when the value µÂ(xk). 
In other words low membership in one set is compensated by higher membership 
in the other set. The min-operator does not follow this criterion while the product 
does. 
6) Range of condensation: when the range of compensation is large the operator 
should be preferred. For instance, the range of compensation for the product 
operator spans the complete interval (0, 1). 
7) Aggregating behavior: when normal or subnormal fuzzy set are aggregated the 
result is a function of the number of aggregated sets. For example, when several 
sets are aggregated by using the product-operator, the resultant aggregate 
membership degree tends to be reduced. 
8) Required scale level of membership functions: the scale type (i.e., nominal, 
interval, and ratio) selected for the design of the fuzzy sets to be aggregated 
restricts the type of operator that can be used. For example, while the min-
operator can be used with ordinal scales, the product-operator cannot. When an 
operator can be applied to low-level scales (i.e., nominal) it is preferable over 
operators that require higher scale level (i.e., absolute, ratio). 
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5.4  INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY RELATIONS 
 
As explained previously for conventional set theory, a crisp relation expresses the 
existence or lack of a specific relation between the elements of two crisp sets. Since the 
definition of a fuzzy set is the generalization of a crisp set, the definition of a fuzzy 
relation can be seen as the generalization of the definition of a crisp relation. The 
total/null association of elements in a crisp relation is generalized by a degree of 
association, which indicates the strength of the relation. When there is full or null 
association the fuzzy relation is reduced to the crisp case [Klir and Yuan, 1997].  
While for the crisp relation the boundaries are well defined, in the case of a fuzzy 
relation the boundaries are vague due to the smooth transitions between regions of full 
membership (i.e., full relations among X and Y) and areas of null membership. When 
fuzzy relations occur among fuzzy sets, the result is a fuzzy set on a multidimensional 
space. The fuzzy relation among two fuzzy sets (i.e., age and height) is given by a         
2-dimension fuzzy set on a Cartesian product space.  
 
5.4.1  Definitions 
The membership function for fuzzy sets is similar to the characteristic function for 
crisp sets in the sense that it allows degrees of membership. Similarly, in the case of 
fuzzy relations, the characteristic function of a crisp relation is expanded to allow 
degrees of association among the element of the fuzzy sets. The crisp relation R, 
between all the possible combination of elements x1∈X1, x2 ∈ X2,...,xn∈Xn that belong to 
the relation defined on the Cartesian product R = X1 x X2 x...x Xn is defined by a 
characteristic function that describes whether an element (x1, x2,...,xn) (i.e., n-tuple) 
belongs to R or not: 
                                   
   µR (x1, x2,...,xn) =  
     
 
   1  if and only if (x1, x2,...,xn) ∈ R  
 
   0  otherwise 
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When the membership of a tuple is one (i.e., µR(x1, x2,...,xn) = 1) the elements x1, 
x2,...,xn are mutually related. When instead of a total/null relationship, degrees of relation 
are allowed between the elements of the n-tuple, the characteristic function for a crisp 
relation becomes a membership function for a fuzzy relation: 
 
µRˆ (x1, x2,...,xn) = [0, 1]  if (x1, x2,...,xn) ∈ Rˆ  
 
 
A binary fuzzy relation, is a subset of a Cartesian product X x Y. If X and Y are two 
crisp sets, the fuzzy relation Rˆ among all possible ordered pairs of elements                  
(x, y) ∈ X x Y, where x ∈ X and y ∈Y, is given by:   
 
Rˆ = {(x, y), µRˆ (x, y)| (x, y) ∈ X x Y }    and   µRˆ x, y)=[0,1] 
 
When for all possible ordered pairs of elements (x, y) ∈ X x Y, the relation values are 
{0,1}, then the fuzzy relations becomes a crisp relation where no partial membership is 
allowed [Zimmerman 1996; Klir and Yuan,1995]. A fuzzy relation established among 
elements of crisp sets can be expressed as a matrix, called fuzzy matrix. 
If X = {x1, x2,...,xn} and Y = { y1, y2,...,ym}, the binary fuzzy relation Rˆ = {(x, y), 
µRˆ (x, y)| (x, y) ∈ X x Y } can be expressed as: 
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where the value of µRˆ (xn, ym ) = [0,1]. An example of this type of fuzzy relations can be 
established about the distances existing between two sets of cities in two states. If          
X = {x1, x2, x3} = “cities in New York State” and Y = { y1, y2, y3} = “cities in New 
Jersey”; the fuzzy relation Rˆ represents the distance between each pair of cities 
describing the concept of “closeness”. If the distance between x1 and y2 is very short 
then it is implied that the two cities are “very close” hence the pair has full membership 
in the fuzzy set represented by the relation Rˆ , or in other words µRˆ (x1, y1) = 1. If xx is 
very far away from y3 then the membership into the relation Rˆ  is low and µRˆ (x2, y3) = 
0.1. When the membership degrees are representing the degree of “closeness”, they are 
assigned to all the n x m pairs, the resulting fuzzy relation, expressed as a fuzzy matrix 
is:
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fuzzy relation can be reduced to a crisp relation R if the concept “close” is 
related to a physical measure such as 100 km. In this case when  the distance among a 
pair of cities (xn, ym) is larger than the threshold the membership value into the relation 
becomes zero (i.e., µRˆ  (xn, ym) = 0) since they are assumed to be farther away than the 
distance that can be assumed to be short enough to be classified as “close”. When the 
distance is shorter than 100 km, then µR(xn, ym) = 1 indicating a full membership in the 
crisp set ‘close”. In this case the relation is expressed in terms of a binary matrix as 
follows [Tanaka, 1996]: 
 
 
 
 
 
  1      1      0 
  0      1      0 
  0      0      1 
R = 
Rˆ  = 
  1    0.6   0.3 
0.4   0.9   0.1 
0.5   0.2   0.7 
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Fuzzy relations can also be established between fuzzy sets. If X,Y ∈ Rˆ  and two 
fuzzy numbers are defined as: 
 
Â = {(x, µÂ (x)) | x ∈ X}     and      Ê = {(x, µÊ (y)) | y ∈ Y} 
 
Then the fuzzy relation Rˆ  is defined as: 
 
Rˆ ={[(x, y), µRˆ (x, y)]| (x, y) ∈ X x Y }    and   µRˆ (x, y)=[0,1] 
 
When                                      µRˆ (x, y)   µÂ (x)    ∀(x,y) ∈ X x Y 
               µRˆ (x, y)   µÊ (y)        ∀ (x,y) ∈ X x Y 
 
and an additional requirement is:   µRˆ (x, y)  min{µÂ (x), µÊ (y)}    ∀ (x,y) ∈ X x Y 
 
The conditions required for fuzzy relations ensure that the degree of membership of 
the relation µRˆ (x,y) is not larger that the membership in each single set µÂ(x) and µÊ(y) 
[Zimmerman, 1996]. Because fuzzy relations are multidimensional fuzzy sets on a 
product space, the set and algebraic operations can be applied in a similar form. If Rˆ and 
Ô are two fuzzy relations on the same product space, then the fuzzy union (i.e., Rˆ ∪ Ô) 
and fuzzy intersection (i.e., Rˆ ∩ Ô) operation are defined as [Zimmerman, 1996]: 
 
µRˆ ∪ Ô (x, y) = max{µRˆ (x, y), µÔ(x, y)}   where  (x, y) ∈ X x Y 
µRˆ ∩ Ô (x, y) = min{µRˆ (x, y), µÔ(x, y)}   where  (x, y) ∈ X x Y 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY SYSTEMS DESIGN 
 
Fuzzy logic and fuzzy systems have been applied to a variety of scientific areas. The 
first practical applications are attributed to process control and civil engineering during 
the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. E.H. Mamdani developed the first application for process 
control and the model he created was named after him and was the first fuzzy logic 
controller used during the 1980s. The Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) model was developed 
by T. Takagi, M. Sugeno, around 1985 and K.T. Kang later, and since the 1990s has 
been used particularly for control applications [Tanaka, 1997]. Since then, other 
disciplines became aware of the fuzzy logic approach. In safety management, fuzzy logic 
has been applied to reliability engineering [Bowles, 1995], environmental impact 
evaluation and ecotoxicology [Stoms et al, 2002; Friederichs et al, 1996], and 
transportation risk analysis [Bonvicini et al, 1998; Gentile et al, 2002]. 
The application of fuzzy modeling is relatively new, but the foundations are already 
well established. This chapter introduces the basic ideas and concepts of fuzzy modeling 
required for the development of the hierarchical model for the evaluation of inherent 
safety, described in Chapters VII and VIII. 
 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF FUZZY MODELING 
 
In order to understand the purpose of this work it is helpful to establish an analogy 
between traditional mathematical and statistical modeling procedures with similar 
methodology for fuzzy systems.  
A traditional model is constituted of a set of mathematical equations that describe the 
behavior and interaction of its independent variables. When the equation is solved, the 
dependent variables are assigned numbers, which are the solution of the equation. If the 
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model is built from physical principles, a mathematical equation or set of equations is 
obtained, which are then tested against real experimental data. In traditional 
mathematics, when enough data is available a regression model can be fitted by using a 
statistical approach to fit a correlation.  
In fuzzy logic, the equivalent of the traditional independent variables, are fuzzy sets 
defined for specific linguistic variables. Each fuzzy set is combined to the fuzzy sets of 
the other variables by IF-THEN rules that describe the relation existing between the sets. 
Procedures for fuzzy modeling can be classified in a similar way as for traditional 
models.  
When enough data is available, it is possible to use fuzzy neural networks such as 
ANFIS (Adaptive Neural Fuzzy Inference System) [Yen and Langari, 1999] to generate 
membership functions and fuzzy IF-THEN rules, which constitute the fuzzy model. This 
procedure is analogous to statistical regression. When ANFIS is used, the interpretability 
of the model can be lost because rules and fuzzy sets are designed for a specific set of 
data. In order to generate general models it is then required to obtain a data set 
representative of a large number of situations. In the case of process safety, this type of 
generalization may not be possible. 
If data that are available is insufficient, ANFIS cannot be used and the membership 
functions and IF-THEN rules must be designed from the underlying physical principles 
of the system. This is analogous to traditional mathematical modeling, but instead of 
obtaining an equation, the fuzzy model is formed by fuzzy sets and IF-THEN rules.  
A third type of fuzzy modeling does not require fuzzy IF-THEN rules and works in a 
more abstract mathematical level using the theory of fuzzy relational equations. While 
for linguistic models the fuzzy relation is given by rules and fuzzy sets, for relational 
models the fuzzy relation is expressed in terms of a fuzzy matrix. However, the linguistic 
meaning of fuzzy matrices is not explicit; therefore relational models are more abstract 
and less interpretable than linguistic models. A methodology to extract fuzzy IF-THEN 
rules from relational models has been proposed by Campello and Amaral (2001). 
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The fuzzy modeling methodology used for this research is based on linguistic 
modeling; therefore fuzzy sets and rules are built by identifying physical principles of the 
selected linguistic variables. The choice is based on the fact that for inherent safety 
modeling there is a general lack of data, but a large amount of information and empirical 
knowledge can be used to build the system. 
 
6.1.1 Computing with words 
As indicated by Zadeh (1996) fuzzy logic is a methodology that allows computing 
with words and no other modeling method offers such flexibility.  The basic concept 
upon which “computing with words” is based is the “granule” that groups points that 
have similar features; in other words a granule is a fuzzy set. A granule can be atomic 
(e.g., safe) or composite (e.g., very safe) and is represented by a word which is a fuzzy 
constraint on the variable. For example, for the proposition “Mary is young” the word 
“young” represents a granule that groups certain ranges of ages and act as a fuzzy 
constraint (i.e., fuzzy set) on the linguistic variable “age”.  
When there are several propositions expressed in terms of IF-THEN rules, as for 
example: 
IF  X  is small THEN Y is small 
IF  X  is medium THEN Y is large 
IF  X  is large THEN Y is small 
 
the rules describe a function f: U →∈V, X ∈U, Y∈V. The function f is approximated by 
the fuzzy graph f *: 
f *= small x small + medium x large + large x small 
 
where the symbols x and + indicate disjunction and Cartesian product (introduced in 
Chapter V). For example, if A and B are two words, then the expression AxB represents 
a Cartesian granule (shown as gray rectangles in Figure 6.1), therefore the fuzzy graph f 
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*can be understood as a disjunction of Cartesian granules. In other words, a fuzzy graph f 
* is an approximation of a function or relation f as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Unknown function f approximated by a 
fuzzy graph f* built from the linguistic granules of 
the linguistic variables X and Y. 
 
 
 
Computing with words is defined by Zadeh (1996) as “…a necessity when the 
available information is too imprecise to justify the use of numbers, and when there is a 
tolerance for imprecision which can be exploited to achieve tractability, robustness, low 
solution cost, and better rapport with reality...”  
When the concepts of “computing with words” are applied to the problem of inherent 
safety quantification, several advantages become evident. In inherent safety 
quantification function f is unknown, but heuristic and empirical knowledge is available. 
The inherent safety principles are an example of the type of knowledge that can be 
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X 
Y 
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modeled through the “computing with words” methodology in order to approximate the 
unknown “safety function” fs through a fuzzy graph fs*. The procedure for the selection 
of the variables, definition of the granules, and definition of the rules is described in the 
following section. The application to the specific problem of inherent safety is described 
in Chapters VII and VIII. 
Computing with words requires working with language and knowledge. Klir (1994) 
indicates that language is associated with vagueness and, in order to model vague 
concepts, the used logic does not need to follow the law of excluded middle and the law 
of contradiction, introduced in Chapter V.  
 
6.1.2 Theory of possibility 
Zadeh (1999, reprinted from 1978) indicated that in several cases the information 
used for decision making and information analysis is possibilistic rather than 
probabilistic because of the issue of vagueness. Fuzzy logic is often confused with 
traditional probability theory, however when uncertainty is associated with vagueness a 
possibility approach should be used; only when uncertainty is derived from stochastic 
variability a probabilistic method can be used.  
An event must be possible in order to be probable; however a high possibility degree 
does not imply a high likelihood. The concept of possibility is related to the concept of 
fuzzy set that acts as an elastic (i.e., not crisp) boundary on the values that the linguistic 
variable can accept. Therefore, partial membership (allowed by fuzzy sets but not by 
Boolean sets) does not represent frequency, but it describes how much that element 
satisfies the properties that characterize the fuzzy set [Laviolette et al, 1995a; Lootsma, 
1997].  
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6.2 INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY REASONING: MAMDANI MODEL  
 
Fuzzy reasoning requires inference rules expressed in IF-THEN format. There are 
three model based on fuzzy rules [Yen and Langari, 1999]:  
- Mamdani’s method  
- Takagi and Sugeno’s method (TSK) 
- Kosco’s additive model (SAM) 
 
The models TSK and SAM are based on similar inference algorithms for the 
aggregation of the conclusions of the fired rules. This inference uses weighted sum, 
therefore TSK and SAM are classified as “additive rule models”. The Mamdami model 
combines the rule outputs by using superimposition, therefore is a “nonadditive rule 
model” [Yen and Langari, 1999].  
One of the most common reasoning methods is the Mamdani procedure, which is 
based on a simple structure of max and min operations. Mamdami’s method uses rules 
such as:  
IF x is Â
 i AND y is Êj THEN z is k 
 
where Â, Ê, and  are fuzzy sets and x, y, and z are linguistic variables divided 
respectively into i, j, and k fuzzy sets, whose relation is described by the rule. 
The Takagi and Sugeno method (TSK) uses rules such as 
 
IF x is Â
 i AND y is Êj THEN z is ck 
 
where Â and Ê are fuzzy sets but c is either a constant value or a traditional 
mathematical expression.  
The Mamdami method presents advantages with respect to the TSK models because 
it is easier to understand and allows defining the output of the system in terms of fuzzy 
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sets. Therefore the Mamdami model is also convenient for the present work because it is 
more transparent and offers better interpretability of fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules.  
 
6.2.1 The Mamdami fuzzy inference algorithm 
Many other fuzzy reasoning methods have been proposed, however the methodology 
presented here is based on a Mamdani model that uses groups of r rules such as:  
 
Rule 1:  IF x is Â
 i1 AND y is  j1 THEN z is Ê k1 
Rule 2:  IF x is Â
 i2 AND y is  j2 THEN z is Ê k2 
. . . 
Rule r:  IF x is Â
 ir AND y is  jr THEN z is Ê kr 
 
where Â,  , and Ê are fuzzy sets; x, y, and z are linguistic variables, and r is the number 
of rules (r = 1… r). This type of rule is defined by the generalized modus ponens (i.e., 
based on the modus ponens of the traditional two-valued logic) [Yen and Langari, 1999]: 
 
Premise 1 (fact)                     x is Â
 i and y is  j 
Premise 2 (rule) IF x is Â  AND y is   THEN z is Ê 
Consequence (conclusion)              z is Ê
 k 
 
In the rules the connector AND can be replaced by OR depending on the 
requirements of the physical model. The connectors AND and OR are evaluated 
respectively by the standard operations of intersection (µÂ and Ê(x) = µ Â∪ Ê (x) = µ ) and 
union (µÂ or Ê(x) = µ Â∩ Ê (x) = µ ) described in Chapter V. The linguistic variables x, 
and y are the input variables, while the linguistic variable z is the output. The linguistic 
variables x is divided into i fuzzy sets while the variables y and z are divided into j and k 
fuzzy sets, respectively. 
Fuzzy rules with two antecedents (e.g., Â and ) are represented by Â x  → Ê, 
which is known as a fuzzy relation between x, y, and z. The first step of fuzzy reasoning 
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requires the conversion of the fuzzy IF-THEN rules into fuzzy relations RÂ x  → Ê; in the 
second step the conclusion Ê is inferred from the input Âi and j by applying the 
compositional rule of inference: 
 
Ê
 k = (Â i and j) o (RÂ x  → Ê) = (Â i o j) o (RÂ x  → Ê)      
Expressed as: 
Ê
 k = Â i o (j o RÂ x  → Ê) = j o (Â i o RÂ x  → Ê) 
 
The resultant fuzzy set has a membership function expressed as:  
 
µ
 Ê = µ (Âo )oR (x) = max{min[µ (x), max[min(µÂ (y), µR(x, y, z))]]} 
 
which is a combination of max-min composition.  
After the rules have been evaluated, the output fuzzy sets Êr for each rule must be 
aggregated by using Ê 
 
=
 
n
r 1=
Ê
 r  where r is the number of rules. The obtained fuzzy set Ê 
is the fuzzy output of the inference system and must be defuzzified to obtain a crisp 
result.  
The defuzzification methodology used is the center of mass (although there are 
several possible methods) of the resultant fuzzy set Ê, because it takes into account the 
strength of the fuzzy set µ
 Ê (x) and its support, where µ Ê (x)>0.    
A simplified version of the fuzzy inference process based on the Mamdami model is 
shown in Figure 6.2 for a system formed by two linguistic variables, “Tank Volume” and 
“Toxicity’, each described by two fuzzy sets, “Large” and “Medium”, and “Medium” 
and “High”, respectively. The output is represented by the variable “hazard” described by 
two sets, “large” and “very large”.  
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  Figure 6.2: Mamdami fuzzy inference algorithm 
 
 
6.3 ELEMENTS OF A FUZZY MODEL 
 
The concepts of membership function and fuzzy set represent the weakest aspect of 
fuzzy logic, which are at the same time the most powerful aspects of the methodology 
because they allow the modeling of uncertainty and allow the conversion of information 
and data into linguistic terms. Membership functions are the mathematical representation 
of fuzzy sets, and in order to design them, it is required to define the following aspects 
[Oliveira, 1995]: 
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- Number of fuzzy sets assigned to each linguistic variable: as indicated by Lootsma 
(1997) human beings can only process seven categories at most, therefore, the 
granularity of a linguistic variable should not exceed that number.  
- Position of the natural zero: when the physical system has a point that can be 
assumed to be the natural zero, a fuzzy set should represent it. As indicated in 
Chapter IV, inherent safety can be assumed to have a natural limit when no hazard is 
present. While in some cases the natural zero exists (e.g., volume), in others (i.e., 
temperature) the physical zero exists under specific conditions only (e.g., absolute 
temperature scale). 
- Universe of discourse: fuzzy sets should be assigned in such a way that they cover 
the whole range of the universe of discourse.  
- Normalization of the membership functions: because each membership function 
should fully represent at least one point of the universe of discourse, it must be a 
normal function (i.e., with a height of one).  
- Distinct semantic meaning: each fuzzy set must have a specific meaning, therefore it 
should be possible to distinguish it from any other set for the same linguistic 
variable.  
 
The following sections summarize techniques used for membership function design. 
 
6.3.1 Fuzzy set and membership functions design  
 The design of fuzzy sets involves the design of membership functions that assign 
linguistic values to the linguistic variables. A fuzzy variable is known as linguistic 
variable and its universe of discourse (i.e., range) is divided into fuzzy sets defined by 
the membership function, which indicates the degree of membership of each point into 
that set. Fuzzy sets represent the linguistic value of the linguistic variable for a specific 
input value x. For example, in Figure 6.3, the variable “environmental temperature” is 
divided into three fuzzy sets, “Low”, “Moderate”, and “High”. The universe of 
discourse of the fuzzy set “Moderate” is [0 30] °C and the set is normal because there is 
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at least one point, x=15, with µmoderate=1.  The input temperature of x=10 °C belongs 
partially to the fuzzy set “moderate” with µmoderate(x=10)=0.4 and belongs partially to 
the fuzzy set “low” with µlow(x=10)=0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Example of linguistic variable “ENVIRONMENTAL 
TEMPERATURE”, in terms of fuzzy sets “HIGH”, “MEDIUM”, “LOW”. 
 
 
 
The methods available for the construction of membership functions can be classified 
into direct and indirect methods [Despic and Simonovic, 2000]; direct methods imply a 
direct relation between the values x and the interval [0 1], while indirect methods rely 
on relations existing between the elements of the inputs. A brief description of six 
classes of experimental methods is presented by Pedrycz (1998). Methods such as fuzzy 
clustering can be used when a data set is available. In this case the set of data is 
partitioned into overlapping clusters that are then used to design the membership 
functions. Another methodology is based on pairwise-comparison which is based on the 
methodology proposed by Saaty for analytical hierarchy processing (AHP) as cited by 
McCauley-Bell and Badiru (1996 a and 1996b). 
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Another classification of methodologies for the design of membership functions is 
based on two types of information used: data-driven (bottom-up approach) and 
linguistic design (top to bottom approach). The data-driven approach requires a set of 
numerical data from which the rules are inferred by looking at the data, or by using 
algorithmic approaches such as clustering and ANFIS. The linguistic design is used 
when no numerical data is available or when the data is insufficient and, in this case, 
heuristic knowledge is required. Both methods are explained by Berkan and Trubatch 
(1997). 
Because of the lack of data, this research is based on linguistic design. Under this 
approach, several steps are required [Berkan and Trubatch, 1997] to define the 
following parameters of the membership functions: 
- Granularity (number of membership functions) 
- Shape 
- Location on the universe of discourse 
- Fuzzy rules 
 
These aspects have an important impact on the performance of the fuzzy system, and 
the following procedure is used in order to ensure the accuracy of the inference results 
[Berkan and Trubatch, 1997]: 
- The first step requires the determination of the IF-THEN rules from the 
information available on the physical behavior of the system. This step also 
defines the granularity, which should not exceed seven fuzzy sets per linguistic 
variable.  
- The following step requires the identification of shape and location of each 
membership function on the universe of discourse of the variable. In order to 
locate the membership functions it is necessary to identify the decision 
boundaries of the sets; the decision boundaries indicate which output set 
corresponds to which input set. In other words local models are created as shown 
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in Figure 6.1 where each rectangular gray area reflects the decision boundaries of 
two sets.  
- The shape of the functions must be selected according to the physical meaning of 
the variable. This step requires following some design principles for the analysis 
of the shape. 
 
An additional step is required for the selection of hedges (e.g., very, more or less, 
almost) that modify the shape of the function. However, for the present project, hedges 
are not used.  
As described by Berkan and Trubatch (1997), the analysis of the shape of the 
membership function defines the following parameters of each membership function: 
- Shape 
- Height 
- Overlap degree 
 
The shape of the functions affects the performance of the inference system but in a 
limited form compared to the effect of number and location of the functions. The 
membership functions can have several shapes such as piece-wise-linear (e.g., triangular 
and trapezoidal), curve, S-shaped, pi-shaped and other functions. Commonly used shapes 
are presented in Figure 6.4. 
In general, triangular and trapezoidal functions offer a good compromise between 
descriptive power and computational simplicity, therefore these are the functions used 
for the hierarchical model developed for inherent safety quantification.  
The height of the function indicates the maximum possibility value that can be 
produced by the inference rule related to the specific set. If the height of the set is lower 
than one (i.e., subnormal fuzzy set), then the rule will always produce an output set with 
less importance compared to the output generated from a normal set. Output fuzzy sets 
designed with a height less than one will produce paralysis (insensitivity) for a certain 
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range of input values [Berkan and Trubatch, 1997]. For the proposed model, only 
normal input and output sets are used.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: Common shapes for membership functions 
 
 
An aspect of the paralysis phenomena is given by the geometric scaling of the output 
functions. When the output is defined over a large scale (compared with the range of µ 
which is the close interval [0 1]) and the method used for defuzzification is the centroid 
(explained in the next section), the functions are stretched [Berkan and Trubatch, 1997] 
as shown in Figure 6.5. Because the centroid defuzzification method is based on the 
calculation of the clipped output set (e.g., gray areas in Figure 6.5), when the sets are 
stretched (because of a wide scale of the universe of discourse of the output) the method 
becomes insensitive to changes in the inputs. To avoid this problem the range of the 
output is normalized on a scale [0 1], [Berkan and Trubatch, 1997].  
A similar phenomenon occurs with the scale of the inputs, because when it is too 
wide and the sets are not equally spaced (e.g., toxicity intervals) then the narrower sets 
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are lost compared to the wider sets. To solve this problem, a logarithm transformation is 
applied to the scale of the linguistic variable.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Effect of the output scale 
 
 
 
The election of the shape of the membership function requires understanding the 
inherent uncertainty of the linguistic term. In the case of triangular functions it is 
assumed that only one value of the support of the set has full membership (i.e., µ=1.0) 
while the rest of the support represents the uncertainty or possible range of variability of 
the linguistic term. For example, the normal temperature of operation of a reactor can 
betaken to be the point with full membership, while the normal range of variability of the 
operation temperature can be represented by the two extremes of the triangular 
membership function. A triangular membership function implies strict standards for the 
antecedent variable since only one point is assigned with full membership [Berkan and 
Trubatch, 1997]. 
The trapezoidal shape indicates that several input points have full membership in the 
set; therefore the use of this shape implies that the requirements for full membership are 
less strict compared to the triangular function. The trapezoidal shape also indicates the 
µ 
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 122 
degree of tolerance of the set; shapes with narrow regions of high membership (i.e., 
triangular function) are conservative (since they represent stricter requirements in order 
to assign high membership) while a trapezoidal function is assumed to be more tolerant 
because a wider region is assigned with high membership values [Berkan and Trubatch, 
1997]. 
As shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 the membership functions for an input linguistic 
variable must present some degree of overlap. The overlap permits a smooth transition 
from one set to the other, which is an important characteristic of fuzzy systems. As 
indicated by Berkan and Trubatch (1997), the degree of overlap also increases the speed 
of the response of the rule and the degree of cooperation among rules. When the overlap 
increases, the cooperation of the rules also increases making the response smoother. A 
common practice for fuzzy systems design is to define membership functions with 
crossover points at µ = 0.5 in order to establish a balance between sensitivity and 
smoothness of the response. A lower overlap may indicate the presence of undefined 
regions, while a larger overlap may indicate lack of knowledge about the linguistic 
variable or lack of sufficient partitioning.  
For the model proposed in the next chapter, the membership functions have been 
designed using the principles summarized above and other principles discussed by 
Berkan and Trubatch, (1997). The selected shapes are triangular and trapezoidal, and in 
general they are defined in such a way that the indications on overlap are obeyed. 
According to the Mamdami algorithm, each fuzzy IF-THEN rule can receive a 
weight factor that assigns more or less importance to the rule in comparison to the other 
rules of the rule-basis. The effect of the weights is analyzed by Ishibuchi and 
Nakashima (2001), and by Nauck and Kruse (1998). By changing the weights, the 
rectangular decision area of each rule is modified accordingly allowing the fuzzy graph 
to be changed as required. When the rule base is not complete (i.e., some rules are 
missing) the decision areas are no longer rectangular, however the same approach of 
modifying the relative membership functions can be used [Ishibuchi and Nakashima, 
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2001]. In both cased it is indicated that the use of weights can be replaced by modifying 
the shape of the antecedent and consequent membership functions.  
For the hierarchical model proposed for inherent safety evaluation, while rule 
weights are not used, the functions are tuned manually by trial and error in order to 
obtain smooth fuzzy graphs whose behavior resembles the expected behavior of the 
physical system. 
 
6.3.2 Defuzzification methods 
The step of defuzzification is the last step of the fuzzy inference algorithm where the 
aggregated fuzzy output is converted into a crisp number. Defuzzification is defined as a 
function  F-1 mapping a fuzzy set Â to a certain element (x) of the support of the output 
(as shown in Figure 6.6) and defined as: 
 
F-1 : F(x) → x 
 
Several methods have been proposed for this purpose, however the method chosen 
should be based on the properties of the defuzzification method and the requirements of 
the system.  The properties of the defuzzification methodology can be classified into 
static and dynamic properties [Runkler, 1997].  
Static properties are consistency, monotonicity, scale invariance, and compatibility. 
The property of consistency is related to the fact that the defuzzification method should 
map convex crisp sets to their centroid (e.g., center of a crisp subinterval). Monotonicity 
requires that the result of the defuzzification moves towards the areas of higher 
membership when the opposite part is changed to a lower degree of membership. Scale 
invariance is related to the type of scale (i.e., ordinal, interval, ratio) used to define the 
linguistic variables (as discussed in Chapter VII). The property of scale invariance is not 
required when the degree of membership are defined on interval, ordinal, and ratio 
scales. 
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                                  Figure 6.6: Defuzzification of the output fuzzy set Â 
 
 
 
Compatibility is important for rule-based inference systems because the selected 
defuzzification method must be compatible with the used operators and implication 
methods. The dynamic properties of the defuzzification methods are related to the 
change in response caused by a small change in the input. Other important properties 
have been reported by Leekwijck and Kerre (1999). 
The most important defuzzification methodologies are [Runkler, 1997]: 
- Centroid: it is one of the standard methods and calculates the center of gravity 
(COG) of the area delimited by the membership function of the output set: 
 
F-1
 
(Â) =  µÂ (x) x dx /  µÂ (x)  dx 
 
This method follows the properties of consistency, monotonicity, but does not 
follow the property of scale invariance. 
x 
µ 
Â 
X 
 125 
- Center of area: calculates the point x where the areas under the membership 
function to its right and left are equal and it follows the properties of consistency, 
monotonicity, and scale invariance. 
- Maxima methods: these methods focus on the maximum values of the fuzzy set 
rather than on the area under the membership function (as in the case of centroid 
and center of area). Several methods are classified under this category such as: 
first of maxima, last of maxima, mean (average of maxima), and center of 
maxima (median of maxima). 
 
Other methods have been reported by Runkler(1997), Ali and Zhang (2001), and 
Leekwijck and Kerre (1999). Other criteria for the selection of defuzzification methods 
are related to the specific application such as computational efficiency, transparency, and 
continuity as indicated by Leekwijck and Kerre (1999). While efficiency is related to the 
number of mathematical operations required by each specific method, transparency is 
related to the degree of complexity of the approach. Efficient and transparent operators 
are preferred.  
For the model proposed in this work for the evaluation of inherent safety, the 
selected defuzzification method is the standard center of mass or centroid because of its 
characteristics and the fact that it is the most widely used method for the Mamdami 
model. As explained below, the linguistic variables used are based on continuous ordinal 
scales, which do not required the defuzzification method to follow the scale-invariance 
property. The test performed also showed that the continuity of the response is ensured. 
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6.4 HIERARCHICAL FUZZY SYSTEMS  
 
The application of fuzzy logic to complicated process control problems with a large 
number of inputs highlights the problem of rule-explosion. If a system requires n input 
variables each partitioned into m membership functions, the total number of rules 
required to model the system by using one single fuzzy inference system is mn. As the 
complexity of the problem increases, the number of required inputs increases too, 
requiring an exponentially larger number of rules. In order to deal with the problem rule-
explosion, the development of hierarchical fuzzy systems has been proposed. In 
hierarchical systems, the number of rules increases linearly with the number of inputs 
rather than exponentially [Lee et al., 2003]. The structure of a normal fuzzy system is 
shown in Figure 6.7 and the classical structures of hierarchical fuzzy systems are shown 
in Figure 6.8: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Structure for conventional single-layer fuzzy systems 
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INPUT 3 
INPUT 4 
FIS 1 
Number of rules=mn 
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Figure 6.8: Structure for hierarchical fuzzy systems 
 
 
 
For hierarchical fuzzy systems, the outputs from certain FIS are used as inputs for the 
following FIS, which are difficult to design because the intermediate outputs do not have 
physical meaning. As the number of layers of FIS increases, the difficulty associated 
with their design increases due to the loss of physical meaning [Lee et al, 2003]. A new 
model that further reduces the number of rules for hierarchical systems, and reduces the 
limitations associated with the loss of the physical meaning of intermediate 
outputs/inputs has been proposed by Lee et al., (2003). Examples of hierarchical fuzzy 
systems for applications other than control have been published by Stoms (2002) for 
assessment of land stability, Sasikala and Petrou (2001) for the estimation of the risk of 
desertification, and Despic and Simonovic (2000) for decision making in water resources 
management. 
The problem of inherent safety quantification is a complex problem that requires the 
use of several inputs. For example, as indicated in Chapter VII, the proposed prototype 
requires 25 inputs that correspond to linguistic variables partitioned into 2 to 5 fuzzy 
sets. Assuming an average of 3 fuzzy sets per input a total number of 325=8.47*1011 rules 
would be required. By using the hierarchical structure described in Chapter VII and 
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formed by 35 FIS, less than 900 rules are required. Because the variables are combined 
in such a way that the physical significance of intermediate outputs is not lost, the 
classical structures for hierarchical systems are used.  
The aggregation of intermediate outputs from the lower layers of the hierarchical 
fuzzy model is generally achieved by using aggregation operators; a brief introduction to 
these methodologies is provided in Chapter V. Additional information on aggregation is 
given by Yager (2004) who presents a review of aggregation operations and type of 
problems where information fusion is required; the selection of aggregators for multi-
attribute decision making in engineering is revised by Scott and Antonsson (1998). A 
review of aggregation methods and a case study comparing benefit and limitations of 
each method is provided by Smolikova and Wachowiak (2002); the example 
demonstrates some guidelines about how to select weights for the ordered weighting 
operators (OWA) from the characteristics of the system. Another approach for the 
selection of weight for OWA functions has been proposed by O’Hagan (as cited by 
Yager and Kelman, 1996) and is based on the selection of a single coefficient of 
optimism from which all the weights are estimated. 
Depending on the requirements of the problems and the criteria for the selection of 
the aggregation operators, several methods may be used for describing different parts of 
the problem. The problem of selection for an aggregation methodology is not trivial and 
must be carefully analyzed. In the case of ordered weighted operators (OWA) a vector of 
weights representing the importance of each element must be selected; if data is not 
available to calculate the weights, expert judgment must be used. However, subjectivity 
associated with the expert’s previous knowledge (or lack of it) affect the aggregation 
methodology and inconsistent results may be obtained [Despic and Simonovic, 2000]. 
When parameterized operators (e.g., Zimmermann’s γ-family of operators) are used, the 
values of the parameters must be selected but their meaning is not intuitive. An 
alternative aggregation methodology proposed by Zadeh et al. (1987) as citeted by 
Despic and Simonovic (2000) suggests the use of a fuzzy-algorithmic approach based on 
fuzzy IF-THEN rules.  
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In the case of the proposed hierarchical model for inherent safety evaluation, sources 
of hazard represented by physical factors are combined by fuzzy rules and their 
aggregated outputs represent a measure of the inherent hazard. These measures of 
hazards are then used by the next layers of the hierarchical model; however, since the 
measure of hazard is related to the potential physical consequences, they keep a physical 
significance. Therefore, the aggregation methodology chosen is based on the use of fuzzy 
IF-THEN rule bases. 
In hierarchical systems, when the outputs from previous FIS are used as inputs for 
the next FIS, problems associated with rule chaining can arise due to the fuzziness of the 
used outputs, as shown in Figure 6.2. The output obtained from the evaluation of a set of 
rules is a fuzzy set whose support (i.e., width of its base) is a measure of the uncertainty 
of the result. When the output is defuzzified a single real number is obtained as result, 
however the information about uncertainty is lost. When rule chaining is used, as in the 
case of hierarchical systems, the output is fed to the next set of rules as a fuzzy set or as a 
crisp real number. Each option presents advantages and disadvantages: 
− The option of using fuzzy output from previous layers as fuzzy input for the next 
fuzzy inference system presents the advantage of preserving the information about 
uncertainty. However, when the fuzzy set is too wide it fires several rules of the new 
FIS generating therefore a very uncertain result (i.e., very wide set). As indicated by 
Driankov and Hellendoorn (1995) even areas of the fuzzy output (used as fuzzy 
input) with very low membership degree will fire rules and the resulting new output 
will be composed by sets that should not have been used.  
− When the output is used as a crisp number with no uncertainty, only few rules will be 
fired reducing the uncertainty of the new result, but information is lost. As indicated 
by Driankov and Hellendoorn (1995) when the crisp output is obtained from the 
defuzzification of a non-convex set, the obtained crisp result is associated with a 
lower membership degree.  
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µ=1.0 
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Defuzzified output for 
original fuzzy output 
Modified fuzzy output 
An additional problem of these two approaches is that the final result may not be the 
expected. For instance, if one rule is “IF X is A THEN Y is B”, and the following rule is 
“IF Y is B THEN Z is C”, because of the problems described above, probably the rule 
“IF X is A THEN Z is C” will not be obeyed [Driankov and Hellendoorn, 1995]. 
A compromise between the two options is presented by Driankov and Hellendoorn 
(1995) by decomposing the defuzzification of the output used as input for the next FIS 
into two or more crisp singletons corresponding to the points of highest membership. In 
this case the limitation associated with non-convex sets is solved, and the problem 
related to the chaining of rules is reduced.  
For the hierarchical model proposed for inherent safety evaluation, a compromise among 
the three methods described above is applied by using only the part of the fuzzy output 
with membership degree µoutput  0.4. The resultant fuzzy set is then converted to a 
triangular fuzzy set by taking the lowest and highest values of the support of the output 
where µoutput = 0.4. This approach is shown in Figure 6.9. The original fuzzy output is 
shown in white and its relative defuzzificated value is indicated. The modified fuzzy 
output (i.e., µoutput  0.4) is shown in light gray and the resultant triangular fuzzy set is 
indicated in dark gray. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Approach used to modify fuzzy outputs used as inputs by other 
inference systems. 
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The value of 0.4 was chosen in order to reduce the effect of parts of low membership 
degree on the FIS that takes the fuzzy set as input (e.g white parts of the set in Figure 
6.9). However, the parts of the function with µoutput < 0.4 is taken into account by the 
crisp defuzzified value that is used as the second parameter of the triangular function. By 
the test performed on the systems, in general the defuzzified value is found within the 
support limited by µoutput  0.4. When the defuzzified result falls outside the range of the 
support limited by µoutput  0.4 the inputs are located in areas of high uncertainty and the 
defuzzified output is adjusted to coincide with either the lowest or highest value of the 
support where µoutput =0.4. 
 
 
6.5 INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY MODELING  
 
Fuzzy logic captures and models expert knowledge by using linguistic rules, which 
simplify the modeling process. The main steps for designing fuzzy logic system are: 
1) Expert knowledge collection about the most important factors that affect the systems 
and the behavior of the variables.  
2) Modeling of the knowledge by selecting the inputs to the system. The membership 
functions, fuzzy set and the fuzzy IF-THEN rules are developed at this stage. 
3) The fuzzy system is integrated by fuzzy logic software, and after test and validation 
the system must be optimized to ensure its reliability and accuracy. 
 
The development of the overall model for the evaluation of inherent safety is based 
on several steps. The first stage is the knowledge acquisition from technical information 
and literature, general models, expert knowledge, and data. The main objective of this 
stage is the identification of the most important parameters (i.e., linguistic variables) for 
the description of the each relevant aspect of the system, and the identification of the 
relations among the selected factors (i.e., fuzzy IF-THEN rules). This is a critical step 
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that requires the deep understanding of the physical behavior of each subsystem in order 
to identify the most significant factors. For instance, the hazard due to chemical releases 
is usually assessed by calculating the area covered by a potential chemical plume under 
specific release conditions and other factors such as atmospheric stability and ground 
characteristics. These factors, along with the characteristics of the population present 
around the release source, affect the overall risk. However, from the inherent safety 
viewpoint, the hazard magnitude is a function of the system only (e.g., chemical and 
vessel) and the comparison of factors such as type of phase released and general behavior 
of the substance at environmental conditions control the possibility of a cloud generation 
and dispersion. Following the basic idea of inherent safety, if the cloud cannot be formed 
then the hazard is eliminated. 
The knowledge acquisition for the present project is based on specialized literature 
review, simulation (e.g., dispersion modeling), engineering models, and expert 
assessment. Expert knowledge compilation through survey was not used because other 
researches have collected similar information [Lawrence, 1996] which has been used to 
identify weaknesses of other methodologies that have been addressed by the fuzzy-logic 
approach. This type of information collection was deliberately avoided in order to focus 
on the “reformulation of the problem” as indicated in Chapter IV and avoid the 
temptation to use traditional risk-based approaches. 
The second step of the fuzzy model development is the design of fuzzy sets and 
membership functions. The objective of this step is the identification of physical 
characteristics of each selected variables that can have a potential impact on the 
magnitude of the resultant hazard. To ensure the modeling capability the membership 
functions must describe the general physical meaning of each point on the range of the 
variable. For instance, in the case of operation temperature, points such as the boiling 
temperature and the flash point of the substance affect the potential formation of 
explosive clouds (in case of a flammable chemical) and their dispersion. These two 
points were used to design the granularity of the variable “temperature”. The granularity 
(i.e., number) and shape of functions for each variable was selected following the design 
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criteria proposed by Berkan and Trubatch (1997) and by applying the technical 
information collected during the previous stage. In some cases (e.g., corrosion 
evaluation) the granularity and shape of the membership functions depends on the 
chemical, hence they are variable and adaptive. In this case the user of the software is 
required to feed some parameters that are used to design the specific functions for the 
case analyzed. For certain linguistic variables (e.g., toxicity) with a wide universe of 
discourse (i.e., domain of a linguistic variable) a logarithm transformation was applied in 
order to preserve the narrower fuzzy sets (e.g., very low concentrations of highly toxic 
chemicals). 
The sensitivity of the model to the shape of the functions has been qualitatively 
analyzed comparing the response with the expected physical behavior (based on the 
knowledge of the system) and performing tests for the local systems. The potential utility 
of Adaptive Neural Fuzzy Inference Systems (ANFIS) algorithms for the design of 
membership functions was explored; however, the lack of data prevented the application 
of automated means for the design of membership functions and rules.  
The next step consists of the development of rule-base for each fuzzy inference 
system. The model selected for this application is the Mamdami model and it is based on 
IF-THEN rules. The rules must be able to describe the relation between the inputs for the 
local model and the output (e.g., hazard degree). As described in Chapter VI, this is 
equivalent to establishing a functionality between input variables and outputs but rather 
than being based on a traditional function such as z = f(x,y) here the obtained fuzzy 
graph is an approximation of the unknown relation. In other words, fuzzy logic modeling 
allows transforming the general knowledge expressed in terms of IF-THEN rules into a 
continuous non-linear mapping.  
The next step requires the design of the inference engine and the definition of the 
connectors AND and OR (as explained in Chapter V), the selection of the implication 
and aggregation operators, as well as a defuzzification methodology.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
FUZZY HIERARCHICAL MODEL FOR INHERENT SAFETY 
ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter introduces the general model developed for the evaluation of inherent 
safety including the assumptions and general features of the selected fuzzy inference 
systems.  
 
7.1 FUZZY MODELING 
The steps for the development of a fuzzy model were explained in Chapter VI. This 
section describes the characteristics of the hierarchical model for the evaluation of 
inherent safety. 
 
7.1.1  Fuzzy model specifications  
The used fuzzy model is the Mamdami algorithm because it works with IF-THEN 
rules whose antecedents and consequents are based on linguistic variables defined in 
terms of fuzzy sets. The Mamdami model is used rather than the TSK because the 
consequent part of the rules is expressed by fuzzy sets, instead of linear functions. Fuzzy 
sets are more convenient for the present application because they can express linguistic 
concepts and are easier to interpret. Because of this the obtained model is more 
transparent to the user and highly interpretable since the rules are easy to understand and 
visualize.  
The overall system is formed by 35 fuzzy inference systems (FIS) arranged in a 
hierarchical tree where the output from the lower levels are used as inputs for the lower 
levels. The user is required to provide 25 input values for the chemical substance, 
operating conditions, and vessel design. Other 11 parameters are required for the design 
of adaptive membership functions for the evaluation of dispersion hazard, corrosion 
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potential, and vessel operating conditions. The list of required inputs is reported in 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
 
 
 
Table 7.1: List of required input parameters (linguistic variables) 
HUMAN TOXICITY UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Acute oral toxicity mg/kg CHH1a 
Acute dermal toxicity mg/kg CHH1a 
Acute respiratory toxicity (vapor) ppm CHH2a 
Acute respiratory toxicity (gas) mg/l CHH2a 
Acute respiratory toxicity 
(dust/mist) 
mg/l CHH3a 
Human cancer evidence % CHHc 
Animal cancer evidence % CHHc 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Chemical water toxicity  LD50 CHEdt, CHEat 
Half-time chemical life days CHEdt 
Bioaccumulation factor - CHEat 
Troposphere half-time chemical life days CHEp 
Data quality: troposphere half-time  % CHEp 
FIRE AND EXPLOSION UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Normal boiling temperature °C CHPFa, DISP, DISPTX 
Flash temperature °C CHPFa, DISP 
Maximum potential density  W/ml CHPR 
Water heat of mixing cal/gr. CHPRh2o 
Unit average obstruction fraction % COOB 
Unit average congestion fraction % COOB 
Flame burning velocity cm/s COOB 
DISPERSION UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Vessel operation temperature °C DISP, DISPTX, CORRH 
Vessel operation pressure °C DISP, DISPTX 
Boiling temp. at vessel conditions °C DISP, DISPTX 
DESIGN UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Volume of vessel gal ISIMECH 
Nozzle diameter in NLD 
Nozzle level % NLD 
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Table 7.2: List of required input parameters for adaptive membership design 
DISPERSION UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Normal boiling temperature °C DISP, DISPTX * 
Flash temperature °C DISP * 
Atmospheric temperature °C DISP, DISPTX 
CORROSION UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Temp. for excellent resistance (metal) °C CORRH 
Temp. for good resistance (metal) °C CORRH 
Temp. for satisfactory res. (metal) °C CORRH 
Temp. for unsatisfactory res. (metal) °C CORRH 
Temp. for unsatisfactory res. (plastic) °C CORRH 
NOZZLE UNITS FIS WHERE INPUT IS USED 
Maximum operation level % NLD 
Normal operation level % NLD 
Low normal operation level % NLD 
Minimum operation level  % NLD 
Drain level % NLD 
* also used for evaluation (Table 7.1) 
 
 
 
Binary fuzzy relations evaluate the effect of the interaction of the linguistic variables 
or inputs (e.g., “overall mechanical hazard” is combined with “volume”). By combining 
only two (or three at most) variables per fuzzy inference system it is possible to obtain 
defuzzified surfaces that can be examined to ensure that the system behavior is as 
expected. Except for the fuzzy inference systems DISP and DISPTX that require three 
inputs (i.e., three antecedents are combined by the IF-THEN rules) the rest of the FIS 
require only one or two inputs. The system is designed in this way in order to facilitate 
the comprehension of the rules and allowing the analysis of the FIS by plotting the 
output, or fuzzy graph. 
The linguistic variables are combined by IF-THEN rules that are not modified by 
weights; therefore it is implicitly assumed that all the linguistic variables (i.e., inputs) 
have the same importance. In some cases, synergetic effects among input variables have 
been assumed, and the rule set takes care of it.  
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The logic operators (i.e., AND, OR) are based on the standard max and min 
operators. The choice of the operators for intersection and union (minimum (min) for 
intersection and maximum (max) for union) is not unique. Several operators have been 
proposed in the literature and each one targets specific characteristics of different 
problems. The operators selected here (min and max) are the classical operators in fuzzy 
logic and they are analogous to the logical operators AND (Boolean conjunction) and 
OR (Boolean disjunction). In the case of the classical fuzzy intersection or min operator, 
the lowest degree of membership involved in the intersection dictates the result of the 
operation. This situation is similar to the common metaphor that a chain is as strong as 
its weakest link.  
On the other hand, for fuzzy union, the max operator chooses the highest degree of 
membership among the involved values. These standard fuzzy operators are the only 
ones that satisfy all six required mathematical axioms, explained in Chapter V. Two of 
the most important axioms require the operators to be continuous and idempotent. In 
other words, the continuity axiom ensures that a small change in the membership 
function of one set (e.g., either Â or ) will not produce a large change in the 
membership function of the set Ê given by union or intersection. The independency 
axiom ensures that the union or intersection of one fuzzy set with itself will result in the 
same fuzzy set [Klir and Folger , 1988].  
The implication operators are based on a Mamdani type, while the defuzzification 
methodology chosen is the center of mass (COM) approach. These options for 
implication methodology and defuzzification are commonly used for the Mamdani 
algorithm. 
 
7.1.2  Variable type and fuzzy set design  
The variables selected for the proposed model are identified among the most relevant 
for the evaluation of inherent safety. The main idea on which they have been selected is 
their physical significance in terms of objective interpretation based on physical 
consequences (e.g., explosion overpressure) and physically meaningful thresholds. This 
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characteristic is required in order to eliminate the uncertainty derived from subjective 
interpretation.  
One of the problems associated with variable selection is the fact that while some 
hazards depend only on chemical characteristics, others depend on the combination of 
chemical and design factors. A finer classification is shown in Table 7.3, where the 
variable type is classified by type of threshold and type of property. 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Variable types 
VARIABLE TYPES 
BASED ON THRESHOLDS BASED ON PROPERTIES 
On inputs Physicochemical properties  
On outputs Design properties 
Mixed Interaction 
 
 
 
An example of a variable type based on input thresholds is flammability, which is 
defined based on boiling and flash temperature; once the system has reached specific 
conditions based on these parameters it is considered to be in the flammable range. 
Toxicity is an example of a variable based on output thresholds; a chemical is classified 
as more or less hazardous depending on the effects on living organisms such as mice and 
rabbits. Even though, other toxicological parameters affect the outcome (i.e., dosage, 
time, body mass, stress level during intoxication) they are not taken into account for the 
toxicological classification. An example of variables that could be classified under a 
combination of output and input thresholds is chemical reactivity. Although this is 
subject of intensive investigation around the world, there is not yet a consensus on a 
methodology for reactivity classification. While the NFPA has developed a scoring 
system based on output threshold (i.e., instantaneous power density or IPD) the use of 
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onset temperature could be classified as an input-based threshold. However, design and 
operating parameters may also have an effect on the classification of reactivity. 
For the classification of variables based on properties, while some of the variables 
common in process safety depend only on physicochemical properties of the substances, 
others depend on design factors, and some others require a combination of 
physicochemical properties and design characteristics. Burning velocity of a chemical is 
a physicochemical property only but the flame speed velocity for the same substance 
depends on the combination of the burning velocity and design factors (e.g., degree of 
confinement) that affects the turbulence. For example, hydrogen and propane are both 
classified as highly flammable gases  (NFPA flammability score of 4) but, while 
hydrogen has one of the highest burning velocities (320 cm/sin air and  1175 cm/s in 
oxygen, [Lees, 1996]), propane has a low burning velocity (45 cm/s in air and 390 cm/s 
in oxygen [Less, 1996)]. However, depending on the confinement degree of the unit 
where the release happens, the effects of the flame velocity will change generating more 
or less destruction. An example of a variable that depends only on design parameters is 
volume of the vessel or equipment. 
The variable type based on thresholds is important because it affects the 
methodology followed for the design of the membership functions and fuzzy inference 
systems. In the case of variables that depend on output thresholds (e.g., toxicity), the 
physical effects (i.e., rules outputs) are already defined in terms of comparable values, 
while the rules antecedents are also defined as a function of the outputs. Toxicity is an 
example of this type of variables. When the variable is based on input thresholds (e.g., 
flammability), then in order to design the rule consequent (i.e., output) it is required to 
use simulation in order to identify the consequences and translate them into a scale of 
physical effects. Explosion is an example of this type of variables, and the rules output is 
designed based on source models for releases, dispersion modeling, and overpressure 
evaluation.  
Variable type based on design is important for the structure of the proposed 
hierarchical tree, because the design properties must be combined with physicochemical 
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inputs in order to evaluate their interaction and obtain a better idea of the resultant 
hazard. The evaluation of fire and explosion hazards requires the combination of 
flammability (i.e., chemical property) with the unit obstruction and congestion measures 
(i.e., design parameters). The evaluation of design hazard due to nozzle location and 
diameter is based only on equipment characteristics. 
After the selection of the variables presented in Table 7.1, the granularity (i.e., 
number of fuzzy sets and location) for each one of them was decided based on physical 
principles, as explained in Chapter VIII. The maximum number of membership function 
for each variable is seven as indicated in Chapter VI, because of the limited human 
capacity to manage a larger number of categories. The shapes used for the membership 
functions are triangular and trapezoidal because they represent a tradeoff between 
modeling flexibility and simplicity. The details of the selection of each shape for each 
particular variable are explained in Chapter VIII.  
The universe of discourse (i.e., range of interest of the variables) is defined by their 
physical units, however in order to follow the design principles suggested by Berkan and 
Trubatch (1997), when the range is too wide (e.g., more than 150 units) a logarithm 
transformation is used (e.g., toxicity range goes from 0.001 ppm to 1,000 ppm) in order 
to preserve the effect of the narrower sets (e.g., high toxicity sets) with respect to the 
wider ones (e.g., low toxicity). The transformation does not affect the rest of the 
algorithm; however it has an impact on the value of membership of the input. Because 
the range of membership degree µ is [0,1], if the universe of discourse is very wide the 
membership function would be stretched (as explained in Chapter VI) reducing their 
sensitivity to the inputs.   
Fuzzy logic allows working with uncertain information. This is achieved through the 
use of membership functions and the use of inputs based on fuzzy numbers rather than 
crisp values. This characteristic of fuzzy systems is particularly important for the present 
model where most of the required inputs present high degrees of vagueness and 
uncertainty. Because of this problem, the proposed system allows the user to feed inputs 
either as crisp or fuzzy numbers. In the case of fuzzy inputs, the available information 
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regarding a input variable is converted to a fuzzy number by defining the lowest possible 
value, most likely value, and most likely maximum value. In the case of operating 
conditions, the range could represent the normal variability of the process (e.g., normal 
operating temperature fluctuates between 40 and 50  °C). 
Hierarchical trees combine several fuzzy inference systems and the inputs to the 
upper branches are the outputs from the lower branches of the tree (as shown in Figures 
7.1 to 7.9). The output of a fuzzy inference system can be a fuzzy set or the defuzzified 
crisp value. The system developed here uses both outputs to define the input to the next 
branch. However, in order to reduce the uncertainty given by low-membership values 
(i.e., µ < 0.4) the fuzzy output is clipped at µ = 0.4, defining then the fuzzy number by 
three parameters:  
- Minimum value for the input fuzzy set: minimum value of the output fuzzy set where 
µ = 0.4 
- Most likely value: defuzzified result of the output set 
- Maximum value for the input fuzzy set: maximum value of the output fuzzy set 
where µ = 0.4 
 
Other proposed approaches have been explained in Chapter VI but the selected one 
offers a good compromise between accuracy and simplicity. The sensitivity of the model 
to the shape of the functions has been qualitatively analyzed comparing the response 
with the expected physical behavior (based on the knowledge on the system) and 
performing tests as proposed by Boston (1995). The potential utility of Adaptive Neural 
Fuzzy Inference Systems (ANFIS) algorithms for the design of membership functions 
was explored; however, the lack of data avoided the application of automated means for 
the design of membership functions and rules.  
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7.1.3  Output design  
The design of the output requires special consideration because it is common to all 
the fuzzy inference systems and must give an indication of the physical hazard. The 
interval [0,1] is the range chosen for the output; 0 indicates total lack of hazard and 1 
indicates a very hazardous situation. The lack of hazard is only achievable when 
equipment and chemicals have specific safe conditions, which are expressed through 
strict IF-THEN rules. In general, as shown by the figures in Chapter VII, the absolutely 
non-hazardous states are single points at the origin of the defuzzified surface plots, 
therefore they are difficult to achieve. 
An additional reference point on the output scale is set at 0.5; this fuzzy threshold 
establishes a separation between conditions of low hazard, assumed to be inherently 
safer, and conditions that tend to be hazardous and therefore cannot be classified as 
inherently safer. If the value of the output is smaller than 0.5, then the degree of inherent 
safety increases until becoming “absolute” when it reaches the limit (i.e., 0). When the 
value of the output is larger than 0.5 it is assumed that the principles of inherent safety 
must be applied in order to reduce the inherent hazard.  
The relative importance between the real values on the output scale is not ensured; 
for example output = 0.3 cannot be understood as being twice as safe as an output = 0.6. 
However, special care has been taken in order to provide correspondence for the output 
of the different FIS. For example, 0.5 represents the threshold between the inherently 
safer region and the non-inherently safer region for all the inference systems. The 
equivalence is based on the potential physical impacts on the combinations of input 
parameters. When there is possibility of irreversible effects on population, environment, 
or equipment, then the output must always be above 0.5; as the magnitude of the 
consequences increases, the index must also then increase to 1. When the consequences 
are reversible then the index should be below 0.5 with a tendency to zero when the 
magnitude of the consequences is negligible. The selected approach simplifies the 
aggregation process by mapping the inputs and their interaction to a common “hazard 
possibility index”.  
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7.1.4  Rule design  
For each one of the 35 FIS, a different set of IF-THEN rules was designed according 
to the general knowledge and information regarding the physical behavior of each 
system. The purpose of the rules is to map each combination of fuzzy sets for the input 
variables to a fuzzy set for the output variable. The rules must be able to describe and 
capture the expected behavior of the physical system when the values of the input factors 
correspond to the specific range defined for the input fuzzy sets.  
When a specific rule requires two inputs each one with i and j fuzzy sets respectively, 
the completely specified rule-bases requires (i x j) rules. However, in order to simplify 
and optimize the system it is possible to eliminate certain rules. For this work, most of 
the fuzzy inference systems are based on completely specified rule-bases; however, in 
certain cases simplification were made. In other cases some of the rules do not have 
physical significance but are part of the rule-matrix to ensure the behavior of the system 
along the borders of the region of physical significance. An example of this case is the 
combination of “high congestion” with “low obstruction” for the evaluation of the degree 
of congestion of a unit.  
The Mamdani algorithm allows the specification of weighting factors to assign 
different degrees of importance to each rule, but for the present model it is assumed that 
all the rules have the same significance, hence all the weights are set to 1. As indicated 
by Berkan and Trubatch (1997), when hierarchical systems are used, the individual rule 
design is not affected; however, care must be taken in order to ensure that the overall 
behavior of the system is as required. The test of individual rules and rules sets is 
described in Chapter VII and is mainly related to the evaluation of specific cases.  
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7.1.5 Software 
The software used for the design and evaluation of the fuzzy inference systems is 
MATLAB® and the basic software for the functions for the Mamdami algorithm and 
fuzzy operations are from Hines (1997). The basic algorithm has been adapted to the 
needs of this research. 
 
 
7.2 ON SCALE THEORY AND VARIABLE TYPE 
 
As explained in Chapter IV several of the indices used in process safety have a 
classificatory nature, due to the lack of understanding of the physical phenomena to 
convert them into quantitative measures. According to Torgerson (1958) the 
classificatory concepts about properties are substituted by quantitative measures as 
science progresses. The transition from classificatory indices to quantitative measures 
offers several advantages [Torgerson, 1958]: 
- Ordering of lumped elements: a quantitative measure allows establishing a logic 
relative sequence of elements classified under the same category. For instance, while 
the vague concept “warm” can group several objects whose temperature is neither 
high nor low, the use of the quantitative construct “temperature” allows classifying 
the object within the same category of warm. A similar problem exists in safety and 
as indicated in Chapter II, score-based indices exhibit lack of sensitivity within the 
limits of the subintervals and excess of sensitivity at the sub-range thresholds. For 
example, if the temperature range between 0  T < 70  °C receives a score of 0, the 
range between 70  T < 150  °C receives a score of 1 and the range between 150  T 
< 300  °C receives a score of 2 [Heikkila, 1999], then a temperature of 70 °C has the 
same significance as a temperature of 140 °C. However, since the physical 
implications of a temperature of 69.9 °C are practically the same as the implication at 
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70 °C (but they receive different scores), and 150.1 °C can be assumed to be the 
same as 150 °C, then 69.9 °C and       150.1 °C should also be the same (and with 
them the rest of the intervals between 70-150  °C and 150-300  °C). This is the same 
paradox introduced in Chapter VI by the discussion about the vagueness associated 
with weather classification. 
- Increased descriptive capability: quantitative measures allow the formulation of 
general physical models. For instance, the relation between temperature change and 
the variation of height of a mercury column cannot be established by using 
classificatory concepts.  
- Application of theories of higher mathematics: when a quantitative measure is used 
the general laws can be expressed in terms of equations (e.g., the calibration curve 
for a mercury thermometer expresses the relation between temperature and mercury 
height) and can be linked to other theories (i.e., the concept and measurement of 
temperature played a fundamental role in the development of thermodynamics).  
 
A fundamental distinction between two important types of constructs, systems and 
properties, must be established here. While systems are formed by objects and properties, 
only the latter can be measured while the former can only be classified. Properties of a 
system can be observed, hence measured, however the system by itself cannot be 
measured [Torgerson, 1958]. 
A type of construct that is important in safety is the consequences of an incident. The 
consequences can be assumed to be another system formed by objects and properties. For 
instance, the consequences of a fire can be explosion, damage due to overpressure, 
fatalities and injuries. Some of them are objects (e.g., fire and damage) while others are 
properties. The distinction becomes important when measuring safety because fire 
cannot be measured hence flammability is assessed by using intrinsic properties of the 
chemicals representative of the degree of easiness with which the chemical is ignited. 
The effect of the explosion can however be measured in terms of the magnitude of the 
overpressure generated from the explosion (i.e., TNO multi-energy model). On the other 
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hand, the consequence of exposure to a toxic chemical could be different type of 
systemic injuries, and fatalities. In this case the potential toxic effects of a chemical are 
assessed by using the effects of the chemicals (i.e., LD 50) rather than its intrinsic 
properties. These are examples of “proxies” [Bradley and Schaefer, 1998] which are 
characteristics used to describe entities that cannot be measured. 
 
7.2.1  Measurement scale types   
After the properties that need to be measured are selected an isomorphism must be 
established by developing a one-to-one relationship between a certain quantity of the 
property and a specific number that is assigned to the measured quantity. The numbers 
assigned are located on the real axis (or real number series) and have the following 
characteristics: 
- Order: the numbers are ordered 
- Distance: the difference between a pair of numbers is ordered with respect to 
difference between any other pair (e.g., larger, equal, or smaller) 
- Origin: the real number series has a unique origin (i.e., zero). 
 
Depending on how many characteristics are obeyed by the isomorphism, the obtained 
measurement scale is different. Order is the only property held by all scales then, 
depending on the presence of the other two properties, four different unidimensional 
scales can be obtained: 
1. Ordinal scale: in this case there is no natural origin and the property of distance is not 
obeyed. Data on this scale is ordered but not in a quantitative way. The numbers 
assigned to the magnitude of the property follow the same relative order as the 
relative order of magnitude.  
2. Ordinal scale with natural origin: this ordinal scale has the additional restriction that 
the lack of the property receives a score of zero. An example of this is the NFPA 
scoring system; a score of 3 for flammability means that the chemical is more 
“flammable” than another chemical with a score of 2 or 1. When the score is 0, the 
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chemical is classified as nonflammable. However, in the case of flammability the 
score indicates the relative distance between flash temperature and boiling point with 
the atmospheric temperature, as described in Chapter VII. Ordinal scales are 
described by monotonic increasing functions such as f(x) > f(y) if a > b. 
3. Interval scale: in this case there is no origin but the order of the number assigned to a 
specific magnitude of the property follows the same relative order of the magnitude, 
and additionally the difference between two scores is representative of the difference 
in magnitude between two states of the property. An example of this type of scale is 
time. Other examples are the Celsius and Fahrenheit temperature scales. Here a 
positive linear transformation such as f(x) = ax + b where x > 0 is used. However, the 
position of the zero is not fixed and varies with the value of b. 
4. Ratio scale: when the interval scale has a meaningful zero indicating a natural origin 
(i.e., lack of the specific property), hence here the distance is related to the origin. In 
this case the ratio between two numbers is meaningful. Examples of this type of scale 
are the Kelvin and Ranking, temperature scales, length, and weight. A similarity 
transformation of the type f(x) = ax with x > 0 is used and implies that no matter the 
value of a, the zero does not change. 
 
An additional scale, the nominal scale, is the simplest and only requires 
categorization without following a logical order. Each category receives a name, which 
cannot be logically ordered with respect to other classes. For instance, type of processing 
equipment classified according to unit operation. The objects must be classified 
according to a specific property or set of properties, however for this scale only the 
presence or absence of the specific property is important, while for the other scale the 
“amount” or magnitude of property present is required.  
This type of scale is similar to the classification of a chemical processing plant as 
safe/unsafe based on the presence/absence of a specific set of properties (i.e., low risk 
from the traditional safety viewpoint). However, in Chapter IV it was noted that safety 
cannot be classified in such a dichotomy because of the complexities involved in the 
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problem, and it would be better to use “degree of safetiness” as also indicated by 
Mansfield and Cassidy (1991). Torgerson (1958) presents further analysis about scale 
types and conceptual interpretations from various authors.  
Assuming that our system is a specific type of equipment (e.g., vessel) and we are 
interested in measuring the degree of hazard inherent in the vessel due to its mechanical 
design, its operating conditions or the chemical, we need to identify measurable 
properties that can be related to the “degree of hazard”. Since inherent safety deals with 
the elimination or reduction of hazards, it is possible to infer that the “degree of inherent 
safety” is directly related to the “degree of hazard” of the vessel. As explained in Chapter 
IV, the absolute state of inherent safety occurs when all sources of hazard have been 
removed; therefore the degree of hazard is zero. This limit establishes a natural origin for 
the measurement of inherent safety, hence the only scales that can be used are ordinal 
with origin or ratio (which is the interval scale with origin).  
 
7.2.2  Application to safety evaluation   
While the information presented in Chapter IV suggests that it should be possible to 
develop an interval or ratio scale for inherent safety evaluation, the lack of information 
as well as the lack of a “theory of safety” able to connect the available constructs, limits 
the progress toward the development of such “safety scale”. A scale for inherent safety 
could be developed by comparing the magnitude of the physical consequences associated 
with certain combination of parameters to the consequences of a standard set of 
conditions whose known consequences can be assumed to be “inherently safer” because 
they do not pose a substantial hazard. For example, the release of a flammable chemical 
in vapor form at low pressure implies a lower hazard degree than the release of the same 
chemical in a liquid form at high pressure and temperature. The reference states should 
be chosen for each set of rules and requires not only consensus among safety 
practitioners (in order to make sure that the selected “inherently safer” reference state is 
widely accepted) but requires also the development of data through modeling and 
simulation, and in some cases a better scientific understanding of the phenomena 
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involved, as in the case of reactive chemicals. Because of the previous limitations and 
research challenges, for this prototype model, the scale of “inherent safety” is based on a 
continuous ordinal scale between 0 and 1 with two fixed points: 0 for no hazard and 0.5 
for the reference threshold as explained in section 1.4 of this chapter.  
 
 
7.3 MODEL OVERVIEW FOR INHERENT SAFETY 
 
This section introduces the general inherent safety model proposed by this research 
however, the hierarchical fuzzy model described in next section, only focuses on the first 
part of the overall model.  
 
7.3.1 Description of the overall inherent safety model  
In Chapter II and IV it was indicated that inherent safety is complementary to the 
traditional safety model, and it is suggested as the first option in order to reduce process 
hazards and the consequent risk. It was also stated that inherent safety must be applied by 
looking at the whole chemical plant as a system in order to identify hazard migration 
problems. Another aspect that must be taken into account is the fact that hazard will 
“migrate” outside the boundary of the plant if hazard reduction is sought through 
reduction of storage capacity and transportation of chemical substances is not taken into 
consideration.  
Therefore, following the format of fuzzy IF-THEN rules to capture all the relevant 
aspects related to inherent safety, the next two overall rules can be developed. The first 
rule is: 
 
IF    “chemical hazard” is “LOW”    AND “dispersion potential” is   “LOW” 
AND    “design hazard”     is “LOW”    THEN  “inherent safety level” is “HIGH” 
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The evaluation of “chemical hazard” is based on chemical properties that describe 
the potential toxicological, environmental, and explosion hazard. The “dispersion 
potential” depends on chemical properties but also operating conditions, while “design 
hazard” depends mainly on characteristics of the plant but also on some chemical 
properties. This is the part of the overall model addressed by this research and the 
proposed hierarchical model is explained in the next section.  
It is assumed that each equipment, pipe, and element of a plant contributes in some 
degree to the overall hazard; therefore the previous rule must be applied to each 
equipment and pipe. The summation of all the indices will represent the overall hazard 
score for the plant. This idea is similar to the concept of cost, where the total cost of the 
plant is the summation of the individual costs of each equipment and pipe. 
However, inherent safety cannot always be achieved because of technical or 
economic limitations in the application of the principles. As a result, options to reduce 
risk (but not hazard) such as the application of passive and active layers of protection, 
and administrative controls, are used to increase the extrinsic safety level.  
Looking at another aspect of the problem, true inherent safety can only be achieved 
without minimizing the transportation hazards, although this could decrease the chances 
for eliminating plant hazards by inventory reduction. The rule here should be: 
 
IF     “inherent safety level” is “LOW”    AND   “transportation hazard” is   “LOW”   
THEN      “overall inherent safety level” is “HIGH” 
 
Transportation is addressed in this research by evaluating chemical transportation by 
train and the proposed preliminary model is briefly described in Chapter X. 
An additional fuzzy inference system can be developed in the future in order to 
evaluate the relation between the size of a plant and its overall inherent safety index 
(calculated as the contributions for each piece of equipment). A large plant with a low 
inherent safety index can have a lower hazard density than a small plant with a low 
index. Plants with high hazard density could have more opportunities for design 
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improvement than plants with low hazard density. A small plant with high inherent 
safety index (hence very high hazard density) could be very inherently unsafe. Several 
tests must be performed before the set of rules for the consistency rules can be designed 
because it is necessary to analyze several case studies on real plants, which is outside the 
reach of this project. 
 
 
7.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE INHERENT SAFETY HIERARCHICAL MODEL 
 
The basic assumption upon which the methodology is based is that every piece of 
equipment and pipeline acts as a vessel with a double objective: 
- accomplish a specific processing task (i.e., unit operation) 
- keep the chemical substances confined avoiding releases to the environment 
 
For example, the task of a storage tank is to accumulate a certain volume of 
chemicals, while the task of a pump is to increase the pressure of a specific stream. For a 
process vessel, the task could be mixing to obtain a homogeneous chemical mixture or to 
ensure homogenous heat transfer. The loss of the mixing action (due to malfunction or 
other upsets) may imply the appearance of hazards due to heterogeneous properties such 
as hot spots or points with concentrations different from specifications. In the case of 
reactive chemicals, the heterogeneity can result in a runaway reaction. Hence there are 
hazards inherent to the specific task of the equipment.  
Regardless of the specific task, every equipment and pipeline has a common purpose 
related to avoidance of releases of chemicals. Based on this assumption a general model 
for the evaluation of hazards and their interactions can be developed. The general 
hazards analyzed by the proposed model are: 
- explosion due to continuous release of flammable chemicals 
- toxic dispersion and environmental impact due to continuous release of toxic 
substances 
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The model can analyze these hazards for pure chemicals, released from vessels such 
as storage tanks and process drums. The application to towers, heat exchangers, and 
pipelines is possible by modifying the basic model. For instance, heat exchangers can be 
modeled as two vessels; however, the hazard derived from mixing the two streams is not 
accounted for. Distillation towers can be modeled by assuming that the normal liquid 
level is the one present for the reboiler. The following aspects are not considered: 
- Internal explosions 
- Sudden release of chemicals (i.e., puff dispersion model) 
- Domino effect 
- Stability of process control related to volume intensification 
- Mixtures of chemicals (unless the required mixture properties are calculated by using 
accepted methodologies) 
- Reactivity with air or incompatible chemical contaminants  
- Toxicity of combustion products 
- Toxicity of reaction products due to environmental degradation 
- Reaction due to mixture of incompatible chemicals 
- External corrosion due to specific environments 
- Corrosion under insulation 
 
However, in the future, specific models for each type of hazard and each type of 
equipment can be developed by adding the required design parameters and developing 
the fuzzy IF-THEN rules. 
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7.4.1 Description of the basic hierarchical model for vessel i in unit j 
The basic event taken into account by the model is the release of chemical 
substances and the possible consequences in terms of fire and explosion, toxic effects on 
humans and the environment as well as long-term effects on the atmosphere. Problems 
associated to the loss of production due to process upsets that reduce the quality of the 
final product are not considered. 
The model takes into account the interaction of several parameters, by using 35 sets 
of IF-THEN rules arranged in a hierarchical tree-like structure that describes the 
potential hazard due to combinations of specific conditions such as chemical properties, 
operating conditions, and equipment design parameters. Figure 7.1 presents the 
explanation of the symbols used for the diagrams in Figures 7.2 through 7.9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Explanation of symbols used in Figures 7.2 through 7.9 
 
 
 
The first layer of the tree (i.e., Layer 1 in Figure 7.2) describes the inherent safety 
level (ISL) as a fuzzy index (FISIij) of the equipment i located in unit j as a function 
inversely proportional to the amount of hazard inherent to the chemical properties of the 
 
 
FISIij Overall hazard evaluation (inherent safety index) for equipment i in unit j 
Fuzzy inference system  
Output/input from/to fuzzy inference system on different 
figures 
User input for the evaluation of a fuzzy inference system  
User input for the design of adaptive membership functionsence 
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substances (which are also affected by specific operating conditions) and the 
characteristics of the design of the equipment including volume. The description of the 
interaction between the two main sources of hazards is obtained by the first set of IF-
THEN rules of the form: 
 
IF (“chemical hazard” is ____) AND (“mechanical hazard” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
This rule expresses the principles of “intensification”, “moderation”, and 
“substitution”, by indicating that “chemical hazard” can be reduced either by selecting a 
less hazardous chemical and/or less hazardous processing conditions (evaluated in Layer 
2.1) while the potential consequences of “mechanical hazard” can be reduced by using 
smaller volumes and/or more benign operating conditions (evaluated in Layer 2.2) as 
shown in Figure 7.2. However, in order to assign each a high degree of inherent safety 
(i.e., low inherent hazard, FISIij <0.5) both conditions, “chemical hazard” and 
“mechanical hazard”, must be low. The outputs from Layer 2.1 and Layer 2.2 are used as 
the inputs for Layer 1, and they are calculated by evaluating respectively the fuzzy 
inference systems for “chemical and design hazards” (ISICHEM), and “mechanical and 
design hazards” (ISIMECH) as indicated in Figure 7.2. 
The combination of hazards posed by the chemical substances present in the 
equipment i being analyzed is evaluated by the FIS called “Hazard due to chemical and 
design factors” (ISICHEM) whose IF-THEN rules combine the results of the inference 
systems that evaluate toxic chemical hazard (for humans and environmental) and hazards 
due to flammability and reactivity behavior. The IF-THEN rules evaluated for ISICHEM 
have the following general structure: 
 
IF (“fire/explosion/reactivity hazard” is ____) AND (“toxicity/environmental 
impact” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
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Figure 7.2: Hierarchical tree for Layer 1 and Layers 2.1 and 2.2 
 
 
 
The objective of this set of rules is the identification of conflicts between process 
safety requirements and environmental requirements. In order to be considered inherently 
safer a chemical must show low toxicity, be environmental friendly, and have low 
flammability and reactivity. If any of these properties is high then the inherent hazard 
posed by the substance in equipment i will increase. It is important to clarify that design 
factors, such as operating conditions, are able to modify the inherent hazard due to 
chemical properties of the substances; however, this is taken into account by the next 
layer as explained below. The inherent safety principle evaluated is “substitution”. 
As shown in Figure 7.2, the hazards due to the interaction of mechanical and design 
factors is evaluated by the FIS called ISIMECH which describes principles such as 
“minimization”, “moderation” and “simplification”. The general objective of this set of 
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rules is to capture the possibility of release occurrence due to vessel failure caused by 
internal corrosion, or chemical release due to failure of vessel connections such as 
nozzles and other penetrations of the wall of the tank. The set of IF-THEN rules 
evaluated for ISIMECH has the following general form: 
 
IF (“hazard due to mechanical design” is ____) AND (“volume” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
An important factor used as input for this FIS is the volume of the vessel. For this 
FIS the effect of the volume plays a double role since it affects the amount of chemical 
substance contained, but also is an indication of the area of plastic or metal surface 
exposed to the chemical and subject to corrosion or other forms of mechanical failure. If 
the potential for failure is high but volume is small, then the overall hazard obtained by 
the interaction of the two factors is reduced.  
By including the variable “volume” at this point it is possible to capture the 
importance of this variable for inherent safety, as recognized by several authors and also 
often misunderstood, as explained in Chapter IV, when volume reduction is seen as the 
sole approach for reaching an inherently safer design. The value of volume has the power 
to minimize or magnify the hazard posed by chemical properties, operating conditions, 
or mechanical design. If the potential for mechanical failure is low but the volume is 
large then the overall hazard due to the interaction is high but must be combined with the 
chemical hazard; if chemical hazard is low then the overall hazard will be low to giving 
then a high degree of inherent safety, but if the chemical substance presents a high 
degree of hazard (which is obtained by combining chemical properties and operating 
conditions) then the overall hazard level will be higher yielding a lower inherent safety 
level.  
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7.4.2 Description of the hierarchical model for chemical hazard: toxicity  
The inherent chemical hazard due to toxicity combines two factors, hazards due to 
human toxicity and due to environmental impact, with the dispersion potential in case of 
release. The hierarchical tree is shown in Figure 7.3. 
The fuzzy inference system called “Hazard due to toxicity, environmental impact, 
and potential dispersion” (AGCHM) is formed by a set of IF-THEN rules of the type: 
 
IF (“human/environmental chemical hazard” is ____) AND  
(“hazard due to toxic dispersion” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of hazards due to chemical properties 
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The rules evaluate the interaction between the toxicity potential with the possibility 
of releasing the substance in a physical form capable of dispersing into the environment. 
The analyzed inherent safety principles are “substitution” and “moderation”. If the 
chemical is not toxic or the operating conditions are able to reduce the dispersion 
potential, then the hazard posed by the vessel is reduced. However, if the chemical is 
toxic for humans and/or the environment and is managed at conditions such as high 
pressure and/or high temperature, then the potential for releasing large quantities able to 
vaporize and disperse increases, reducing the inherent safety level of the equipment 
(expressed as high hazard level).  
The “hazard due to toxic dispersion” (DISPTX) requires inputs from the user in 
order to evaluate the rules but also to define the parameters of the membership functions, 
which for this fuzzy inference system are adaptive. The information required for the 
design of the membership functions is; 
- Normal boiling temperature 
- Boiling temperature at vessel pressure 
- Atmospheric temperature 
 
The input parameters for the FIS are: 
- Operation temperature of the vessel 
- Operating pressure of the vessel 
 
The values for these inputs can be provided as crisp numbers (e.g., operation 
temperature = 45 °C and pressure = 4 atm) or they can be given as fuzzy numbers 
representing the expected variation in the vessel temperature and pressure (e.g., 
maximum operation temperature = 55 °C, normal operation temperature = 45 °C, 
minimum operation temperature = 35 °C). The use of a range of temperature and 
pressure increases the uncertainty of the analysis, (i.e., more rules are fired) but increases 
the flexibility of the methodology because rather than exploring one single operation 
point, the whole region where the equipment is likely to operate is analyzed. The 
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objective of the IF-THEN rules for this FIS is the detection of operating points near the 
saturation curves. In this region, when the chemicals are released in the liquid phase 
(e.g., operating temperature lower than saturation temperature at the vessel pressure) the 
released mass flow is higher compared to a vapor release (e.g., operating temperature 
higher than saturation temperature at the vessel pressure). However, if the released 
chemical is in the liquid phase and the vessel operates at a temperature higher than the 
normal boiling point, then the liquid will totally or partially vaporize producing a vapor 
cloud that will be dispersed. If the pressure of the vessel is higher than the atmospheric 
pressure, then the released flow rate increases but also increases the possibility of aerosol 
formation that increases the evaporation rate. The fuzzy IF-THEN rules used for DIPTX 
have the following general form: 
 
IF (“vessel temperature” is ____) AND (“vessel temperature” is ____) AND 
(“vessel pressure” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The input “vessel temperature” is used by two linguistic variables and the logic 
behind this requirement is explained in Chapter VII. The traditional approach for 
dispersion modeling requires weather and wind parameters (e.g., atmospheric stability, 
wind velocity) however in this case it is assumed that in order to be dispersed a chemical 
has to be released. If the mass of the released chemical is small then the hazard is 
reduced regardless of weather conditions. However, if the released mass is large and has 
the potential to quickly evaporate and form a toxic cloud, then the toxic hazard will be 
large. A similar approach is followed by Hendershot (2003) to demonstrate the effect of 
phase type on the total mass of released chlorine from a pipeline of liquid chlorine and 
another of gas chlorine. The weather and wind parameters change the shape (e.g., length, 
width, height) of the cloud in predictable ways and, and unless the wind is strong enough 
to quickly dilute the cloud, the dispersion hazard remains.  
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The fuzzy inference system “Human and environmental hazard” (AGCH) shown in 
Figure 7.3 has the objective to combine the effect of the chemicals on human as well on 
water organisms, animal, and the troposphere. The IF-THEN rules have the general 
form: 
 
IF (“human toxicity” is ____) AND (“environmental impact” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
and evaluate the inherent safety principle “substitution”. In order to be considered 
inherently safer a chemical must show low or no human toxicity but also low or no 
environmental impact. If either two effects are capable of producing adverse 
consequences, then the hazard level increases reducing the degree on inherent safety. 
The hierarchical tree for the evaluation of the environmental hazard due to toxicity is 
shown in Figure 7.4. 
The evaluation of environmental impacts is divided in two main parts, water/soil and 
air impacts, combined by the FIS called “Hazard due to water/soil and troposphere 
toxicity” (AGET). This set of rules evaluates the environmental part of the inherent 
safety principle “substitution” in the sense that, in order to be inherently safer from the 
environmental view point, a chemical must show certain characteristics given by the 
outputs from two other FIS: “Hazard due to atmospheric stability” (CHEp), and “Hazard 
due to bioaccumulation potential and degradability” (CHPF). The IF-THEN rules for 
AGET have the form: 
 
IF (“bioaccumulation/degradability” is ____) AND (“atmospheric stability” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The ISL index will be high only when both antecedents of the rules reflect low inherent 
hazard; if both or either antecedent imply high hazard, the ISL index will be low.  
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As shown in Figure 7.4, “atmospheric stability” is evaluated by a FIS whose inputs 
have to be fed by the user for the chemical used by the equipment being evaluated. The 
required information is: 
- Troposphere half-life time 
- Quality of used data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of environmental hazard due to chemical 
properties 
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can be fed as a fuzzy number indicating the possible range of values that can be assigned 
to the parameter. This option reduces the uncertainty associated with the decision about 
which number to choose from a possible set of values given by different references.  
On the other hand, each source of information can have a different level of accuracy 
and credibility and this type of uncertainty is also taken into account by the second input. 
The details of the FIS are explained in Chapter VII. The set of IF-THEN rules for CHEp 
has the following general form: 
 
IF (“troposphere half-life time” is ____) AND (“quality of information” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
If the half-life time in the troposphere is large then the chemical tends to be less 
degradable therefore will accumulate. An example of this type of behavior is given by 
the chlorofluorocarbons that not only accumulate but also interact with the ozone layer. 
In this case the possibility of atmospheric reaction is not included because of the lack of 
information easily accessible to non-experts in the field. 
The evaluation of the chemical hazard to the biota is estimated by the fuzzy inference 
system called “hazard due to bioaccumulation potential and degradability” (CHPF), as 
shown in Figure 7.4. This FIS combines the effects due to bioaccumulation, water and 
animal toxicity, and degradability; when either of these characteristics, or its 
combination, implies threat to the biota the overall hazard level increases reducing the 
degree of inherent safety. Therefore, this FIS evaluates another aspect of the principle of 
“substitution”. The general format of the IF-THEN rules fro CHPF is: 
 
IF (“hazard due to toxicity/bioaccumulation” is ____) AND (“hazard due to 
toxicity/degradability” is ____)  THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The  principal  concept  behind  the rules are explained in Chapter VII, but in general  
when   the  chemical  substance  presents  high  bioaccumulation  potential  (i.e.,  due  to  
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liposolubility) and toxic effects, the inherent hazard to animals increases which increases 
the possibility of chemical accumulation in the higher links of the food chain. If the 
chemical substance presents low degradability then the possibility of accumulation in 
soil increases and if this effect is combined with toxic potential, the overall hazard level 
become high. Chemical products generated by degradation reactions, which can be more 
toxic than the original chemicals, are not taken into consideration. Additional rule sets 
can include this hazard.  
As shown in Figure 7.4, the inputs for the fuzzy inference system CHPF are 
calculated by two FIS; the first one is called “Hazard due to aquatic toxicity and 
degradability” (CHEdt), while the second is called “Hazard due to bioaccumulation 
potential and toxicity” (CHEat). The inputs for these two FIS are given by the user for 
the specific substance. For the inference system CHEdt the required inputs are the 
following: 
- Half-life time 
- Aquatic toxicity 
 
For the inference system CHEat the required inputs are the following: 
- Bioaccumulation potential  
- Aquatic toxicity 
 
In both cases, the inputs can be provided as single numbers, with a low degree of 
uncertainty, or as fuzzy numbers able to describe the possible range of values. The 
information required for the evaluation of these two FIS must be obtained from several 
references and data sources, therefore it is assumed that in most of the cases the inputs 
are uncertain and, in order to avoid losing the information regarding their uncertainty, the 
option of using fuzzy number reduces the problem of deciding which crisp value would 
be the best. This approach is useful when the user is not an expert in environmental 
chemistry but requires getting a general idea about the potential effects of a specific 
chemical.  
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As shown in Figure 7.3, the next branch of the hierarchical tree for the evaluation of 
chemical toxicity is related to humans, as shown in Figure 7.5. The fuzzy inference 
system called “Hazard due to human acute and chronic toxicity” (AGHEA) combines the 
potential short and long term effects due to exposure to the specific chemical present in 
the analyzed equipment i in unit j. The general format of the IF-THEN rules for this FIS 
is the following: 
 
IF (“hazard due acute human toxicity” is ____) AND  
(“hazard due to chronic human toxicity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The objective of this set of rules is the evaluation of the inherent safety principle 
“substitution” in terms of human toxicity, by implying that if the chemical is capable of 
producing acute effects or long-term consequences such as cancer, then the potential 
hazard associated with a release and human exposure due to dispersion increases, 
reducing therefore the overall level of inherent safety. The input for the antecedent 
related to chronic effects is the output of the fuzzy inference system called “hazard due 
to chronic human toxicity” (CHHc) which combines the information regarding the 
potential hazard of human cancer. This type of information is highly uncertain and must 
rely not only on human data but also on animal test. Because of this the required inputs 
are the following: 
- Human cancer evidence 
- Animal cancer evidence 
 
Due to the uncertainty of this information because of lack of data, extrapolation of 
information across species, and the complexity of living organisms the inputs are 
characterized by high uncertainty, which is addressed by the model by allowing the use 
of a range of data through fuzzy numbers. The general structure of the IF-THEN rules is 
the following: 
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Figure 7.5: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of human toxicity 
 
 
IF (“human cancer evidence” is ____) AND (“animal cancer evidence” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
If there is enough information about the human response to a certain chemical in 
relation to cancer occurrence, regardless of the lack of animal evidence, the resultant 
inherent hazard will be high. On the other hand, if human information is not available 
but there is enough animal evidence about the potential occurrence of human cancer, 
then the inherent hazard is also assumed to be high. The only situation when the inherent 
cancer hazard is low occurs when the evidence for both, animals and humans, suggest so.  
The evaluation of acute toxic effects for humans is evaluated by the FIS called 
“hazard due to acute human toxicity” (ACHEALTHa), as shown in Figure 7.5. This set 
of rules evaluates the inherent safety principle “substitution” in terms of the potential 
short-term effects on human health caused by the chemical substance used in the 
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equipment being evaluated. The structure of the general rules for this FIS is the 
following: 
IF (“hazard due to respiratory toxicity” is ____)  
AND  (“hazard due to oral/dermal toxicity” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The structure of the rule is based on the assumption that dermal and oral exposure to 
the chemical requires direct contact with the substance as in the case of an operator. 
Hence, this part of the rules is mainly focused on industrial hygiene practice and people 
not supposed to work with the specific chemical should have less possibility of being 
exposed through these routes. Exceptions to this assumption are emergency response 
personnel who might respond to emergency events. Respiratory toxicity is assumed to 
present a broader impact due to the possibility of cloud generation and dispersion 
exposing larger number of people and general public.  
The inputs for this fuzzy inference system are the outputs obtained from the 
evaluation of other two sets of rules, “hazards due to respiratory toxicity” and “hazards 
due to oral and dermal toxicity” (CHH1a), shown in Figure 7.6.  
The evaluation of the set of rules for CHH1a combines the evidence of toxicity due 
to ingestion of the chemical and due to acute dermal contact. The general structure of the 
IF-THEN rules is the following:  
 
IF (“acute oral toxicity” is ____) AND (“acute dermal toxicity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The objective of the rule is to identify the potential occurrence of adverse health 
effects due to either characteristic or due to a combination of both. The chemical is 
evaluated with a low degree of inherent hazard only when both types of toxicity are low; 
therefore the chemical is assumed to be inherently safer with respect to these specific 
aspects of the acute human toxicity. The evaluation of the FIS requires the input of: 
- Human acute oral toxicity  
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- Human acute dermal toxicity  
 
As in the previous cases, the information regarding toxicity is highly uncertain, and 
the system takes it into consideration by allowing the input of both crisp and fuzzy 
numbers. When only a range of toxicity values is available and it is not possible to 
decide which number to use, the fuzzy number can be formed by the lowest most likely 
value, the average value, and the highest possible value. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Hierarchical trees for the evaluation of hazards due to human oral/dermal 
toxicity and respiratory toxicity 
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The evaluation of respiratory toxicity requires the distinction of the physical phase of 
the chemical. When the substance is in a powder or dust form, the inhalation hazard is 
evaluated by the FIS called “hazard due to respiratory toxicity for dust” (CHH3a) while 
when the physical form is liquid, vapor, gas, or mist, the hazard is evaluated by the FIS 
called “hazard due to respiratory toxicity for vapor or mist”(CHH2a). The general IF-
THEN rule format for CHH3a is the following: 
 
IF (“acute dust toxicity” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
In this case the rules map a range of toxicity from concentration units to a common scale 
of potential hazard. This step is required in order to facilitate the aggregation of results in 
the upper layers of the hierarchical tree. The input required from the user is the value of 
dust toxicity. The general IF-THEN rule format for CHH2a is the following: 
 
IF (“acute vapor toxicity” is ____) AND (“acute gas/mist toxicity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
In order for the chemical to receive a low degree of inherent hazard, it must present low 
vapor and gas/mist toxicity. The structure of the rule is also based on the availability of 
the data, as explained in Chapter VII. The inputs required from the user are: 
- Human acute toxicity for vapors  
- Human acute toxicity for mist and/or gases  
 
As explained earlier, the higher uncertainty associated with toxicity information 
justifies the use of fuzzy numbers as inputs.  
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7.4.3 Description of the hierarchical model for chemical hazard: fire and 
explosion  
As shown in Figure 7.2, the second part for the evaluation of “hazards due to 
chemical and design factors” (ISICHEM) requires the evaluation of the fire and 
explosion potential. The hierarchical tree for the estimation of this hazard is shown in 
Figure 7.7. The overall evaluation of fire and explosion hazards is accomplished by the 
fuzzy inference system called “hazard due to fire and explosion” (AGEXPL), whose 
general IF-THEN rules are of the form: 
 
IF (“hazard due to fire/explosion and congestion/obstruction” is ____)  
AND (“hazard due to dispersion” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The structure of these rules combines the chemical potential for adverse 
consequences such as explosions with the potential of forming a cloud that could reach 
an ignition source. As in the case of toxic chemicals the possibility of formation of a 
cloud depends on the physicochemical properties of the substance but also on the 
operating conditions, hence the set of rules evaluates the principles of “substitution” and 
“moderation” by combining chemical properties, design factors, and operating 
conditions.  
The evaluation of the interaction is fundamental for this FIS because regardless of 
the chemical potential for fires and explosions (i.e., due to intrinsic flammability, 
reactivity, and explosiveness of the substance) if the operating conditions reduce the 
potential for cloud formation (e.g., low temperature and pressure) the overall hazard is 
reduced. However, if the chemical is flammable, and is managed at hazardous conditions 
(e.g., high pressure, temperature above normal boiling temperature) then the hazard can 
still be reduced by designing the unit providing sufficient ventilation (e.g., low 
obstruction and low congestion) to avoid the formation of clouds and/or pockets of gas 
 170 
within the explosive range (e.g., concentration between lower and upper flammability 
limits). The structure of the rules offers the opportunity to take into account factor 
interactions and to develop and evaluate different design strategies in order to reduce the 
hazard due to fire and explosion.  
As shown in Figure 7.7, the fuzzy inferences system AGEXPL requires the input 
from other two sets of rules. The first one is called “hazard due to dispersion” (DISP) 
which calculates the potential of cloud formation based on operating conditions and 
some properties of the chemical; the second one is called “hazard due to fire/explosion 
and congestion/obstruction” (ACOFRV) that estimates the inherent chemical hazard due 
to the substance properties and other design factors. 
The fuzzy inference system for dispersion, DISP, is the most complex set of rules 
used by the whole hierarchical tree. It is formed by three set of similar rules with the 
following general structure: 
 
IF (“vessel temperature” is ____) AND (“vessel temperature” is ____)  
AND (“vessel pressure” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The input “vessel temperature” is used by two linguistic variables in order to detect 
the type of phases inside and outside the vessel. The set of rules detects the phase of the 
chemical inside the vessel and the potential phase of the chemical outside the vessel. For 
toxic dispersion, it is assumed that if the released flow rate is liquid (e.g., vessel 
temperature below boiling temperature at vessel pressure) then the total mass available 
for vaporization and dispersion is much larger compared to the case of the release of a 
vapor phase. The leak flowrate is also proportional to the operating pressure; if the 
pressure is higher than the atmospheric then the flowrate is increased as well as the 
possibility of aerosol formation. Additional explanation of the physical phenomena and 
the assumptions is given in Chapter VII. 
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Figure 7.7: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of fire and explosion hazards 
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chemical released as very cold liquids (e.g., vessel temperature below flash temperature 
of the chemical), liquids around environmental temperature, and vapor or gas phase 
The inputs that the user must provide for the design of the membership functions are: 
- Flash temperature for the chemical substance 
- Normal boiling temperature 
- Atmospheric temperature 
 
The flash temperature is understood according to the NFPA definition as being the 
temperature at which the chemical can generate enough vapors to reach the lower 
flammability limit. For the evaluation of the dispersion potential the user must provide 
the following input values: 
- Vessel operating temperature 
- Vessel operating pressure 
 
The user can choose to provide a crisp value or a fuzzy number for each required 
input. In the case of operating conditions, the fuzzy number describes the range within 
which temperature and pressure vary during normal operation. A second approach can 
include the expected maximum, normal, and minimum values expected during abnormal 
situations, start-up, and shutdown.  
As shown in Figure 7.7, the second input required for the overall fire and explosion 
hazard (AGEXPL) is the output from the fuzzy inference system called “hazard due to 
fire/explosion and obstruction/congestion” (ACOFRV). This set of IF-THEN rules has 
the following general structure: 
 
IF (“fire/explosion potential” is ____) AND  
(“obstruction/congestion/burning velocity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
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The rules evaluate the interaction of chemical factors with design parameters. The 
inherent safety principles evaluated are “moderation”, “simplification” and 
“substitution”. In order to generate a hazardous situation the chemical must be reactive 
or flammable but also the equipment must be located in an area with low ventilation 
(e.g., high obstruction) or high ventilation but high congestion where turbulence effects 
can enhance the flame front burning velocity (which depends on design factors and 
chemical properties). Regardless of the degree of congestion and obstruction, the flame 
burning velocity characteristic of the chemical (which is an inherent characteristic of the 
substance) can increase or decrease the hazard degree by modifying the resultant 
explosive overpressure.  
The output from the fuzzy inference system ACOFRV, as shown in Figure 7.7, can 
be combined with another set of rules, indicated as NOTE 1, which can be added in 
future revisions of the model. Fire and explosions are likely to produce domino effects 
when the release of the flammable substance occurs in congested units where other 
equipment are likely to suffer damage and release more flammable chemicals. Another 
consequence of explosions is the possibility of damage to adjacent equipment due to 
missiles projected from the exploding equipment towards other areas of the plant. For 
the evaluation of possibility of the domino effect, design factors should be taken into 
account; for instance, equipment layout, spatial arrangement, distance between 
hazardous processing equipment, and hazard degree of other units. A special case of 
domino effect is described by Lees (1996) as pressure piling, and depends on the 
possibility of pressure waves generated from exploding internals to vessels towards other 
interconnected equipment. Khan and Abbasi (1998d) have proposed a model called 
DOMIFFECT that can serve as starting point for the development of the fuzzy inference 
systems that could be integrated into this prototype model. 
The inputs for the fuzzy inference system ACOFRV are the outputs from other 
systems, as shown in Figure 7.7. The first one is the “hazard due to 
obstruction/congestion/flame burning velocity” (COBV), while the second is the “hazard 
due to fire/explosion and viscosity” (AFRVISC). 
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The objective of the fuzzy inference system ACOFRV is the combination of the 
hazards due to congestion and obstruction, and flame burning velocity. The general 
structure of the IF-THEN rules is: 
 
IF (“obstruction/congestion” is ____) AND (“flame burning velocity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The inherent safety principles evaluated by this set of rules are “substitution” 
because flame burning velocity is a chemical property and “simplification” because the 
physical arrangement of the unit affects the overall hazard resulting from the interaction 
of these parameters. The evaluation of this set of rules requires two inputs. One is the 
output from the FIS called ”hazard due to obstruction and congestion” (COOB) and the 
other is provided by the user and is the characteristic flame burning velocity. This 
parameter, as in the case of the other user inputs can be fed as a crisp number or as a 
fuzzy number. 
The FIS called ”hazard due to obstruction and congestion” (COOB) evaluates the 
combination of two design parameters, hence it is related to the inherent safety principle 
of ”simplification”. The general structure of the IF-THEN rules for COOB is:  
 
IF (“obstruction fraction” is ____) AND (“congestion fraction” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
In general, when obstruction is high, it is expected that congestion will also be high, 
and vice versa, unless the unit equipment is arranged in such a way that corridors and 
tunnels are left open between two rows of equipment. The inputs required from the user 
are: 
- Processing unit congestion fraction 
- Processing unit obstruction fraction 
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These two values are highly uncertain due to the approximation required for its 
calculation (as explained in Chapter VII) and because they should reflect the average for 
the whole unit. When the degree of congestion and/or obstruction is variable within the 
processing unit, it is possible to estimate a range (i.e., maximum and minimum value) for 
each one of the two inputs and feed them as fuzzy numbers that reflect the physical 
variability.  
As shown in Figure 7.7, the evaluation of the overall hazard due to fire/explosion 
and congestion/obstruction (ACOFRV) requires the input from the fuzzy inference 
system called “hazard due to fire/explosion and viscosity” (AFRVISC). This set of rules 
combines chemical and design properties evaluating the principles ”substitution”, 
“moderation” and ”simplification”. The principle of substitution is related to the 
chemical properties of flammability and reactivity. The principle of moderation is related 
to less hazardous form of the chemical substance and here viscosity is implicitly related 
to mixing and possibility of generating heterogeneous properties within the vessel. When 
viscosity of the chemical is high, it is assumed that more mixing power is required in 
order to reach homogeneous properties. In case of mixing failure the occurrence of hot 
spots or zones of higher/lower than specification concentration can occur. In the case of 
reactive chemicals, this abnormal lack of homogeneity can cause runaway reactions 
while in the case of flammable chemicals (i.e., low flash temperatures, low boiling 
points, and/or low autoignition temperature) the reduced heat transfer rate can generate a 
temperature rise sufficient to reach hazardous conditions. 
The general structure of the IF-THEN rules for AGOFR is: 
 
IF (“viscosity” is ____) AND (“flammability/explosivity/reactivity” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
While the input for the second part of the rule is given by the output from the FIS 
called “hazard due to fire/explosion and reactivity” (AGOFR), shown in Figure 8, the 
input for viscosity is given by the user. Since viscosity is a function of temperature it can 
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be fed as a fuzzy number whose maximum value is given by the maximum viscosity in 
relation of the minimum (or maximum) vessel temperature; the minimum value of the 
fuzzy number is given by the minimum expected value of viscosity obtained at the 
maximum (or minimum) expected temperature of the vessel. The option of using fuzzy 
numbers for entering the value of viscosity is especially important for chemicals such as 
sulfur whose viscosity presents an inversed strong dependence with temperature. 
Other factors that could be added in the future to the fuzzy logic-based model 
prototype are the estimated requirement of mixing power in order to keep the vessel 
contents in a homogeneous phase. While viscosity describes part of the problem of fluid 
homogeneity, other aspects such as mixing of multiphase, as in the case of immiscible 
liquids or solid suspensions, cannot be modeled by using only viscosity as an input 
factor. An example of this type of hazard is the rollover (or boilover) of oil tanks when 
heated due to external fires if water is accumulated at the bottom [King, 1990; AIChE, 
1993]. Similar hazardous situations can occur when mixing is lost and two or more 
phases can be formed due to miscibility and density gradients. 
The overall objective of the set of rules for AFRVISC is the combination of 
flammability and reactivity hazards with the possibility of generating heterogeneous 
properties due to high viscosity of the mixture and, in an implicit form, due to lack of 
appropriate mixing. When high flammability and/or reactivity are combined with highly 
viscosity, the implicit degree of hazard of the equipment is high; if viscosity is low for 
high flammable chemicals the hazard degree is slightly reduced due to the possibility of 
maintaining homogeneous properties even with lack of mechanical mixing because of 
convective forces. When the chemicals are not flammable and/or reactive regardless of 
the value of the viscosity, the hazard will be low.  
The second input for AFRVISC is the output from the FIS called “hazard due to 
fire/explosion and reactivity” (AGOFR) that aggregates the three types of hazards 
(Figure 7.8). The format of the IF-THEN rules for AGOFR is the following: 
 
IF (“flammability” is ____) AND (“reactivity” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
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In terms of inherent safety principles, the set of rules evaluates “substitution” by 
identifying hazardous chemical characteristics. If either of two properties implies high 
hazard, the resultant degree of inherent safety is reduced. It is assumed that reactivity can 
trigger fire and explosions hence a certain degree of synergy between the two hazards is 
taken into account by the rules.  
As indicated by note 3 in Figures 7.7 and 7.8, additional IF-THEN rules set can be 
added in order to take into consideration hazards due to static electricity generated by 
fluids of low conductivity in vessels and equipment whose design does not provide 
grounding means or minimization of energy-generating operations such as splashing 
during filling [Crowl and Louver, 2002]. 
As shown in Figure 7.8, the evaluation of flammability and reactivity is based on the 
FIS called “hazard due to fire ad explosion” (CHPF) whose IF-THEN rules have the 
following format: 
 
IF (“boiling temperature” is __) AND (“flash temperature” is __) THEN (ISL is __) 
 
The rules describe the relation between normal boiling and flash temperature 
established by specialized flammability standards such as NFPA and the UN ratings. The 
general knowledge expressed by the rules is that if the flash temperature is low and 
boiling temperature is lower or around the environmental temperature, then the 
possibility of fire, and hence explosion, is high. A detailed description of the systems is 
presented in Chapter VII. The user is required to feed the following inputs: 
- Normal boiling point of the chemical 
- Flash temperature 
 
 178 
Figure 7.8: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of hazards due to flammability and 
reactivity 
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both inputs to the rule must imply low hazard. The effect of side reactions, reactions due 
to air reactivity, or reactions due to incompatibility with impurity and/or contamination 
are not taken into account.  
The inputs to the rule set AGORx is given by the outputs from two other simple set 
of rules; the possibility of chemical reactivity intrinsic to the kinetics of the reaction is 
given by the FIS called “hazard due to reactivity” (CHPR), while the water reactivity 
hazard is given by the FIS “hazard due to water reactivity” (CHPRh2o).  
The general format of the IF-THEN rules for CHPR is: 
 
IF (“maximum power density” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The user is expected to provide the maximum power density (MPD) for the reaction, 
however it can be substituted by the “initial power density” (IPD) as explained in 
Chapter VII, if the MPD is not available. When the value of the MPD is high, the overall 
hazard increases due to the possibility of runaway reaction. If IPD is used, the 
uncertainty is much greater due to the fact that while a low MPD implies a low IPD, a 
low IPD may be followed by a higher MPD. The input can be fed either as crisp number 
or as a fuzzy number. The general format of the IF-THEN rules for CHPRh2o is: 
 
IF (“heat of mixing with water” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The user is expected to provide the estimated value for heat generated due to mixing 
of the evaluated chemical with water. When the heat of mixing, is high the hazard 
increases. As in the previous case the parameter can be fed a as crisp number or as a 
fuzzy number. 
The purpose of both set of rules set is to convert a physical scale into the hazard 
possibility scale used for the rest of the fuzzy inference systems. 
The efforts to understand and model chemical reactivity are an ongoing area of 
research [Saraf, 2003; Aldeeb, 2003] around the world. The parameters selected for the 
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model proposed by this research are based on the NFPA 704 (2001) approach, however 
only cover a limited type of chemicals (e.g., flammable as classified by the NFPA 
scoring system) and phenomena (e.g., water reactivity and simple reaction kinetics). In 
the future, when more information and understanding of the reactivity phenomena is 
available, the model can be expanded by including additional IF-THEN rule sets and 
hierarchical trees able to describe the new knowledge. This current lack of information is 
highlighted in Figure 7.8 by the label Note 4. 
 
7.4.4 Description of the hierarchical model for design hazard 
The design aspects that are not already taken into account during the evaluation of 
chemical hazards, are evaluated under the branch indicated in Figure 7.2 as “hazard due 
to mechanical and design factors” (ISIMECH). One of the inputs for ISIMECH is given 
by the FIS known as “hazard due to nozzle failure and corrosion” (CORNZ) that has the 
objective of combining the potential hazards from mechanical failure of the shell of the 
vessel, connection points to the rest of the process such as nozzles, or other penetration 
of the wall for instrumentation and other devices. The inherent safety principle evaluated 
are “simplification”, ”moderation”, and “substitution” because chemical properties of the 
substances interacting with the mechanical design and vessel construction material are 
involved.  
The general structure of the IF-THEN rules for CORNZ, shown in Figure 7.9, is the 
following: 
 
IF (“corrosion potential” is ____) AND (“nozzle failure hazard is” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
It is assumed that if either the failure of the vessel wall is possible or failure of any 
nozzle or wall penetration is possible, the hazards due to leak of chemicals increase, 
hence the level of inherent safety is reduced.  
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The branch of the tree that evaluates the corrosion potential is formed by the fuzzy 
inference system called “hazard due to corrosion potential” (CORRH), shown in Figure 
7.9. 
The general structure of the IF-THEN rules for CORRH is: 
 
IF (“operation temperature” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The rule structure is based on the fact that temperature is one of the most important 
factors for the occurrence of corrosion for a specific pair chemical-construction material.  
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Other factors such as impurities and abrasives, galvanic effects, pH, fluid velocity, 
metallurgy, mechanical stress and detailed equipment design are important, however in 
order to capture their effects additional sets of rules are required. As indicated by Note 5 
in Figure 7.9, additional IF-THEN rule sets can be added to model the effect of specific 
type of corrosion, and to include the effect of the environment characteristics that can 
affect external corrosion, such as the presence of contaminant such as sulfur dioxide, 
chlorides, and salts. 
In order to model the specific interaction between the chemical and the construction 
material of the vessel, the fuzzy inference system is based on adaptive membership 
functions whose parameters must be provided by the user and are the following: 
- For metals:  
• Temperature at which the corrosion rate is excellent 
• Temperature at which the corrosion rate is good 
• Temperature at which the corrosion rate is satisfactory 
• Temperature at which the corrosion rate is unsatisfactory 
 
- For plastics:  
• Temperature at which the corrosion rate is unsatisfactory 
 
In general, only one or two values are available for each material, therefore the user 
is not required to submit all the inputs and the FIS will work with a limited number of 
functions (i.e., minimum two if only the unsatisfactory value is provided or up to five if 
all the values for metals are available).  
In order to model other factors that can produce the mechanical failure of the vessel, 
such as sudden pressure increase due to relief valve failure or due to runaway reaction, 
more IF-THEN rule sets can be added. These factors can be inserted as indicated by note 
6 in Figure 7.9. 
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Another scenario for the release of chemicals to the environment is the failure of 
nozzles such as indicated in Figure 7.10. It is assumed that the vessel has up to four 
nozzles (however the number can be increased) and each one presents a different degree 
of hazard depending on its position (e.g., height from bottom) and diameter. In the case 
of a vessel with liquid contents, a nozzle located at the bottom of the tank, in case of 
failure will release a liquid phase, increasing therefore the hazard of large mass flowrate 
releases; when a nozzle is located above the maximum liquid level of the vessel the 
hazard is reduced since the released chemical will be in a vapor phase. The released 
flowrate is also a function of the diameter of the nozzle; however this parameter also 
affects the possibility of failure, since small bore pipes (e.g., diameter smaller than 2 in) 
are more likely to fail. The general structure of the IF-THEN rules for the fuzzy inference 
system called “hazard due to nozzle failure” (NLD) is the following: 
 
IF (“nozzle location is” is ____) AND (“nozzle diameter is” is ____)  
THEN (ISL is ____) 
 
The FIS is based on adaptive rules whose parameters must be provided by the user 
and are related to the liquid levels of the vessel: 
- Overflow level 
- Normal high level 
- Normal operation level 
- Normal low level 
- Minimum level (or drain) 
 
The inputs required for each of the nozzles for the evaluation of the hazard are: 
- Level at which the nozzle is located 
- Diameter of the nozzle 
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The hazard levels calculated for each nozzle are then aggregated and the result is 
used as input for the fuzzy inference system CORNZ. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Hierarchical tree for the evaluation of nozzle failure 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
DESIGN OF MEMBERSHIP FUNCTIONS AND IF-THEN RULES  
 
This chapter introduces the general physical theory upon which the fuzzy inference 
systems are designed. The most important IF-THEN rule sets, with its linguistic 
variables and membership functions are described in order to show the rationale behind 
the design procedure. The parameters reported for the membership functions correspond 
to the vertices of the triangular or trapezoidal functions. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the evaluation of hazards is based on a scale 
defined on the real interval [0 1], where 0 indicates absolute absence of hazard (i.e., 
inherently safest option) and 1 indicates extreme hazard. A reference state for the outputs 
(i.e., hazards) is set at 0.5 and indicates the threshold between different degrees of 
inherent safety and different degrees of hazards. The hazard inherent to the reference 
value of 0.5 is assumed to be low enough to be considered as acceptable or manageable 
by simple layers of protection such as procedural controls or simple control systems. The 
significance of the output values is related to the identification of the combination of 
conditions that raise the hazard level beyond the reference state of 0.5 and that must be 
analyzed in order to identify design options to reduce the source of hazard. 
The chapter is divided in four main topics covering fire and explosion models, 
human and environmental toxicity, design hazards, and aggregation rules.  
 
8.1 REACTIVITY, FIRE AND EXPLOSION FUZZY MODELS  
 
As indicated in Chapter VII, fire and explosion hazards for this research are related to 
the continuous release and dispersion of flammable chemicals. Internal explosions 
capable of destroying the vessel and sending projectiles towards other equipment 
inducing a domino effect are not covered, but can be added in the future. 
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For the evaluation of fire and explosion hazards, six fundamental fuzzy inference 
systems (FIS) are used; this FIS require the input of physical and chemical parameters 
for the specific substance and equipment being evaluated. Other 5 FIS integrate the 
information generated from the fundamental FIS. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 shows the names of 
the 11 FIS and the list of inputs they require. As indicated in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, some of 
the inputs are used for the design of adaptive membership functions, as in the case of the 
evaluation of the dispersion potential (DISP). 
As mentioned previously, in order to eliminate the subjectivity derived from 
interpretation of the phenomena, the model must be based on sound technical principles. 
In the next section the fundamental physical principles used to design the fuzzy inference 
systems for the evaluation of fire and explosion hazard, including dispersion of 
flammable chemicals, are summarized. Section 1.2 reports the parameters of the 
membership functions for some representative FIS, as well as the sets of IF-THEN rules. 
 
 
 
Table 8.1: List of fundamental FIS and required input parameters 
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
CHPF      “Hazard due to fire and explosion “ Normal boiling temp. °C 
 Flash point °C 
CHPR            “Hazard due to reactivity “ Power density W/ml 
CHPRh2o       “Hazard due to water reactivity “ Heat of mixing cal/gr 
DISP              “Hazard due dispersion “ Normal boiling temp. °C 
 Flash point °C 
 Atmospheric temperature °C 
 Vessel boiling temperature °C 
 Vessel temperature °C 
 Vessel pressure atm 
COOB   “Hazard due congestion/obstruction “ Congestion factor % 
 Obstruction factor % 
COBV        “Hazard due COOB and burning 
                        velocity“ 
Flame burning velocity cm/s 
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Table 8.2: List of aggregation FIS and input parameters  
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
AGORX            “Hazard due to reactivity “ CHPR HP* 
 CHPRh2o HP* 
AGOFR       “Hazard due to fire/explosion and  
                      reactivity “ 
CHPF HP* 
 AGORX HP* 
AGOFRVISC     “Hazard due to fire/expl./react.  AGOFR        HP* 
                                and viscosity “ Viscosity cp 
ACOFRV           “Hazard due to fire/expl./react. AGOFRVISC         HP* 
                   and viscosity  and cong./obstr.“ COBV HP* 
AGEXPL            “Overall explosion hazard” ACOFRV             HP* 
                    DISP HP* 
* HP = hazard potential index 
 
 
 
8.1.1  Theoretical foundation for the design of IF-THEN rules and membership 
functions 
As reported by Lees (1996) several types of fire and explosion have occurred in the 
chemical industry. The type of fires addressed here are vapor cloud fires, jet fires, and 
pool fires with explosion. Fireballs and solid fires are not addressed. It is assumed that 
explosions will occur due to releases of flammable gases that are then ignited. 
Davletshina (1998) indicates that “…flammability can only be subjectively defined…” 
because several parameters affect the hazard evaluation, some substances are assumed to 
be flammable because of their heat content (e.g., fuel oils) but they have high flashpoint; 
others have low flash point and low heat content too. King (1999) reports several 
physicochemical, design, and firefighting factors that should be used in order to evaluate 
the overall fire hazard. Kondo et al. (2001 and 2002) propose a flammability measure 
based on flammability limits and heat of combustion. Glassman and Dryer (1980) 
present a general discussion of flammability and the experimental uncertainty of 
parameters relevant to flammability and flame spreading. 
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Looking at flammability as a type of variable defined with basis on input thresholds 
(as explained in Chapter VII) only chemical properties can be used. This approach 
simplifies the problem for the prototype fuzzy logic-based model proposed in this 
research, however in the future it will be possible to include additional design factors. 
Physicochemical factors that describe flammability are: 
- Boiling temperature 
- Flash temperature 
- Flammability and explosivity limits  
- Flame burning velocity 
- Autoignition temperature 
- Vapor density 
 
8.1.1.1   Flammability hazard 
The boiling point and flash temperature are the base variables used by NFPA 704 
(2001) and other systems, such as the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
EU Risk Phrases to classify substances based on to their potential to get ignited. The 
relation between the thresholds used by each system is shown in Figure 8.1. 
The Risk Phrases assign the label R12 to “extremely flammable chemicals”, R11 to 
“highly flammable substances”, and R10 to chemicals that are flammable (INSET, 
2001). The DOT classes of flammables (i.e., IA, IB, IC, II, and III) are assigned to 
chemicals with different degrees of flammability, Class IA being the most hazardous. 
According to the NFPA system, a score of 4 is assigned to substances that vaporize at 
ambient conditions and burn fast [NFPA 704, 2001]. A score of 2 is assigned to 
materials that must be exposed to a relatively high temperature before releasing enough 
vapors to be ignited. NFPA 2 and DOT Class IIIA are the states taken as a reference 
threshold for inherent safety, as explained in Chapter VII. Chemicals with NFPA scores 
of 1 and 0 are assumed to be inherently safer than chemicals with scores 3 ad 4; from 
Figure 8.1 the conclusions can be extrapolated to the DOT classes and the Risk Phrases. 
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Figure 8.1: Relation between the flammability thresholds used by NFPA, DOT, and Risk 
Phrases 
 
 
 
The information summarized in Figure 8.1 is used to design the fuzzy IF-THEN rules 
for the evaluation of flammability as shown in section 1.2; however it must be noted that 
certain regions do not have physical meaning. For example, by definition Tflash < Tboiling, 
therefore the region above line 1 in Figure 8.1 is physically not possible. Similarly, the 
region below line 2 requires a very low flash temperature with a high boiling point. By 
testing chemicals listed in NFPA 325 (1994) with a score of 3 and with high boiling 
temperature none was found to have high boiling temperatures (i.e., located under line 
2). 
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8.1.1.2    Dispersion hazard 
The potential for the formation of an explosive cloud is based on the location of the 
operation point of the vessel (i.e., temperature or pressure) with respect to the vapor 
pressure curve for the specific chemical. When a flammable liquid is released it forms a 
vapor-liquid equilibrium in air, hence the system is binary (i.e., air-flammable chemical) 
and should be described by a binary VLE diagram (Figure 8.2). The approach explains 
why the flash temperature is lower than the boiling temperature of the pure substance. 
Flash temperature corresponds to the temperature at which the equilibrium composition 
is the lower flammability limit (i.e., x = xLFL). Similarly, the composition of the upper 
flammability limit (i.e., x = xUFL) corresponds to a temperature higher than the Tflash but 
lower than Tboiling, however this temperature is rarely reported, as indicated by King 
(1999). A closed vessel working at T > TUFL generates a vapor too rich in terms of the 
flammable vapor, therefore outside the flammable composition. This is not true for open 
systems, where ventilation can modify the concentration of the cloud. 
When the three-dimensional envelope for the binary VLE at different pressures is 
projected on the PT plane, a diagram similar to Figure 8.3 is obtained; this figure 
exemplifies the reasoning for the modeling of inherent hazard when a liquid chemical 
with a flash temperature lower than the atmospheric temperature (i.e., Tflash < Tatm) is 
released.  
Due to the low boiling point of air, the two saturation curves for pure components 
(e.g., air and flammable chemicals) are separated quite a bit. At constant pressure (i.e.,    
P = Patm), the distance between the two pure boiling temperatures represents also the 
range of composition between pure air (i.e., xA = 0) and pure flammable chemical (i.e.,  
xA = 1). Therefore, when the location of temperatures at upper and lower flammability 
limits are transported on the composition axis, the flammable range for a flammable 
chemical in a closed system is obtained (i.e., TLFL and TUFL). 
When a chemical is released to the environment the system is no longer closed and 
dilution effects can take place due to transport phenomena and turbulence generated by 
wind flow. Therefore, for an open system it is assumed that when the chemical is 
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released at a temperature higher than Tflash , the formation of a flammable cloud is 
possible if the plume is not diluted. The assumed flammability range for an open system 
is shown in Figure 8.3 by the larger arrow. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Relation between the flash temperature and composition at the lower 
flammability limit for a closed vessel 
 
 
Flammability limits are often used as a parameter to classify the possibility of 
ignition of a chemical (e.g., Heikkila index as described in Chapter II). For the model 
proposed in this research the flammability limits are taken into consideration in an 
indirect form by DISP, which is the FIS that evaluates the potential of formation and 
dispersion of flammable clouds after the chemical has been released. 
Flammability limits are taken as crisp thresholds for the analysis of flammability 
hazards; however, they present high uncertainty due to their dependence on several 
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system characteristics such as size of the experimental vessel, experimental procedure, 
and pressure [Lees, 1996; Takahashi et al., 2003]. Therefore due to their inherent 
uncertainty flammability limits should be used as fuzzy thresholds. For the hierarchical 
model proposed in this research, the flammability limits are modeled by using the flash 
temperature only.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Projection of the binary (Air-Flammable liquid) vapor-liquid 
equilibrium PTx envelop on the plane PT, and effect of pressure on 
flammability region for closed and open systems 
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The upper flammability limit is unknown for open systems due to ventilation effects 
that modify the concentration. However, when the temperature of the system is higher 
than the flash temperature the potential for formation of an explosive cloud increases. 
The dependence of the flammability limits with respect to pressure is indicated in Figure 
8.3 by the gray region. 
The design of the membership functions for the analysis of the hazard inherent to the 
formation of flammable clouds is based on the idea that the flash point can be assumed 
to be the lowest temperature at which the chemical generates enough vapor to be ignited. 
Although in order to sustain the flame the temperature must be higher (i.e., fire 
temperature) as indicated by NFPA 704 (2001), the two values are only few degrees 
apart, therefore the flash temperature is one of the parameters, with boiling and 
atmospheric temperature, used to design the membership functions.  
In order to design the consequent part of the rule, which evaluates the potential for 
the formation of a flammable cloud, the dispersion potential is estimated as a function of 
the released phase. Three parameters are used: 
- Difference between the ambient temperature and the normal boiling point of the 
chemical  
- Difference between the ambient temperature and the vessel temperature 
- Vessel pressure 
 
The general heuristic knowledge modeled by these three variables is the following:  
- As the boiling point of a substance increases, its volatility decreases reducing the 
hazards due to vaporization and dispersion. The effect of heavy gases is not taken 
into account by the model, because as indicated by Lees (1996) the cloud density 
depends on physicochemical factors of the released chemical (e.g., molecular weight) 
but also on other dynamic factors such as temperature of the cloud, presence of mist 
or aerosol, environmental humidity, and temperature. 
- As the storage temperature increases the hazard due to dispersion increases, 
especially around the saturation curve. The hazard reduction due to high temperature 
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release (e.g., release of very hot gases that produce a chimney effect carrying the 
cloud away from the site, hence reducing the hazard of rain out) is not taken into 
account by the used rules. 
- As the storage pressure increases the mass flow from a leak increases and the 
possibility of aerosol formation is higher. Hazard reduction due to jet mixing (e.g., 
concentration dilution due to entrapped air) is not taken into account. 
 
The general principles summarized above are graphically represented by Figure 8.4 
for a volatile liquid and by Figure 8.5 for a gas.  
According to King (1999) when the operation region of a vessel with a flammable 
chemical is located in region a in Figure 8.4, the inherent hazard in case of release is very 
high because the released phase is liquid but vaporizes immediately (cooling down until 
it reaches the normal boiling temperature) generating a large explosive cloud. For 
pressurized vessels (e.g., region b and c, Figure 8.4), the liquid flow rate is increased, 
and the possibility of aerosol formation is also increased. When the liquid is stored at 
very low temperatures (e.g., region c, Figure 8.4) the sudden release to the environment 
initially generates high vaporization that cools the formed pool to an equilibrium 
temperature at which the vapor release is slower [Lees, 1996]. As indicated by Kletz 
(1998) refrigerated storage is inherently safer than pressurized storage. Region e in 
Figure 8.4 is under vacuum; hence the pressure effects are derived only by the 
hydrostatic liquid height above the leak point. An additional hazard, not taken into 
account by the model is the reactivity of the substance with atmospheric humidity or air.  
Two types of liquids can be identified according to the value of the flash point with 
respect to the atmospheric temperature; when Tflash < Tatm the liquid is assumed to be 
more hazardous due to higher volatility, however, a liquid with Tflash > Tatm can also 
become hazardous if heated above its flash point [Lees, 1996]. These effect of pressure is 
also relevant when the formation of mist and aerosol is possible, since, they can be 
ignited at temperatures lower than the flash point [Lees, 1996; Zabetakis, 1965]. 
 
 195 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Hazard regions for a flammable liquid with Tflash<Tatm 
 
 
In the case of flammable gases region b in Figure 8.5, is also hazardous due to the 
effect of pressure that increases the release rate and the density of the substance. Gases 
under cryogenic conditions (e.g., region b, c, and d, Figure 8.5) when released from a 
liquid pool that boils violently [Lees, 1996; Jensen, 1983] releasing large quantities of 
vapor and mist until the temperature of the pools drops below the substance’s normal 
boiling point. 
The normal procedure for dispersion modeling of gases and vapors (both flammable 
and toxic) is complex and it is developed by specialized models based on different 
approaches depending on the characteristic behavior of the chemical (e.g., dense gas). 
Each model is based on different assumptions (e.g., box models assume that dense gases 
disperse generating a flat pancake-like cloud) and mathematical tools. The uncertainty of 
the models is also a function of atmospheric conditions, wind speed and direction, height 
of release, and type of source model.  All  these factors  increase  the  uncertainty  of  the 
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final result. In the case of flammable and explosive chemicals, other factors affect the 
hazard degree of the release event, such as the amount of gas that will contribute to the 
explosion [Lees, 1996].   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Hazard regions for a flammable gas 
 
 
The hierarchical model proposed in this research evaluates the sources of hazards 
based on the potential for cloud formation and dispersion, and does not use 
uncontrollable conditions such as wind velocity and direction. Because of this the 
uncertainty associated with weather are not taken into account by the fuzzy model. 
After the flammable chemical is released, it is assumed that an ignition source is 
present. As indicated by Davenport (1977 cited by Kletz (1980)), the probability of 
ignition is proportional to the size of the cloud (hence the quantity of released substance) 
and in general clouds drift less than 100 m before exploding. Similar information is also 
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reported by Wiekema (cited by Lees (1996)). Kletz (cited by Lees, 1996) indicates that 
there is no theoretical threshold relating the release quantity of flammable substance to 
the strength of the explosion but it is possible to infer that as the mass increases the size 
of the cloud increases too; therefore, as indicated previously the possibility that the 
flammable cloud finds an ignition source is also higher. A similar conclusion regarding 
the influence of the spilled amount of chemical is reported by Wiekema (cited by Lees 
(1996). 
Based on this information, the evaluation of the dispersion potential by the FIS DISP 
does not depend on the size of the inventory (i.e., vessel volume) but on the potential of 
forming a large vapor cloud, which is inferred by applying the information summarized 
by Figure 8.3, 7.4 and 7.5, as well as from the fact that at high pressure the possibility of 
aerosol and mist formation is high. 
 
8.1.1.3 Congestion and confinement of the processing unit 
Two factors identified as relevant to the consequence potential of a vapor cloud 
explosion are chemical reactivity and confinement degree of the processing unit. In 
general these two aspects are also related to cloud inhomogeneity that increases flame 
speed and overpressure, because of the formation of pockets of high or low concentration 
of gas. The cloud geometry has an additional impact on the generation of overpressure; 
for heavy gases the pancake shaped-cloud allows venting pressure buildup and gases 
through the top reducing the compression of the gases in front of the flame front, 
reducing then the flame speed. However, when the chemical is released in congested 
areas the venting effect is reduced [Wiekema (1984) cited by Lees (1996)]. 
The degree of obstruction generates turbulence and increases the flame speed, 
however the reactivity of the chemical is also important. As reported by Lees (1996) for 
a low reactivity gas exploding in an area of low obstruction, the velocity increase is 
negligible. However, in presence of confinement, the overall effect of 
obstruction/confinement is significant even for low reactivity gases. The combination of 
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all these factors leads to generate high flame velocity, increasing therefore the negative 
impact of the explosion. 
In order to take into account the interaction of confinement, obstruction, and flame 
reactivity, a system of two fuzzy inference systems has been designed. The first FIS 
(COOB) combines degree of congestion with degree of obstruction, and the result of this 
first FIS is combined by the second FIS (COBV) with the reactivity of the fuel, 
expressed in terms of burning velocity. 
The degrees of confinement and congestion are calculated following the guidelines 
provided by Hjertager et al. (1992), Mercx et al. (2000), Clutter (2001), Wingerden and 
Zeeuwen (1983), and Fothergill et al. (2003) and based on a concept of porosity. Two 
parameters are required: the “overall volume blockage fraction” and the “degree of 
confinement”. 
 The “overall volume blockage fraction” is obtained by using the average sizes of 
pipelines, equipment, and vessel to calculate the volume occupied with respect to the 
total volume of the unit: 
 
Overall volume blockage fraction = Vobstruction/Vtot 
Where Vobstruction =  Vequipment + Vvessels+ Vpipelines 
 
Since the blockage fraction can vary within the same unit, it is possible to estimate the 
range  of  variation (e.g., maximum and minimum blockage fraction) and use the values 
as a fuzzy number. The “Degree of confinement” is estimated from the percentages of 
face obstruction of the unit. It is assumed that the processing unit is a parallelepiped with 
five possible open faces, each one covering 20% of the possible area, as shown in Figure 
8.6a. The calculation of the degree of confinement requires the estimation of the 
percentage of coverage of each one of the five sides. This is an approximate   calculation   
(unless  specialized  technical  drawing  software  is  used),  however,  because the  fuzzy  
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system accepts a range of inputs rather than a crisp number, a rough estimate is 
sufficient. After the percentages of coverage of each side are defined the weighted 
summation of the five values gives the result for the degree of confinement. For 
example, in Figure 8.6b sides 3 and 4 are totally obstructed, while side 1 has an 
approximate 50% of obstruction, therefore the overall percentage of face obstruction of 
the unit is given by 0.2*(0.5)+0.2*(0)+0.2*(1)+0.2*(1)+0.2*(0) = 0.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Processing unit totally unconfined (a), and unit with 50% of 
confinement (b) 
 
 
 
These concepts and the guidelines of the TNO multy-energy model for the 
classification of the classes of blast are used to design the membership functions for the 
FIS COOB. For instance, obstruction is assumed to be high when the overall blockage 
fraction is larger than 30%. Parallel confinement occurs when walls or other barriers 
block two or three sides of the unit, therefore when the degree of confinement is at least 
40 to 60%  [Lees,1996; Van der Berg, 1985]. 
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8.1.1.4   Burning velocity 
The burning velocity is the other factor that can modify the overpressure generated 
by an explosion, and it is a property of the mixture air-flammable chemical. Burning 
velocities are affected by pressure, temperature, and concentration; for example, the 
burning velocity for paraffinic hydrocarbons varies between few cm/s the flammability 
limits up to 45 cm/s at the stoichiometric concentration [Lees, 1996]. Depending on the 
value of the burning velocity, for the TNT equivalent models for explosion, chemicals 
are classified as Low, Medium, and High reactivity [Lees, 1996]. A low reactivity 
material is relatively uncreative as for instance propane and butane whose burning 
velocity are respectively 45 cm/s and 40.5 cm/s; a moderately reactive material is 
ethylene that has a burning velocity of 68.8 cm/s; acetylene is classified as a highly 
reactive material and has a burning velocity of 173 cm/s [Lees, 1996]. These values are 
used to design the membership functions for burning velocity. 
 
8.1.1.5 Viscosity 
Mixing is required in order to ensure homogeneous properties of the contents of 
process vessels and reactors and it is important for mass and heat transfer. When liquids 
contained in a vessel can separate in multiple phases due to loss of mixing (e.g., mixer 
failure) or when viscous mixtures require heat transfer to maintain a specific 
temperature, the loss of mixing can create hazardous conditions. For instance, hot spots 
and concentration gradients can initiate runaway reactions. While for low viscosity 
mixtures the loss of mixing for heat transfer can be partially substituted by convective 
forces, in the case of viscous chemicals convection cannot take place, creating therefore 
heterogeneous bulk conditions. 
The effect of fluid viscosity on the shape and flow pattern of gas bubbles in viscous 
liquids was published by Benuzzi et al. (1989) while Oster et al. (1990) and Bell and 
Morris (1991) considered the hydrodynamic aspects of emergency venting of vessels 
when the contained fluids are high-viscosity. Because of the hydrodynamic effects of 
viscous fluids on gas bubbles generated at the bottom of the vessel, high viscosity liquids 
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present two-phase emulsions which indicate that the liquids swell more and for longer 
times compared with less viscous fluids.  
Fluids with viscosity between 13-19 cp are considered low viscosity [Bell and 
Morris, 1991]. The value of viscosity also affects the type and design of mixer and 
impeller that can be used to achieve efficient mixing. For low viscosity fluids up to 4000 
cp, propellers with three blades can be used, while for up to 100,000 cp turbines with 
vertical blades can be used [Walas, 1988]. 
An additional inherent hazard related to viscosity is the complication associated with 
the design of relief systems for two-phase viscous flows. Melhem et al. (2002) present 
estimates of flow reduction with respect to water due to viscosity increase; while for 
fluids with up to 100 cp, the flow is reduced 32%, for viscosity up to 10,000 cp the flow 
is reduced 59%.  
Common procedures for relief design are based on low-viscosity fluids, however in 
the case of higher viscosity friction effects reduce the mass flowrate that can be vented 
[Fisher et al., 1992]. When the viscosity is below 50 cp, the fluid is assumed to be low 
viscosity, while fluids with viscosity values in the hundreds are assumed to be high 
viscosity [Fisher et al., 1992]. 
From the revised references, the membership functions for viscosity are designed as 
follows: viscosity up to 25 cp are assumed to be low, between 25 to 75 the viscosity is 
classified as low to medium, between 75 and 130 cp the viscosity changes from medium 
to high. For these three sets, low viscosity is associated with low hazard; while for 
medium values the hazard is high, and for high viscosity the hazard is very high. 
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8.1.1.6 Reactivity 
Reactivity is another aspect that is taken into account for the evaluation of fire and 
explosion hazard. A list of physical and chemical properties that affect the reactivity 
hazard is provided by Lees (1996).  
For the model proposed for inherent safety analysis, the evaluation of chemical 
reactivity is divided into two aspects: chemical reactivity inherent to the property of the 
substance (evaluated by the FIS CHPR) and chemical reactivity with water (evaluated by 
the FIS CHPRh2o). The problem of reactivity is complex and is being investigated 
extensively because of the difficulty in understanding and predicting the possibility of 
runaway reaction. For the modeling of these two aspects several approaches have been 
tested such as the use of the onset temperature for runaway reactions, and the approach 
proposed by Saraf et al. (2001). However, due to the complexity of the problem and the 
uncertainty associated with the lack of predictive models, the NFPA [NFPA 704, 2001; 
Hofelich et al., 1997] ratings for reactivity hazards and water reactivity have been used.   
The NFPA scoring methodology for reactivity and thermal stability is based on the 
parameter called “Instantaneous Power Density” (IPD) which indicates the quantity of 
energy that the material at 250 °C will initially release if it suffers a chemical reaction 
due to decomposition or incompatibility with other materials. As indicated by Saraf et al. 
(2001) and by Kossoy (2003) this approach has the disadvantage of being applicable only 
for a zero-order reaction. When the expected reactive behavior does not follow single 
stage reaction without self-acceleration, the calculated IPD can be lower than the 
maximum power density (MPD). Therefore, Kossoy (2003) suggests the use of MPD 
rather than IPD for the evaluation of the reactivity hazard. The disadvantage of this 
approach is that the data is not available for a large number of chemicals and its 
calculation is not a simple task.  
Therefore, in order to simplify the application of the proposed methodology for the 
evaluation of inherent safety, the NFPA methodology based on IPD is used, however it 
should be kept in mind that when MPD data is available it should be used instead of IPD. 
Kossoy (2003) also introduces the software Thermal Safety Software (TSS) useful for 
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the calculation of IPD and kinetics values. The evaluation of water reactivity is based on 
the NFPA 704 approach [NFPA, 2001] that uses heat of mixing as suggested by Hofelich 
et al. (1997). The hazard associated with water reactivity is evaluated with respect to the 
violence of the decomposition reaction with water.   
 
8.1.1.7 Aggregation of hazards 
The outputs from the fundamental fuzzy inference systems are then combined, in 
order to obtain the overall evaluation of chemical hazard due to fire, explosion, and 
reactivity. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the outputs are on a continuous 
scale [0 1], and the rules for the fuzzy inference systems have been designed in relation 
to specific “inherently safer” fuzzy thresholds which are assigned to the “medium 
hazard” output fuzzy set. The “medium hazard” fuzzy set is located at 0.5±0.25. When 
the index obtained from a FIS is below 0.5 the set of conditions evaluated for that FIS 
are assumed to have a high degree of inherent safety; when the index is higher than 0.5 
then the evaluated conditions imply higher hazard than the selected “inherent safety” 
threshold. 
Each fuzzy inference system for aggregation of outputs is based on rules designed 
intuitively according to technical information (e.g., high congestion increases the 
explosion hazard which is a consequence of the chemical properties). These rules could 
be designed in a systematic form by simulating and modeling releases of several 
chemicals under different operating conditions and unit congestion. From the results of 
the simulation it would then be possible to generate rules that can have a quantitative 
meaning (i.e., ratio scale). 
For the present project, the FIS for aggregation are used to rank the results with 
respect to the threshold 0.5. In the case of dispersion hazard, the dispersion modeling 
software Canary was used to model the dispersion of hexane under several conditions of 
pressure, temperature, and unit congestion. The data for maximum overpressure was then 
used as an indication of hazard due to vapor cloud explosion.  
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The overpressure threshold is established at 3 psi according to the IRI (1992) which 
indicates that steel frames are damaged. The distance where the 3 psi overpressure is 
generated has been used as ranking parameter with respect of the distance obtained from 
the selected reference case. The reference case used is refrigerated liquid, since it is 
assumed to be inherently safer due to slow generation of vapors. While the design of the 
output of the rules (i.e., hazard degree related) for dispersion modeling has quantitative 
tendency, the other aggregation FIS are more qualitative because modeling and 
simulation was not used to generate data.  
 
8.1.2  Example of the design of IF-THEN rules and membership functions 
The membership functions and set of IF-THEN rules for flammability are designed 
according to the information summarized in Figure 8.1. The membership functions for 
the input are shown in Figure 8.7, and their parameters are reported in Table 8.3.  
In Figure 8.7 the first two membership functions for the boiling temperature present a 
degree of overlap higher than that suggested in Chapter VII; however the overlap is 
required to obtain a faster and smoother response of the fuzzy graph. The last two fuzzy 
sets for flash temperature have been extended assuming a very high upper limit (i.e., 800 
°C) in order to model chemicals that are not flammable. By examination of the list of 
chemicals included in NFPA 325 (1994), the highest flash temperature reported is 360 
°C for tert-Butyl tetralin that has a NFPA flammability score of 1. 
Figure 8.8 shows the membership functions for the output and the fuzzy graph 
obtained after defuzzification of all possible combination of inputs; Table 8.4 shows the 
parameters of the output functions. The matrix of rules used to estimate the flammability 
index by the inference system CHPF is reported by Table 8.5. 
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Figure 8.7: Membership functions for FIS CHPF 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3: Parameter for CHPF inputs 
INPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS [°C] 
Boiling VLTb Very Low Tb Trapezoidal [0 0 32.2 80] 
Temp. LTb Low Tb Trapezoidal [32.2 37.8 82.2 93.2] 
Tb HTb Medium Tb Trapezoidal [82.2 93.2 250 250] 
Flash VLTf Very Low Tf Trapezoidal [-50 -50 -17.8 22.8] 
Temp LTf Low Tf Trapezoidal [-17.8 22.8 26.7 37.8] 
Tf MTf Medium Tf Trapezoidal [26.7 37.8 60 93.4] 
 HTf High Tf Trapezoidal [60 93.4 100 800] 
 VHTf Very High Tf Trapezoidal [100 800 800] 
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     Figure 8.8: Membership functions for output of FIS CHPF and related fuzzy graph 
 
 
     Table 8.4: Parameter for CHPF output 
OUTPUT NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS [°C] 
 VLH Very Low Hazard Triangular [-0.25 0 0.25] 
 LH Low Hazard Triangular [0 0.25 0.5] 
Hazard MH Medium Hazard Triangular [0.25 0.5 0.75] 
Potential HH High Hazard Triangular [0.5 0.75 1] 
 VHH Very High 
Hazard 
Triangular [0.75 1 1.25] 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for CHPF. The general rule is: IF (“boiling 
temperature” is ____) AND (“flash temperature” is ___) THEN (HP is ___) 
HP  Boiling temperature 
  VLTb LTb HTb 
VLTf VHH VH MH 
LTf VH VH MH 
MTf MH MH MH 
 
Flash 
Temp. 
HTf LH LH LH 
 VHTf VLH VLH VLH 
 
Boiling Temperature (C) Flash Temperature (C) 
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As mentioned previously some of the rules in Table 8.5 do not have physical 
meaning (e.g., gray cells) but are included in the rule base in order to ensure the model 
sensitivity along the limits of region with physical meaning. This is required because of 
the fact that several rules are fired at the same time.  
From the rule matrix, it is clear that only chemicals with very high flash temperature 
represent low fire and explosion hazard. The fuzzy set MH (medium hazard) is assumed 
to be the reference state that indicates the threshold between the different degrees of 
inherent safety and conditions of higher hazard and it corresponds to the NFPA 
flammability score 2. 
The membership functions for reactivity due to water are reported in Figure 8.9 and 
the parameters for input and output fuzzy sets are shown in Tables 8.6 and 8.7; the IF-
THEN rules are reported in Table 8.8. In the case of water reactivity the values of heat of 
mixing used by NFPA to define the categories (i.e., 30 cal/gr, 100 cal/gr, 600 cal/gr) are 
transformed to a logarithmic scale for the design of the membership functions and the 
values are used to define the crossover points of the fuzzy sets.  
The membership functions for chemical reactivity based on Instantaneous Power 
Density (IPD) are similar to the functions for water reactivity; however they have one 
more set, according to the NFPA scoring system. The NFPA score 2 for reactivity is used 
as the reference inherently safer state. The reference state for inherent safety is assumed 
to be the output fuzzy set “Very low heat of mixing” because the other sets imply the 
potential of vapor and gas generation that can overpressurize the vessel. The discrete 
scale of NFPA scores is on the range [0 3] and the score of 1 is used by the model 
proposed by this research as the inherently safer reference value. This score is for 
materials that react vigorously but not violently with water however, they can still 
generate gases and toxic vapors.   
The membership functions for the potential hazard due to dispersion of flammable 
and volatile chemicals (i.e., Tflash < Tatm) are shown by Figure 8.10. 
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Figure 8.9: Input and output membership functions for hazard due to chemical reactivity 
CHPRh2o 
 
 
 
Table 8.6: Parameter for CHPRh2o inputs 
INPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS 
ln[cal/gr] 
Heat of VLHWmix Very Low H mix Trapezoidal [0.6 2.2 2.8 4.0] 
water LHWmix Low H mix Triangular [2.8 4 5.2] 
mixing MHWmix Medium H mix Trapezoidal [4 5.2 5.8 7] 
 VHHWmix Very high H mix Trapezoidal [5.8 7 8 9.2] 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.7: Parameter for CHPRh2o outputs 
OUTPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS [cal/gr] 
Hazard VLH Very low hazard Triangular [-1 0 1] 
 MH Medium hazard Triangular [0 1 2] 
 HH High hazard Triangular [1 2 3] 
 VHH Very high H mix Triangular [2 3 4] 
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Table 8.8: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for CHPF. The general rule is: IF (“heat of 
water mixing” is ____) THEN (HP is ____) 
  HP 
VLHWmix VLH 
LHWmix MH 
MHWmix HH 
 
Heat  
of 
mixing VHHWmix VHH 
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Figure 8.10: Input and output membership functions for the evaluation of the 
dispersion potential 
 
 
The design of the membership function for pressure is based on the fact that for 
gases when the pressure of the vessel is P > (1.7 - 1.9) x Patm the flow becomes sonic. 
The principle does not apply to liquids, however here it is taken as an approximate 
physical indication for the design of the symmetric functions for pressure. The 
parameters of the membership functions are not reported because they change according 
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to the location of the fuzzy set for the flash temperature and the normal boiling 
temperature. 
The rules reported in Table 8.9 have the following meaning: VLH = very low hazard 
LH = low hazard, MH = medium hazard (and this is also the reference state), VH = high 
hazard, HH = very high hazard, VVHH = extremely high hazard. 
 
 
 
Table 8.9:  Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for DISP. The general rule is: IF (“vessel temperature” 
is __) AND (“vessel temperature” is __) AND (“vessel pressure” is _) THEN (ISL is __) 
  Tt < Tbt   Tt ≅ Tbt   T
t > Tbt  
 
Pt < 
Patm 
Pt ≅ 
Patm 
Pt > Patm Pt < 
Patm 
Pt ≅ 
Patm 
Pt > Patm Pt < Patm Pt ≅ 
Patm 
Pt > 
Patm 
Tt < Tf LH MH MH LH - - VLH - - 
Tt ≅ Tf VLH VLH VLH VLH - - VLH - - 
Tt > Tf VLH VLH LH VLH - - VLH - - 
Tt ≅ 
Tatm 
LH LH MH LH - - VLH - - 
Tt < 
TbN 
MH MH HH MH - - LH - - 
Tt ≅ 
TbN 
- - VVHH - HH - MH - - 
Tt > 
TbN 
- - VVHH - - VVHH VLH MH HH 
 
 
Where: 
Tt: vessel temperature 
Tbt: boiling point at the vessel pressure 
Tf: Flash temperature 
Tatm: Atmospheric temperature 
Tt: vessel temperature 
Patm: Atmospheric pressure 
-: combination of input sets without physical meaning 
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For the case of the evaluation of the hazard derived from the degree of confinement 
and obstruction and the burning velocity of the chemical, Figure 8.11 shows the input 
membership functions, and Figure 8.12 shows the output functions and the fuzzy graph. 
Table 8.10 reports the parameters of the input functions and Table 8.11 reports the 
parameters for the output sets.  
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           Figure 8.11: Membership functions for the FIS COBV 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 8.12a, the last three output sets are narrower than the first three 
in order to emphasize the hazard associated with conditions of high obstruction and 
congestion, when the chemical is flammable and capable of producing a strong 
overpressure due to an explosion. The fuzzy sets for COOB are the output set for the FIS 
that combines the degree of obstruction and confinement, and they describe the potential 
strength of the explosion. 
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Figure 8.12: Output membership functions (a) and fuzzy graph for FIS COBV (b) 
 
 
 
Table 8.12 reports the rules used for the FIS COBV; the gray cells indicate a region 
of high uncertainty because of the firing of four rules over the whole range of the output. 
In this case, the strength of each rule’s output determines the location of the defuzzified 
value (i.e., the hazard degree). The rules are designed in this way in order to generate a 
rapid increase of the hazard score. 
 
 
Table 8.10: Parameter for COBV inputs 
INPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS [cm/s] 
 
WEAK Low overp. Trapezoidal [0 0 2 3] 
COOB MED Med. overp. Trapezoidal [1 3 4 6] 
HP STRONG High overp. Trapezoidal [4 6 7 9] 
 
VSTRONG Very high overp. Trapezoidal [7 9 10 10] 
Burning NOBV No reactivity Trapezoidal [0 0 10] 
velocity LOWBV Low reactivity Trapezoidal [0 10 30 50] 
[cm/s] MEDHBV Medium reactivity Trapezoidal [30 50 90 110] 
 
HIGHBV High reactivity Trapezoidal [90 110 120 120] 
 
Burning velocity (cm/s) Obstruction/confinement hazard 
a b 
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Table 8.11: Parameter for COBV output 
OUTPUT NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS [°C] 
 VLH Very Low Hazard Triangular [-0.25 0 0.25] 
Hazard LH Low Hazard Triangular [0 0.25 0.5] 
Potential MH Medium Hazard Triangular [0.25 0.5 0.67] 
HP HH High Hazard Triangular [0.67 0.83 1] 
 VHH Very High 
Hazard 
Triangular [0.83 1.0 1.17] 
 
 
 
Table 8.12: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for COBV. The general rule is: IF 
(“obstruction/congestion” is __) AND (“flame burning velocity” is __) THEN (HP is __) 
HP  Burning velocity  
  NOBV LOWBV MEDBV HIGHBV 
WEAK VLH VLH VLH LH 
MED VLH MH HH VHH 
 
COOB 
STRONG VLH HH VHH VVHH 
HP VSTRONG VLH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
 
 
 
8.2 FUZZY MODELS FOR TOXICITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD 
 
The evaluation of chemical substances from the view point of their toxic effect and 
the impact on the environment and the troposphere has the objective to identify potential 
negative consequences other than fire and explosion. Process safety design is mainly 
focused on the reduction of likelihood of a chemical incident, fire and, explosion. The 
long-term effects of small releases that do not pose fire or explosion hazards are rarely 
taken into consideration unless there are specific environmental regulations imposing 
limits on the type, flow, or concentration of released contaminants streams. 
When a chemical is evaluated from the environmental viewpoint, the properties used 
for evaluating its process safety characteristics are not sufficient compared to properties 
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as photo and biodegradation rates, water solubility, and bioaccumulation. For instance, 
paper is one of the most common supplies of the modern world, and it is thought to be 
biodegradable and environmentally friendly. However, even if it does not pose a toxic 
hazard (it can pose a fire hazard if stored in large quantities) it poses an environmental 
problem since its biodegradation process is very slow. 
The evaluation of environmental effects is restricted to water toxicity and 
atmospheric persistence. The impact on soil and biota is modeled by assuming that if the 
chemicals are hard to degrade and bioaccumulable, the potential for persistence in soil 
and accumulation in the food chain is possible. The purpose of this part of the proposed 
hierarchical model for inherent safety evaluation is the identification of potential 
environmental hazards. Chemical fate modeling is not part of the scope of the project; 
however, the results derived from environmental simulation can be applied to develop 
general rules (as in the case of dispersion modeling in air) that can then be used to 
expand the hierarchical model. 
The evaluation of acute toxic effects for humans is based on the three potential routes 
of exposure: dermal, oral, and respiratory. Chronic effects are restricted to the potential 
for carcinogenicity based on information for animals and humans. The combination of 
both sources of data is required because of the limited quantity of information for 
humans; however because carcinogenicity in animals must be extrapolated across 
species, when human data is available, it is assumed to be more reliable. Other chronic 
effects such as teratogeneity, cell mutations, respiratory and skin sensitization, are not 
taken into consideration due to the lack of data easily accessible to non-experts such as 
process design engineers. 
For the evaluation of toxic and environmental hazards, eight fundamental fuzzy 
inference systems (FIS) are used while six integrate the information generated from the 
fundamental FIS. Tables 8.13 and 8.14 report the names and required inputs for the 14 
FIS. As indicated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, some of the required inputs are for the design of 
adaptive membership functions, as in the case of toxic dispersion potential evaluation 
(DISPTX). 
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Table 8.13: List of fundamental FIS and required input parameters for toxicity 
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
CHEp           “Hazard due atmospheric stability”  Troposphere half-life days 
 
Data quality % 
CHEat              “Hazard due to bioaccumulation  Bioaccumulation factor Log Kow 
 potential and toxicity” Aquatic toxicity (LD50) µg/l 
CHEdt             “Hazard due to aquatic toxicity  Half-life time days 
                          and degradability” Aquatic toxicity (LD50) µg/l 
DISPTX           “Hazard due to toxic dispersion”  Normal boiling temperature °C 
 Atmospheric temperature °C 
 Vessel boiling temperature °C 
 Vessel temperature °C 
 Vessel pressure atm 
CHHc              “Hazard due to chronic  Human cancer evidence % 
                          human toxicity” Human cancer evidence % 
CHH1a           “Hazard human acute and  Acute oral toxicity mg/kg 
                        chronic toxicity” Acute dermal toxicity mg/kg 
CHH2a           “Hazard due to respiratory  
                         toxicity  
Acute respiratory tox.: 
vapor 
mg/l 
                        for vapor or gas/mist” Acute respiratory tox.: mist ppm 
CHH3a   “Hazard due to respiratory toxicity for  
                 dust” 
Acute respiratory tox.: dust mg/l 
 
 
 
Table 8.14: List of aggregation FIS and input parameters for toxicity 
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
AGCHM       “Hazard due toxicity, environmental  AGCH HP* 
                       impact and potential dispersion” DISPTX HP* 
AGCH           “Human and environmental  AGHEA HP* 
                       chemical hazard” AGET HP* 
AGET           “Hazard due to water/soil and  CHPF        HP* 
                        troposphere toxicity “ CHEp HP* 
CHPF            “Hazard due to bioaccumulation CHEdt          HP* 
                       potential and degradability” CHEat HP* 
AGHEA        “Hazard due to human acute  CHHc             HP* 
                       and chronic toxicity’ AGHEALTHa HP* 
AGHEALTHa   “Hazard due to acute human toxicity” CHH1 HP* 
 CHH2a/CHH3a HP* 
* HP = hazard potential index 
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As for fire and explosion hazard, in order to eliminate the subjectivity derived from 
interpretation of the phenomena, the model is based on accepted toxicological and 
ecotoxicological principles. In the next section the fundamental concepts used for the 
design of the fuzzy inference systems for the evaluation of toxic and environmental 
hazard, including dispersion of toxic chemicals, are summarized. Section 2.2 reports the 
parameters of the membership functions for representative FIS, as well as the sets of IF-
THEN rules. 
 
8.2.1  Theoretical foundation for the design of IF-THEN rules and membership 
functions 
The limited knowledge available on the long-term effects of chemicals on the 
environment due to accumulation and slow degradation kinetics can mislead the decision 
process into hazardous directions. An example is the substitution of ammonia and 
propane by CFC. However, the recognition of the possible lack of information or data 
related to a specific chemical can be used as an additional piece of data. For instance, if 
there is not specific information about the life-cycle of a chemical (i.e., how it is 
transported across different environmental systems, how it is degraded, and how long 
does it take to be bio-decomposed) its evaluation, from the environmental view point, 
should be less favorable than the evaluation of another chemical whose properties are 
well known and supported by scientific data. This approach is used by the GDCh-
Advisory Committee (1989). 
To understand the environmental problems it is necessary to introduce the concepts 
of Environmental Risk Analysis (ERA), and ecotoxicology. 
 
 
8.2.1.1  Environmental hazard 
The environmental impact analysis (EIA) has the objective of identifying and 
evaluating the importance and duration of the possible impacts and benefits to the natural 
and social environment due to an activity or project.  The impact is defined by a spatial 
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component (i.e., a defined area) and a temporal component (i.e., a specified period of 
time) produced by the change in an environmental parameter (Wathern, 1988).  
The subjectivity along with uncertainty inherent in the environmental factors, the 
reliability of the information, and the low-probability events that must be addressed, 
increases the uncertainty of the analysis. However, this aspect is rarely taken into 
consideration.  
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the environmental risk assessment 
(ERA) have many common, and in some case overlapping points. However they have 
been developed by two professional communities emphasizing different aspects. The 
community interested in EIA is generally related to biological and environmental 
sciences, resource management, and sociology. Professionals related to ERA can be 
grouped into toxicologists, epidemiologist, and biostatisticians as well as engineers. The 
focus of both studies is different, and while EIA emphasizes the effects on the natural 
ecosystems, ERA emphasizes human health consequences (Wathern, 1988).  
With respect to the environment, the risk is related to hazards imposed on the 
ecosystems by the properties of the substances, their degradation products, or other 
chemicals generated during the manufacturing processes. The impact of the substances 
can occur on any of the compartments of the ecosystems, and some of the most 
important hazardous properties include low degradability (hence high persistence), 
bioaccumulation, and mobility. 
Environmental risk is characterized by uncertainty and time dependency. The 
probability of causing environmental damage is given by a set of conditional 
probabilities defined over a specific period of time. However the risk should be judged in 
different ways depending on the time length the risk will exist and its severity. In general 
an ERA should include the evaluation on the type, quantity, and extent of risk, control 
mechanisms and transport mechanisms able to move the source of hazard to sites where 
the environmental damage can occur. The general targets for environmental risk are 
sensitive environments and humans. In both cases assessment factors include surface and 
ground waters, air routes, fire and explosion, and direct contact.  
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Environmental risk assessment relies on ecotoxicology knowledge to identify and 
evaluate chemical hazards due to exposure to specified doses. When ERA is performed 
as a predictive evaluation, it should include levels of toxicity to the biological systems 
and the potential environmental distribution and fate of the chemicals. The evaluation 
should start from physical and chemical properties of toxicants (Bacci, 1994). 
Ecotoxicology is a branch of toxicology formed by the union of environmental 
chemistry and ecology and aims to produce criteria and standards for pollution 
prevention and minimization. Another goal of ecotoxicology research is the evaluation of 
acceptable risk levels for the biological systems. The study of contamination is focused 
on the protection of human health, however it is understood that this could not be 
achieved unless wildlife and ecosystem would be also preserved.  
Ecotoxicology is based on models to predict the behavior of the substances in the 
environment and to detect possible impacts on the compartments. The models are based 
on the physicochemical properties of the substances that define the environmental 
behavior and the hazards intrinsic to the nature of the chemicals (Bacci, 1994). In 
general, five parameters are required to describe the environmental hazard:  
- Rate of entry 
- Stability 
- Movement 
- Bioconcentration  
- Toxicity 
 
Each one of the parameters can be measured by using physicochemical properties. 
Movement can be evaluated by using water solubility and vapor pressure; stability is 
evaluated by the rates of hydrolysis, photodegradation and biodegradation; 
bioconcentration is evaluated by using the octanol-water partition coefficient and the 
bioaccumulation and biomagnification factors; the toxicity can be evaluated by using 
carcinogenic data and the LD50 (Golden et al., 1979).  
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Other properties describe chemical partitioning and fate. Environmental partitioning 
is controlled by properties such as boiling and melting points, gas and liquid densities, 
surface tension, vapor pressure, air-water partition coefficient, and sorption coefficient 
for soil and sediment. The environmental transport and fate are controlled by the 
diffusivity in air and water, the phase transfer coefficient for air-water and for soil-air. 
Only for a few of the required properties, information is available in the literature. 
However, estimation methods exist but should be used only when the experimental 
information is difficult to assess (Baum, 1998). 
The criteria used to estimate the potential hazard to the environment are the 
following: 
• Degradability: The resistance to degradation by biological or chemical mechanisms, 
is one of the major sources of hazards when combined with toxic properties of the 
chemicals or their products of side. The degradation of chemical substances can 
occur either due to biological effects (biodegradation) or chemical reactions such as 
reduction, oxidation, photolysis, and hydrolysis (Bacci, 1994). 
• Bioconcentration: This is one of the three possible mechanisms according to which 
the chemicals are partitioned with water. Bioconcentration is related to the intake of 
chemicals from air or water via respiration that produces higher chemical 
concentration in the organism than in the water; bioaccumulation is referred to the 
chemical intake from any possible source for an organism (e.g., contact, respiration, 
ingestion, etc.) and happens because the intake rate exceeds the organism capacity to 
degrade it FROM its parts. Both bioconcentration and bioaccumulation are species-
specific parameters due to different transport mechanisms inside the organism. 
However, bioconcentration depends solely on the physicochemical properties of the 
substances (Bacci, 1994). This parameter is a measure of the amount of chemicals 
absorbed by an organism and stored into the tissue. These chemicals are not degraded 
by the metabolism or excreted from the organism (Connell et al., 1999) therefore 
they have the potential for biomagnifcation (i.e., accumulation in higher levels of the 
trophic chain).  
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• Aquatic toxicity: This is the potential of the substance to produce harm and can be 
divided into acute and chronic toxicity. Paracelsus stated (as cited by Bacci, 1999) 
“all substances are poisons; there is no one which is not a poison; the right dose 
makes the difference between poison and remedy” and this represents the dose-effect 
relationship associated with the toxicity concept. The effect caused by the exposure 
to a chemical is described by the surface response-concentration-duration from which 
the curve dose-response is derived. Acute toxicity occurs at high chemical 
concentrations during short exposure times (i.e., 24-96 hrs or as short as 30 min for 
highly toxic substances). The physical effects of acute toxicity are associated with 
breakdown of physiological systems. Acute toxicity is given by the lowest 
concentration at which effects are evident within few days of continuous exposure; 
subchronic effects occur when the organism is exposed at the highest concentration 
in order for the effects to become evident around one-tenth of the lifespan of the 
animal; this data is useful to understand the mode of action of the chemical. Chronic 
effects are given by the highest concentration tolerable by the organism without 
presenting life threatening effects for the whole life-span of the organism 
[Verschueren, 1996].  
 
For short-term exposure one of the significant parameters is the median lethal dose 
LD50 while for chronic studies other response levels (i.e., LD01) are used. When 
chemicals are present in a mixture the overall toxicity can be modified; when the 
chemicals act independently the effect of the mixture can be predicted by adding the 
individual toxic effects. On the other hand, the toxic effects can be similar but 
independent, synergetic or antagonistic (Bacci, 1994). These combined effects are not 
taken into consideration here. 
Other important parameters are the vapor pressure, boiling and melting temperatures, 
water solubility, Henry’s Law constants, molecular diameter and surface area, molecular 
structure, partition coefficients (soil/sediment, vegetation/air, etc.), surface tension, 
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diffusivity, and sorption coefficients. These properties affect the concentration of the 
chemicals in air, water, soil, biota, and sediments and should be taken into consideration 
for improved models. Rate of entry into the environment is important and can be 
estimated from mass balances of the chemical plants, production rates, and dispersion 
rates due to fugitive emissions, spills, and accidental releases, waste effluents and 
controlled emissions to the atmosphere.  
The design of the membership functions for the evaluation of the environmental 
hazards due to toxic effects is based on three main documents: the Harmonized 
Integrated Classification System for Human Health and Environmental Hazards of 
Chemical Substances and Mixtures [OECD, 2001], published by the Environmental, 
Health and Safety Division of the Environmental Directorate of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
relative risk-based environmental indicators methodology [Bouwes and  Hassur (1996)]; 
GDCh-Advisory Committee on Existing Chemicals of Environmental Relevance (BUA), 
[GDC, 1989]. 
 The purpose of the Harmonized system [OECD, 2001], is relevant for this research 
because it is focused on the development of a system for the classification of hazardous 
chemical substances based on their inherent physical and chemical properties based on 
the following general principle: “…harmonization means establishing a common and 
coherent basis for chemical hazard classification and communication, from which the 
appropriate elements relevant to means of transport, consumer, worker and 
environmental protection can be selected…”. Based on the previous principle, common 
cut-offs for each hazard category, are proposed and must be accepted as a fundamental 
basis for any type of application. The harmonized system developed thresholds for 
categories of chemical hazard by integrating the threshold specified by other 
classification systems. 
The TRI [Bouwes and Hassur (1996)] is also relevant for the present project because 
of the effort to develop environmental indicators based on risk using scores assigned 
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according to the relative importance of each class. Therefore, the ordinal scale used 
includes information on a relative basis. 
For the present research the evaluation of environmental effects is focused on the 
aquatic environment and the air compartment only. Effects on soil are not taken into 
account. For the aquatic environment the indicators taken into account by the 
hierarchical system are: 
- Aquatic toxicity 
- Bioaccumulation potential 
- Degradability 
 
The criteria used to estimate the potential hazard to the environment are the 
following: 
• Degradability: Environmental degradation occurs due to biotic and abiotic 
factors. Chemical substances can be classified into readily degradable when 70 to 80% of 
the initial content is degraded. The uncertainty in the results is derived from the different 
experimental methodologies that can be used. Particular attention should be paid to 
mixtures, which are not addressed by this project. The five possible degradation 
reactions can be analyzed separately to obtain information about the behavior of the 
chemical in the different compartments (e.g., hydrolysis rate is more important for water 
environment, while photolysis is not important for areas that do not receive sunlight). 
However, they can be grouped into a first-order global reaction rate, kR, which is used to 
define the overall half-life t½ overall parameter (Bacci, 1994): 
 
kR = khydrolysis +   kphotolysis + koxidation + kreduction + kbiodegradation 
t
 ½ overall = (ln 2)/kR 
 
Under natural conditions the half-life time for the degradation of a substance can 
show considerable variability. However it is constant under controlled experimental 
conditions and this is helpful for comparative ranking of different chemicals (Connell, 
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1999). The uncertainty associated with the variability in the environment is taken into 
account by the proposed hierarchical model by allowing the user to work with a range of 
values (expressed by a triangular fuzzy input) rather than a single crisp value. Mackay 
(1992) and Bouwes and Hassur (1996) indicated the following classes (Table 8.15) for 
mean half-life times: 
The values reported in Table 8.15 are used for the design of the membership 
functions for the evaluation of the degradability of the chemicals. The linguistic variable 
is however, on a logarithmic scale (i.e., ln(t1/2)) because of the wide range of the universe 
of discourse. 
 
 
Table 8.15: Suggested classes for half-time according to Mackay (1992) and Bouwes 
and  Hassur (1996) 
[Mackay, 1992] [Bouwes and  Hassur, 1996] 
CLASS MEAN HALF-TIME RANGE [hr] SCORE  
1 5 hrs < 10  12 1 day < t 
2 17 hrs (~ 1 day) 10 - 30   
3 55 hrs (~ 2 days) 30 - 100 10  
4 170 hrs (~ 1 week) 100 - 300  1 day < t < 2 weeks 
5 550 hrs (~ 3 weeks) 300 - 1,000   
6 1700 hrs (~ 2 months) 1,000 - 3,000 5 2 weeks < t < 8 weeks 
7 5500 hrs (~ 8 months) 3,000 -10,000 3 8 weeks < t < 52 
weeks 
8 17,000 hrs (~ 2 years) 10,000 - 30,000 0 t > 1 year 
9 ~ 5 years > 30,000   
 
 
 
• Bioconcentration: This parameter is chosen because it is independent on the 
properties of the organism or ecosystem. The bioconcentration potential is evaluated 
either by the bioconcentration factor (BCF) or by the fish-water partition coefficient 
(KFW), which is correlated to the n-octanol-water partition coefficient (KOW). Several 
correlations have been proposed [Verschueren, 1996], but the most frequently used is the 
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one proposed by Mackay, which assumes that fish behave as if it was a mixture of 4.8% 
octanol in water (the percentage is similar to the fish lipid content) (Bacci, 1994): 
 
BCF = KFW = 0.048 KOW 
 
The previous equation also implies that the thermodynamics of the partition 
coefficient water-octanol is similar to the partition between water-lipid (Baum, 1998). 
However, the equation should be used only for non-polar substances because polar 
chemicals can affect the transport properties and can produce complexation reactions 
modifying the results. When a substance has a log(KOW)>6.5 it is defined as 
superhydrophobic, and the results obtained with BCF = KFW = 0.048 KOW are 
overestimated with respect to the experimental values due to longer times required to 
achieve the equilibrium state and solubility differences (Bacci, 1994). Another possible 
explanation is that the chemical solubility in lipids reaches the maximum when BCF = 6. 
As an example BFC for chlorobenzenes reaches a maximum of 5.5 in fish when 
log(KOW) = 6.0 and then decreases as KOW increases (Baum, 1998).  
According to Bouwes and Hassur (1996) and the Harmonized system [OECD, 2001], 
the preferred measure of bioaccumulation and bioconcentration is the Bioconcentration 
factor (BCF) obtained experimentally by comparing the chemical concentration in water 
and in the tissue of the test organism. However, when the information is not available, 
the BCF can be approximate by the octanol-water partition coefficient (i.e., log(KOW)) or 
by water solubility. For this research the bioconcentration potential of a chemical is 
evaluated by using the log(KOW) because of the easier accessibility to the information.  
The values reported in Table 8.16 are used for the design of the membership 
functions for modeling bioaccumulation. When log(KOW) < 3 the bioconcentration 
potential is considered low while when it is larger than 3 it is considered high [GDC, 
1989]. According to the Harmonized system [OECD, 2001] when the log(KOW) < 4 the 
toxic effects of the chemicals on the aquatic ecosystem are considered acute, while when 
log(KOW) > 4 they are assumed to be chronic. 
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Chemicals that are highly liposoluble (i.e., high octanol/water partition coefficient) 
have low water solubility therefore they do not undergo rapid biological transformation. 
Bioconcentration and biomagnification become important for chemicals with low acute 
toxicity because they accumulate and they may produce chronic effects [Verschueren, 
1996].  
 
 
 
Table 8.16: Suggested classes for bioconcentration according to Bouwes and  Hassur 
(1996) 
BCF Log Kow 
BCF < 1 <0.8 
1 <BCF < 10 0.8-2.0 
10 <BCF < 100 2.0-3.2 
100 <BCF < 1000 3.2-4.5 
1000 <BCF < 10000 4.5-5.5 
BCF > 10000 5.5-6.0 
 
 
 
• Aquatic toxicity: The evaluation of this parameter is mainly based on acute 
toxicity and is described by the parameter LD50 (for solids and liquids) and LC50 (for 
gases).  When LD50 < 1 mg/kg the substance is classified as extremely toxic while a 
chemical with LD50 < 50 mg/kg is highly toxic. Another commonly used parameter is the 
threshold limit value (TLV), but this is not a measure of toxicity (Golden, 1979). Criteria 
for acute aquatic toxicity and acute fish toxicity are reported in Table 8.17 by the 
indicated sources. 
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     Table 8.17: Categories proposed for the classification of aquatic acute toxicity 
 [VCH, 1989] [Bouwes and  
Hassur, 1996] 
[OECD, 2001] 
Specie 
Exposure time 
Fish or Daphnia  Fish 
96 hrs 
Very High Toxicity  LC50 < 0.1  
High toxicity  LC50 < 1 0.1 < LC50 < 1 LC50 < 1 
 
Average toxicity 
 
 
1 < LC50 < 100  
1 < LC50 < 10 1 < LC50 < 10 
Low toxicity  100 < LC50 < 1000  10 < LC50 < 100  10 < LC50 < 100 
No toxicity  1000 < LC50 100 < LC50  
        * LC50 in mg/l 
 
 
For simplicity, fish or daphnia aquatic toxicity are used as inputs for the hierarchical  
model proposed here, rather than the acute mammalian toxicity values (based on LD50 
for oral, dermal, and inhalation absorption). The values proposed by [Bouwes and 
Hassur, 1996] are used for the design of the membership functions because are similar to 
the values given by the Harmonized system [OECD, 2001] but they include two 
additional category that allow finer granulation of the linguistic variable “aquatic 
toxicity”. In case that data for fish are not available, the ranges given by the Harmonized 
systems can also be applied to crustacean with exposure time of 48 hrs (in this case EC50 
is used with the same ranges given for LC50) or to algae and aquatic plants with exposure 
times of 72 to 96 hrs (in this case ErC50 must be used with the same ranges given for 
LC50), [OECD, 2001]. 
The fuzzy system for the evaluation of the environmental impact due to aquatic acute 
toxicity, bioaccumulation potential, and degradability is composed by three sets of rules, 
as explained in Chapter VII. The first set of rules “hazard due to aquatic toxicity and 
degradability (CHEdt) evaluates the combination of toxicity and degradability. Highly 
toxic and degradable chemicals have the potential to produce short-term negative effects 
on the environment; if these chemicals are not degradable the negative impact is higher 
 227 
[OECD, 2001]. In both cases (i.e., toxic degradable chemicals and toxic non-degradable 
substances) these chemicals are assumed to represent very high inherent hazard for the 
environment; however, in the case of high degradability, the effects can be localized 
therefore the evaluation is conservative.  
Chemicals with low toxicity and low degradability can generate chronic 
consequences therefore they imply high environmental hazard. Chemical with low 
toxicity and high degradability are assumed to have a low hazard degree. The reference 
states for inherent safety are represented by chemicals with medium or high toxicity and 
easy to degrade. Another reference state is given by non-degradable and non-toxic 
chemicals that do not imply adverse effects on the environment.    
The second set of rules “hazard due to bioaccumulation potential and toxicity”, 
(CHEat) combine the hazards due to toxicity and bioaccumulation potential. If chemicals 
are toxic, regardless their bioaccumulation potential, they receive high hazard scores. 
The lowest hazard degree is assigned to chemicals with low or no toxicity and with low 
or null accumulation potential; the reference for inherent safety is assumed to be for 
chemicals with low toxicity and low accumulation potential and for non-toxic chemicals 
with high bioaccumulation potential.  
The combination of the outputs from the fuzzy systems CHDT and CHEdt is 
evaluated by the FIS “hazard due to bioaccumulation potential and degradability” 
(CHPF) which evaluates the aggregated effect of acute aquatic toxicity, degradability, 
and bioaccumulation potential. It is assumed that if either one of the inputs implies high 
hazard, the inherent hazard is high while both inputs must imply low hazard in order to 
obtain an overall low inherent hazard for the aquatic environment. 
• Tropospheric half-time: An additional parameter that must be considered is the 
impact of chemicals on the atmosphere and the future global warming potential. As 
proposed by the Environmental Performance Indicators (EPI) project developed in 1999 
under a partnership between several entities lead by the Association of the Dutch 
Chemical Industry (VNCI), several effects can be taken into account. Examples of 
relevant aspects are the potential for greenhouse effect, potential for depletion of the 
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ozone layer, potential for atmospheric acidification, and the potential for ozone creation 
[EPI, 2001]. The EPI approach could be translated into a fuzzy system that could be 
added to the prototype proposed in this research. 
However, for this work only the degradability in air based on photochemical 
reactions is modeled by using the tropospheric half-time of the chemicals. According to 
the report “Existing Chemicals of Environmental Relevance” [GDC, 1989], when the 
tropospheric half-life of a substance is less than one day, it is considered easy to degrade; 
if the half-life is between 1 and 10 days the chemical is assumed as potentially 
degradable, but if the half-life is longer than 10 days then it is classified as hardly 
degradable. In order to reach the troposphere, a chemical must be volatile therefore for a 
chemical substance with low volatility the impact on the atmosphere is assumed to be 
negligible.  
Another possible approach for the design of the membership functions is based on 
the six classes proposed by IPUAC [2001] (i.e., 1day, 10 days, 100 days, 365 days); this 
system allows finer granulation of the linguistic variable and it is used for the design of 
the fuzzy sets. 
The information regarding the air half-life is becoming a common parameter reported 
by the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and therefore it was selected. However, due 
to the high uncertainty associated with the parameter, for the design of the fuzzy IF-
THEN rules that evaluate the atmospheric impact an additional parameter is required, 
“quality of the information”, in order to take into account the reliability of the source of 
information. When the reference is considered highly reliable and published by experts 
(e.g., research institutes, governmental and specialized reports) the linguistic variable 
should be assigned a value, or range of values, above 0.9; if the half-life value is 
estimated by using analytical models the input for “information quality” should receive a 
value between 0.25 and 0.75; if the source is not very reliable, then the parameter should 
receive a value below 0.5. The rule set “hazard due to atmospheric stability“, (CHEp) 
combines the estimated atmospheric hazard with the quality of information.  
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The aggregation of the overall aquatic inherent hazard and the hazard due to the 
atmosphere is evaluated by the fuzzy inference system called “hazard due to water/soil 
and troposphere toxicity”, (AGET). The inputs are assumed to have equal importance, 
therefore only when both aspects imply very low hazard the overall aggregated 
evaluation is set to low hazard; if both imply medium hazard, then a synergistic effect is 
assumed and the overall hazard is assumed to be high.  
The reference states for inherent safety (i.e., overall hazard assumed to be medium) 
occur when the tropospheric hazard is medium and aquatic hazard is either low or very 
low; other reference states are assigned when aquatic hazard is medium and tropospheric 
hazard low or very low. 
 
8.2.2 Human toxicity 
Toxic effects in humans can occur due to exposure to a chemical substance through 
three main routes, inhalation, ingestion, and dermal contact, and the effects can be acute 
or chronic. While acute effects are produced by exposure to high doses of chemical for a 
short time, with immediate consequences for human health, chronic effects occur due to 
exposure to lower doses for a long period of time and the symptoms can be latent or 
gradual [Lees, 1996]. In terms of toxicity, chemical substances can be classified 
according to their effects on the human organism. For instance, gases can be simple 
asphyxiants when they only displace oxygen but are biologically inert (e.g., methane and 
carbon dioxide); chemical asphyxiants affect the absorption of oxygen by displacing it or 
destroying its transport mechanics (e.g., carbon monoxide, cyanide, hydrogen sulfide); 
irritants produce injury of the mucosa and, depending on their water solubility will affect 
the upper or lower airways (e.g., ammonia affects upper airways, while phosgene, sulfur 
dioxide, and chlorine affect the lower airways); asphyxiants and irritants affect the 
airways in both forms, by reducing the oxygenation and by injuring the respiratory tract. 
Other forms of toxicants may cause sensitization of specific organs such as respiratory 
system, liver, eyes and skin; in other cases chemicals can produce cancer, or they may 
have reproductive and teratogenic consequences.  
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The toxic effect of a chemical depends on several factors, such as its 
physicochemical properties, exposure time, dosage, and toxic mechanism. Therefore the 
evaluation of a chemical from the toxicology viewpoint is a complex task and relevant 
information is usually incomplete or nonexistent [Lees, 1996]. Toxicity is assessed in 
several ways such as microorganism test, animal testing, and epidemiological 
assessment. In the case of animal testing the common objective is to determine the 
lowest dosage capable of killing 50% of the specimens; if the substance is administered 
orally the obtained value is the LD50 (i.e., lethal dose that kills 50% of the animals) while 
if it is administered through the respiratory route the result is LC50 (i.e., lethal 
concentration that kills 50% of the animals). The epidemiological approach is possible 
when a group of people are exposed to the chemical and a comparison with non-exposed 
persons is possible. However, besides the implications for the exposed people, this 
approach also implies technical uncertainty due to the impossibility of determining the 
degree of exposure in terms of dosage and time [Lees, 1996].  
When information on chemical toxicity is obtained from microorganisms and 
animals, additional uncertainty is added to the estimation because the data must be 
extrapolated between different species. Because of physiological differences the response 
of different species to the same chemical can vary. In general, it is assumed that if results 
are similar for three animal species then they can be extrapolated to humans with 
caution. Another source of uncertainty is the variability of the human response to 
chemicals depending on general health of the individual, fitness and stress level, as well 
age and gender [Lees, 1996].  
Another measure of toxicity derived from industrial hygiene standards is the 
Threshold Limit Values (TLV) which can be time-weighted average (TLV-TWA), TLV 
for short-term exposure limit (TLV-STEL), or TLV for a ceiling concentration (TLV-C). 
However, as indicated by Lees (1996) TLV are not sharp lines that divide safe from 
unsafe concentrations and the best approach is to keep the chemical concentration as low 
as possible. Other toxicity measures are reported and explained by Lees (1996).  
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When toxicity values are used for risk assessment it must be kept in mind that the 
values are based on the assumption that the organism is static; however, in emergency 
conditions people will be under stress and performing physical activity, increasing 
therefore the air intake, and the potential for injury may be more severe than expected.  
Probit equations are common models for the analysis of toxicity and they are 
available for several industrial gases; however probit equations are based on animal 
experimental data, therefore present the limitation of not taking into account the physical 
activity factor. Another model, known as SLOT (Specified Level Of Toxicity) developed 
by the HSE (Health and Safety as cited by Lees, 1996) is based on values of LD05 or 
LD01 rather than LD50 which are values that can exist for humans and can then be used as 
reference limits. Other models proposed by several entities for the analysis of gas 
toxicity are presented by Lees (1996). 
The hierarchical model proposed for inherent safety analysis, evaluates the potential 
hazards derived from the chemical toxicity for humans based on the guidelines suggested 
by the Harmonized system whose criteria are based on the guidelines issued by the 
United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 
(UNCETDG) [OECD, 2001]. 
 The model is divided into acute and chronic toxicity; acute effects take into account 
respiratory, oral, and dermal toxicity, while chronic effects evaluate the cancer potential 
of the substance. Other acute effects such as eye and skin irritation and corrosion are not 
included due to the lack of data easily accessible to non-experts; similarly, chronic 
effects such as respiratory sensitization, reproductive toxicity and germ cell mutagenicity 
are not included. However, these aspects of human toxicity can be included in future 
improvements of the model.  
• Human acute toxicity: This aspect is divided into three main categories shown 
in Table 8.18; the toxicity values are based on approximate values of LD50 for the oral 
and dermal route, and values of LC50 for the respiratory route, based on exposure times 
of 4 hrs. 
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Table 8.18: Categories proposed for the classification of human acute toxicity 
[OECD, 2001] 
CATEGORY 1 2 3 4 5 
Oral toxicity [mg/kg] 5 20 300 2000 5000 
Dermal toxicity 
[mg/kg] 50 200 1000 2000  
Respiratory toxicity      
Gases [ppm] 100 500 2500 5000  
Vapors  [mg/l]  0.5 2 10 20  
Dust and mist [mg/l]  0.05 0.5 1 5  
 
 
 
When data are available for exposure times of 1 hour they must be converted to the 
required time-scale by dividing them by 2 for gases and vapors and by 4 for mists and 
dusts [OECD, 2001]. The values for inhalation are divided into three categories in order 
to take into account the physical form of the substance; when the chemical is a saturated 
vapor or is a mixture of vapor and mist, it presents experimental challenges for the 
estimation of the toxicity values, therefore the concentrations are expressed as mg/l 
rather than ppm. Category 5 is for chemicals that present very low toxicity but can pose 
some toxicological hazard to sensitive people. Values of respiratory toxicity for mist and 
dust must be related to tests performed on rats, due to the aerodynamic characteristics of 
particles between 1 and 4 mm the chemical is deposited on the whole respiratory tract of 
these animals [OECD, 2001].  
The values reported in Table 8.17 have been used as crossover points for the design 
of the membership functions for the linguistic variables for the FIS “Hazard due to 
respiratory toxicity for vapor or gas”, (CHH2a), “hazard due to respiratory toxicity for 
dust and mist” (CHH3a), and “hazard due to human acute and chronic toxicity” 
(CHH1a). In the three cases the variables have to be converted to logarithmic scales in 
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order to preserve the narrower sets for high toxicity (i.e., categories 1 and 2) with respect 
to the wider sets for low toxicity (i.e., categories 4 and 5).  
Because volatile chemicals can exist either as saturated vapor or as gases, only one 
input is expected for the set of rules CHH2a. The output from these rules is compared 
with the output from the set of rules CHH3a to select the largest hazard of respiratory 
toxicity. Oral and dermal toxicity are evaluated together assuming that this type of 
exposure occurs under specific circumstances such as close contact with the chemical 
(i.e., operator). Respiratory exposure can occur due to close contact but also because 
exposure due to dispersion of the released chemical outside the limits of the plant. In this 
case the general public will also be affected.   
• Human chronic toxicity: The evaluation of long-term effects on the human 
health is focused on the potential to cause cancer. Carcinogenicity potential is estimated 
according to the guidelines given by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) relative risk-
based environmental indicators methodology [Bouwes and Hassur (1996)]. According to 
this system, the cancer potential can be classified into six categories depending on 
experimental and epidemiological evidence available from humans and animals. The 
carcinogenicity categories are shown in Table 8.19.  
 
 
Table 8.19: Carcinogenicity classes according to Bouwes and  Hassur (1996) 
CLASS EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE 
ANIMAL STUDIES 
A  Sufficient evidence  
B1 Limited evidence Sufficient evidence 
B2 Inadequate or no data Sufficient evidence 
C No evidence Limited evidence 
D Inadequate or no data Inadequate or no data 
E No evidence of carcinogenicity 
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Additional explanation regarding the proposed categories and the type of data are 
provided by Bouwes and Hassur (1996). The information reported in Table 8.19 is used 
for the design of the membership functions for inputs and outputs. The inputs required 
by the fuzzy inference system “hazard due to chronic human toxicity” (CHHc), are the 
linguistic variables “human cancer evidence” and “animal cancer evidence”; these 
variables are defined over a range of [0 1], and are divided into four fuzzy sets 
representing the degree of evidence available (i.e., sufficient, limited, inadequate, 
nonexistent). When the evidence is sufficient the value of the input should be between 
0.65 and 1; however, when the evidence is strong enough to support the relation between 
chemical exposure and cancer, the input value should be lower than 0.95. When the 
evidence of potential to cause cancer is limited, the input value should be between 0.35 
and 0.95, while when the evidence is inadequate the input value should be between 0.05 
and 0.65. When there is no evidence that supports the possibility of the chemical to 
generate cancer, the input value should be between 0 and 0.35; when the input is below 
0.05 the chemical is considered not carcinogenic.  
The fuzzy sets for the output are designed with reference to the carcinogenicity 
categories presented in Table 8.19, and the information reported by [Sabljic and 
Peijnenburg, 2001] which classify chemicals into five categories (i.e., carcinogenic, 
probable carcinogenic, possible carcinogenic, not classifiable, and probably not 
carcinogenic) based on the type of evidence available. The fuzzy IF-THEN rules describe 
the relation between the type of information available and the input and output fuzzy 
sets. Because the information regarding carcinogenicity is uncertain and vague, it is 
possible to define a range of values for the two inputs and feed them as fuzzy numbers. 
The fuzzy system “hazard due to human acute and chronic toxicity “ (AGHEA), 
combines the evaluation of acute human toxicity and chronic human toxicity by using 
qualitative rules that assign equal importance to both adverse effects. Only when the two 
types of toxicity imply very low or null hazard for the human health, the chemicals are 
assigned an overall null hazard degree. The reference state for an inherently safer 
combination of acute and chronic toxicity is obtained when acute toxicity hazard is 
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medium and the chemical is not carcinogenic, and when the acute toxicity is low or very 
low and the evidence for cancer effects is not enough to classify is as carcinogenic. 
 
8.2.3 Hazards aggregation and toxic dispersion 
The combination of human toxicity and environmental toxicity are aggregated by the 
qualitative fuzzy IF-THEN rules of the fuzzy inference system “human and 
environmental chemical hazard” (AGCH). For this inference system, human toxicity and 
environmental toxicity are assigned the same importance therefore in order for a 
chemical to represent low overall inherent hazard must also imply low toxicity for 
humans and low environmental impact.  
The dispersion of toxic chemicals after being released is evaluated by “hazard due to 
toxic dispersion” (DISPTX), following the same guidelines and rules developed for fire 
and explosion (i.e., DISP). It is assumed that a toxic chemical stored at high pressure and 
at a temperature above the normal boiling point presents higher hazard due to increased 
flowrate and vaporization potential. The dispersion of toxic chemicals is more dependent 
on weather conditions than the dispersion of flammable chemicals [Lees, 1996]. 
However, for this research it is assumed that, as in the case of flammable substances, if 
the chemical has the potential to vaporize (either due to its physicochemical properties or 
because of the operation conditions) then the inherent degree of hazard is high. Another 
factor important for toxic dispersion is the degree of ventilation of the processing unit as 
indicated by Lees (1996). Ventilation is low when the degree of congestion and 
obstruction is high. While the aspects of confinement are taken into account for the 
evaluation of the explosion hazard, are not used for toxic dispersion, but they can be 
added in the future. 
The potential hazard of cloud formation expressed by DISPTX is then combined with 
the overall hazard for humans and the environment (i.e., AGCH) by the FIS “hazard due 
toxicity, environmental impact and potential dispersion” (AGCHM). This inference 
system is based on qualitative rules that assign a low or very low hazard score only when 
both hazard aspects represent a low degree of hazard. The reference inherently safer 
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combination of human and environmental hazards require medium or low hazard for 
either inputs, combined with low or very low hazard for the other input; if human hazard 
is evaluated as medium and environmental hazard is evaluated as medium, then a 
synergistic effect is assumed and the overall aggregated hazard is assumed to be 
hazardous. 
The aggregation of toxic hazard for humans and the environment, and the chemical 
hazard for fire and explosion, is performed by the fuzzy inference system “Hazard due to 
chemical and design factors” (ISICHEM).The fuzzy IF-THEN rules for this system 
assign more importance to explosion hazards because of the larger destructive power that 
can increase the release of toxic chemicals. While the release of a toxic chemical affects 
human health and the environment, it cannot cause fire and explosion (unless the 
chemical is also flammable) therefore the destructive power is lower. Low hazard scores 
are given only for combination of low toxicity and low flammability, while the reference 
state for inherent safety is assumed to be the combination of medium toxicity (or 
explosivity) hazards with low explosivity hazards (or toxicity hazards). 
 
8.2.4 Examples of the design of membership functions and fuzzy sets  
The input fuzzy sets used as inputs for the evaluation of human toxicity for gases and 
vapors are given in Figures 8.13 and 8.14 show the output sets. 
In Figure 8.14 four additional sets are used in order to smooth the output and the 
fuzzy graph. Table 8.20 shows the parameters for the input fuzzy sets for vapor and gas 
toxicity and Table 8.21 shows the rule-base used for the evaluation of overall respiratory 
human toxicity for a chemical in vapor or gas state. 
In Table 8.21 the output fuzzy sets with * indicate a hazard between that set and the 
next level of hazard; for example, MH* indicates a level of hazard higher than medium 
hazard (MH) and lower than high hazard (HH). The finer granulation of this output 
allows increasing or reducing the sensitivity of certain areas of the output fuzzy graph. 
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      Figure 8.13: Input fuzzy sets for CHH2a (human toxicity for gases and vapors) 
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Figure 8.14: Output fuzzy sets for CHH2a (human toxicity for gases and vapors) 
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    Table 8.20: Parameters for CHH2a inputs 
INPUT
S 
NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS  
 
VHGtox Very high toxicity Trapezoidal [1.4 2.2 3.8 5.4] 
Gas HGtox High toxicity Triangular [3.8 5.4 7] 
toxicity MGtox Medium toxicity Triangular [5.4 7 8.14] 
ln[mg/l] LGtox Low toxicity Triangular [7 8.14 8.85] 
 
VLGtox Very low toxicity Trapezoidal [8.14 8.85 10.15 10.49] 
 
VHVAPtox Very high toxicity Trapezoidal [-1.5-1.5 -1.4 0] 
Vapor HVAPtox High toxicity Triangular [-1.4 0 1.5] 
toxicity MVAPtox Medium toxicity Triangular [0 1.5 2.65] 
ln[ppm] LVAPtox Low toxicity Triangular [1.5 2.65 3.34] 
 
VLVAPtox Very low toxicity Trapezoidal [2.65 3.34 4 4] 
    
 
 
 
Table 8.21: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for COBV. The general rule is: IF (“acute vapor 
toxicity” is ____) AND (“acute gas toxicity” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
HP  Gas toxicity 
  VHGtox HGtox MGtox LGtox VLGtox 
VHVAPtox VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
HVAPtox VVHH VHH VHH VH MH* 
 
Vapor 
toxicity MVAPtox VVHH VHH* MH* MH LH* 
 
LVAPtox VVHH HH MH LH VLH* 
 
VLVAPtox VVHH MH* LH* VLH* VLH 
 
 
 
The fuzzy sets for the evaluation of the environmental impact due to toxicity and 
degradability are shown in Figure 8.15. Tables 8.22 reports the parameters of the input 
functions, and Table 8.23 shows the rules used to evaluate the environmental impact. 
In Table 8.23 the shaded rules indicate a region of high uncertainty that increases the 
sensitivity of the fuzzy inference system. The rules located in the right side of the table 
are associated with acute effects because of the rapid degradability of the substance, 
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while the rules on the left side of the table are associated with long-term effects because 
the chemical will accumulate. 
Table 8.24 shows the rules used for the aggregation of the evaluation of the toxic 
effects for humans (AGHA) and the environment (AGET): 
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Figure 8.15: Input and output fuzzy sets for CHEdt 
 
 
 Table 8.22: Parameters for CHEdt inputs 
INPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS  
 
VHDegr Very high degrad. Trapezoidal [-2.3 -2.3 -1.15 1.3] 
Half HDegr High degradability Triangular [-1.15 1.3 3.3] 
Life time MDegr Medium degrad. Triangular [1.3 3.3 4.94] 
ln[t1/2] LDegr Low degradability Triangular [3.3 4.94 6.83] 
 
VLDegr Very low degrad. Trapezoidal [4.94 6.83 7 7] 
 VVHtox Extreme toxicity Trapezoidal [-4 -4 -3.45 -1.15] 
Chemical VHtox Very high toxicity Triangular [-3.45 -1.15 1.15] 
toxicity HLtox High toxicity Triangular [-1.15 1.15 3.45] 
ln[LD50] Mtox Medium toxicity Triangular [1.15 3.45 5.75] 
 Ltox Low toxicity Triangular [3.45 5.75 8.05] 
 Ntox Very low toxicity Trapezoidal [5.75 8.05 9 9] 
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Table 8.23: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for CHEdt. The general rule is: IF (“hazard due to 
toxicity” is ____) AND (“hazard due degradability” is ____) THEN (HP is ____) 
HP  Half-life time 
  VHDegr HDegr MDegr LDegr VLDegr 
VVHtox VHH VHH VHH VHH VHH 
VHtox VHH VHH VHH VHH VHH 
 
Toxicity 
HLtox VH VH VH VHH VHH 
 Mtox LH MH VH VH VH 
 Ltox VLH LH MH VH VH 
 Ntox VLH VLH LH MH MH 
 
 
 
Table 8.24: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for CHEdt. The general rule is: IF (“human toxicity” is 
____) AND (“environmental impact” is ____) THEN (HP is ____) 
HP  Environmental impact (AGET) 
  VLH LH MH HH VHH VVHH 
VLH VLH LH MH HH VHH VHH 
LH LH LH MH HH VHH VVHH 
 
Human 
impact  MH MH MH MH HH VHH VVHH 
(ACHEA) HH HH HH HH VHH VVHH VVHH 
 VHH VHH VHH VHH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
 VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
 
 
 
The rules in Table 8.24 are based on the fact that no interaction is assumed between 
the two types of hazards. 
 
8.3 FUZZY MODELS FOR DESIGN HAZARD 
 
Inherent safety is the result of the complex interaction of factors related to the 
chemical substances and the properties of the equipment of the plant. In the previous two 
sections the chemical aspects have been evaluated and some design factors have been 
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taken into account when required (i.e., operation conditions for dispersion potential 
assessment). However, there are other design aspects that must be evaluated and concern 
mainly the integrity of the equipment and the possibility of failure and release of 
chemicals. The model proposed in this project is mainly related to vessels, and it is based 
on the concept that each piece of equipment and pipework can be assumed to be a vessel. 
Each equipment, besides the specific task dictated by the unit operation they are intended 
for, must avoid releases of chemicals to the environment. The basic model for vessels 
can then be modified in order to describe other equipment. 
The aggregated mechanical hazard is obtained by combining the potential for wall 
failure (i.e., corrosion potential) and the hazard due to failure of the connection to other 
units (i.e., nozzle failure). The overall mechanical hazard is then combined to the volume 
of the vessel, which indicates not only the amount of substance that can be released but 
also the surface of the vessel exposed to the hazard. It is assumed that larger vessels have 
larger areas increasing the chances of failure.  
The design aspects taken into consideration are related to the corrosion potential and 
potential of nozzle failure; in both cases, if the potential for loss of integrity due to 
failure of the vessel wall or failure of the connection to other parts of the process is high, 
the possibility of chemical release increases decreasing the level of inherent safety.  
The two aspects evaluated here are only representative and the model must be 
expanded in the future to include effects of overpressure due to runaway reactions or 
other scenarios that can increase the hazard of vessel failure. In this case it must be noted 
that the source of hazard can be external to the analyzed vessel as in the case of 
overpressure due to failure of pressure regulation upstream of the vessel or side reaction 
due to contamination.  
For the evaluation of the corrosion potential and hazard due to nozzle failure, 2 
fundamental fuzzy inference systems (FIS) are used and other 2 FIS integrate the 
information generated from the fundamental FIS. Tables 8.25 and 8.26 report the names 
and required inputs for the 4 FIS. As indicated in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, some of the 
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required inputs are for the design of adaptive membership functions, as in the case of 
corrosion potential evaluation (CORRH). 
 
8.3.1  Theoretical foundation for the design of IF-THEN rules and membership 
functions 
The following subsections describe the theoretical information upon which the 
design aspects are analyzed. 
 
8.3.1.1  Corrosion hazard evaluation 
The analysis of the potential for corrosion in a very complex problem, which requires 
detailed mechanical information, as well as chemical and environmental data. Types and 
modes of corrosion have been described by several authors such as Shreir et al. (1991), 
ASM (1997), Lees (1996), King (1990), CCPS (1993), and Jones (1996). In general, the 
most important factors for corrosion are the following [Lees, 1996]: 
- Environmental chemistry: this factor is related to the properties of the fluids directly 
in contact with the metal, such as pH, concentration, and gas content. 
- Physical conditions: this factor takes into account the properties of the system such 
as operating temperature, flow velocity, presence of solids and bubbles that can have 
erosive effects, and heat transfer. Stress and fatigue can also derive from the design 
and operation of the equipment. 
- Operating cycles: in the case of heating/cooling cycles the corrosion potential is 
affected by modification of the chemical and system properties. Other aspects of 
cyclic operations are stagnant periods of operation and cleaning procedures.  
- External environmental properties: the presence of corrosive gases within the plant, 
generated from fugitive emissions or vents, can affect the corrosion rate. Other 
aspects are humidity, temperature, and salt and pollutant concentration in air. 
- Mechanical aspects: the presence of stresses such as tensile and cycling forces can 
modify the material resistance to other factors that can enhance corrosion. 
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  Table 8.25: List of fundamental FIS and required input parameters for design 
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
CORRH          “Hazard due to corrosion 
potential” 
Vessel temperature °C 
 Metal: Temp. excellent res. °C 
 Metal: Temp. good res. °C 
 Metal: Temp. sufficient res. °C 
 Metal: Temp. unsatisf. res. °C 
 Plastic: Temp. unsatisf. res. °C 
NLD                 “Hazard due to nozzle  Nozzle location % 
failure” Nozzle diameter in 
 Overflow level % 
 Normal high level % 
 Normal level % 
 Normal low level % 
 Minimum level % 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.26: List of aggregation FIS and input parameters for design  
FIS NAME INPUT UNITS 
CORNZ              “Hazard due to nozzle failure  COPRH HP* 
                             and corrosion” NLD HP* 
ISIMECH           “Hazard due to mechanical  CORNZ HP* 
                             and design factors” Volume gal 
* HP = hazard potential index 
 
 
 
Depending on the mechanism, corrosion can be classified as localized and uniform. 
In the case of localized corrosion, pitting and crevice formation occurs. Other corrosion 
types are intergranular corrosion, environment induced cracking such as stress corrosion 
cracking, erosion-corrosion, dealloying, and galvanic corrosion. The type of metal (e.g., 
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carbon steel, austenitic stainless steel, nickel alloys) and the composition (i.e., alloy 
concentration) affect the susceptibility of the material to a certain type of corrosion. For 
example, nickel-chromium alloys are susceptible of intergranular corrosion. The 
concentration of chemical substances affects the behavior of the metal but also the 
presence of traces of contaminants can trigger corrosive processes. The mechanical 
design of the equipment also modifies the potential for corrosion; for example, dissimilar 
metals can generate electrochemical cells that are responsible for galvanic corrosion.  
Detailed classifications of corrosion processes, as well as the analysis between 
relevant chemical and mechanical aspects are presented by authors mentioned above. 
The development of predictive models able to detect hazardous combinations of 
conditions is an open research area and due to the complexity of the problem some 
authors investigated the application of neural networks for the modeling of CO2 
corrosion [Nesic et al., 2001] and atmospheric corrosion due to several contaminants 
such as SO2 and Cl-. 
For the hierarchical model proposed in this research, several approaches were 
explored in order to model the corrosion potential. The approach of generating rules for 
each metal type interacting with specific classes of chemicals under certain conditions 
was discarded because of the large number of cases that must be analyzed. The use of 
isocorrosion graphs which are developed for each chemical in contact with a specific 
chemical under different temperatures is a possible approach however it presents the 
same limitations of the previous case. The third approach explored was the evaluation of 
each type of corrosion depending on the combination of chemical, environmental, 
mechanical, and design factors; however, in this case detailed information regarding 
mechanical characteristics was required, and it is assumed that such data may not be 
available. 
Therefore the approach selected for the modeling of the potential hazard due to 
corrosion is based on the information provided by material resistance tables. The 
corrosion resistance tables published by Schweitzer (1991) are taken as model because 
they present the information for a large number of chemicals in contact with plastic and 
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metallic materials, at a range of temperatures. The most common types of metallic 
corrosion for the chemical process industry, as reported by DuPont and cited by cited by 
CCPS (1993), are general corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and pitting. The material 
tables published by Schweitzer (1991) report general notes when the analyzed material 
for the specific chemical under the required operating conditions is susceptible to any of 
them. Therefore the designer can identify design modifications that can control or avoid 
the specific corrosion type. 
The fuzzy inference system for the evaluation of the corrosion potential called 
“hazard due to corrosion potential” (CORRH), is based on adaptive membership 
functions that divide the linguistic variable “temperature” into fuzzy sets that describe 
the ranges of temperature where the specific material for the specific chemical present 
excellent, good, sufficient, and unsatisfactory corrosion resistance. Schweitzer (1991) 
indicates that a corrosion rate < 2 mills penetration/year is considered excellent, a 
corrosion rate < 20 mills penetration/year is considered good, a corrosion rate < 50 mills 
penetration/year is considered satisfactory, while a corrosion rate > 50 mills 
penetration/year is considered unsatisfactory. These values are used as crossover points 
for the membership functions. Usually, only one or two points are available for each 
material, therefore the FIS is designed to recognize which information has been 
submitted and designs only the appropriate sets. In the case of plastic materials, only the 
temperature that divides a region of satisfactory resistance form non-satisfactory 
resistance is required, and only two fuzzy sets are used.  
For example, for acetic acid with a concentration of 80%, stainless steel 316 presents 
excellent resistance up to 90 °F, good resistance up to 150 °F, satisfactory resistance up 
to 230 °F, and unsatisfactory resistance above that. Therefore, four fuzzy sets are 
designed.  In the case of the same acid, monel presents excellent resistance up to 110 °F, 
good resistance up to 219 °F, and unsatisfactory resistance above that; therefore only 
three sets are designed.  
The operation temperature of the equipment is used as input for the specific system 
being analyzed and the membership into each set is evaluated by the fuzzy algorithm. 
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Fuzzy IF-THEN rules are then used to evaluate the hazard inherent in the systems due to 
the combination of material, chemical, and temperature; it is assumed that an operation 
temperature within the unsatisfactory set represents the highest hazard, while the 
operation within the excellent region implies the lowest hazard. 
By following the described modeling approach it is possible to model internal 
corrosion by taking into account some degree of detail by including the essential 
information of the specific system (i.e., chemical substance, material, and operation 
temperature) and at the same time achieve a general model that can work for a wide 
range of cases. However, factors such as stress and fatigue, external corrosion due to 
pollution or other environmental conditions, and other technical details responsible for 
specific type of corrosion are not taken into account. These effects can be added in future 
revisions of the hierarchical model proposed in this research. 
 
8.3.1.2  Nozzle hazard evaluation 
The presence of nozzles in a vessel is assumed to be a potential source of hazard, 
whose magnitude depends on the position with respect to the level of the liquid and the 
size of the wall penetration. As indicated by Lees (1996) in the case of pressure vessels, 
it is better to have discharge and filling pipes entering the vessel above the level of the 
liquid in order to reduce the leak flowrate in case of failure. This approach is based on 
the same ideas presented for the evaluation of dispersion; a liquid release at high 
pressure is more hazardous than a vapor release because of the quantity of material 
leaked is much larger and capable of forming larger clouds.  
For the evaluation of the potential hazard associated with the failure of nozzles of a 
storage or process vessel the approach indicated by Lees (1996) about reducing the 
number of penetrations below the level of the liquid, is used as a general approach to 
reduce the possibility of liquid releases. In order to evaluate this type of hazards, the 
fuzzy inference system “hazard due to nozzle failure” (NLD) is based on adaptive 
membership functions whose design depends on the normal operation levels of the 
vessel being analyzed. The required operation levels are: 
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- Overflow level 
- Normal high level 
- Normal operation level 
- Normal low level 
- Minimum level (or drain) 
 
For vessels working under stable conditions the range of variation of the normal 
levels (i.e., high level, operation level, and low level) should be narrow while for vessels 
working under oscillating and cycling conditions the range is wider. It is assumed that in 
case of failure, nozzles located at or above the drain will release only vapors, while 
nozzles located below the normal minimum operation level will release liquids. In the 
case of vessels containing vapors or gases only, the liquid level is assumed to be located 
at the bottom of the tank and therefore the release will always imply reduced hazard. In 
the case of vessels full of vapors that can condense, it is assumed that the resultant liquid 
phase will occupy a small volume, hence implying low hazard.  
Another factor that is important in order to estimate magnitude of the potential 
chemical release due to nozzle failure is the size of the nozzle which affects also the 
possibility of failure itself. According to Lees (1996) for pressure systems, small-bore 
pipes (i.e., diameter smaller than 1 in) are more likely to fail, being damaged, or 
producing leaks. However, the amount of released material is also relatively low. Larger 
pipes (i.e., diameter  6 in) are less likely to fail but the quantity of materials that can be 
released is much larger. The data presented by Lees (1996) for pressure systems is used 
as baseline and extended to non-pressure pipes too. The failure frequency for five pipe 
diameters (i.e., 1 in, 1.5 in, 2 in, 3 in, 4 in, and 6 in) are compared with the failure 
frequency of small-bore pipes, and the relative factor is then used for the design of the 
membership functions for the evaluation of the possibility of failure. The flowrate that 
can be released through each pipe size is calculated at fixed conditions (i.e., liquid level 
and vessel pressure) and the flows for each nozzle size are compared with the flowrate 
that can be released by a 12 in pipe. The values are used to design the membership 
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functions for the evaluation of the relative hazard inherent to the magnitude of the flow 
released due to size of the nozzle. 
The fuzzy inference system NLD combines the two factors, possibility of hazard due 
to liquid release and possibility of nozzle failure due to its diameter (which includes the 
magnitude of the flow), by using IF-THEN rules. The highest hazard is derived from 
large nozzles located at low levels below the normal low liquid level; the lowest hazard 
is assigned to medium size nozzles (i.e., 2, to 3 in) located in the vapor space of the 
vessel. Three conditions (or rules) are assumed as inherently safer and are given by 
medium nozzles located around the normal liquid level, and larger nozzles located above 
the normal liquid level.  
The hierarchical model is set up to evaluate up to four nozzles for each vessel and it 
is assumed that each one contributes independently to the overall hazard of the vessel, 
therefore the individual contributions taken as fuzzy numbers (by using the procedure 
explained in Chapter VII) are added by using fuzzy addition. Because the evaluation of 
each nozzle is based on a scale on the range [0 1] the aggregated hazard score is on the 
scale [0 4].  
The inference system “hazard due to nozzle failure and corrosion” (CORNZ), 
combines the hazard due to chemical release caused by two factors: 
- Mechanical failure of the wall of the vessel because of corrosion,  
- Hazard due to release of chemical substances by mechanical failure of the 
nozzles of the vessel.  
 
The fuzzy IF-THEN rules used to combine the overall hazard given by the interaction 
of the possibility of wall failure and nozzle failure, are based on qualitative judgment and 
require that both type of failure present low potential. When the failure due to corrosion 
potential is high, the overall hazard is high; if the potential for high release rate due to 
nozzle failure under the liquid level is high, then the overall hazard is high. 
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8.3.1.3  Hazard due to volume 
The output from the inference system CORNZ is used as input for the system 
“hazard due to mechanical and design factors” (ISIMECH), is combined with the 
linguistic variable “volume” which is related to the size of the vessel. The fuzzy sets for 
volumes are designed with reference to the values used by NFPA 30 [NFPA, 1990] for 
storage of class I, II, IIIA, and unstable liquids; the standard indicates distances to the 
property line of the plant for different sizes of storage tanks. These values are assumed to 
represent a measure of potential hazard associated with each vessel size and are therefore 
useful to define membership functions according to the potential physical implications of 
a potential release. Kletz (1980) indicates that vessels with less than 5 tons are not likely 
to generate unconfined vapor cloud explosions; the size of these vessels (assumed to be 
around 1,300 gallons) is taken as the reference state; volumes smaller than 1,300 gallons 
are assumed to be safer than the reference state while larger volumes are more 
hazardous. The scale of volume taken into account is between 0 and 3,000,000 gallons 
but a logarithmic transformation is applied to preserve the fuzzy sets for the smaller 
volumes.  
The fuzzy IF-THEN rules that combine the potential for mechanical failure and the 
size of the volume have the capability of reducing high hazard due to mechanical failure 
to lower hazard levels if the volume is small because even if the release happens, a 
reduced amount of chemical will be released. On the other hand if the potential for 
mechanical failure is very small but the volume is very large, the resultant overall hazard 
is very high. These type of rules is required in order to carry the potential hazard due to 
large volumes to the fuzzy inference system that combines the potential chemical hazard 
with the mechanical hazard and volume.  
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8.3.2  Examples of the design of membership functions and fuzzy sets 
The membership functions for the evaluation of corrosion are shown in Figure 8.16, 
when the temperatures for excellent and good resistance are available. The parameters 
are not shown because the functions are adaptive therefore they move along the 
temperature axis according to the characteristics of the chemical-metal interaction. Table 
8.27 shows the rules used for the potential hazard due to corrosion. 
In Table 8.27, ETcr represents the set that covers the range of temperature where the 
material presents excellent corrosion resistance for the specific chemical substance; 
when the operation temperature is within the range covered by the set for good resistance 
(i.e.,GTcr) the hazard is low but if the operation temperature is within the set of 
satisfactory resistance the hazard for potential corrosion increases and is maximum when 
the temperature is within the set of unsatisfactory corrosion resistance (i.e., UTcr). 
The membership functions for the evaluation of the overall mechanical hazard 
(ISIMECH) by combining the hazard due to potential corrosion and nozzle failure with 
the volume of the vessel are shown in Figure 8.17. Table 8.28 reports the parameters of 
the fuzzy sets and Table 8.29 report the rules used. 
The rules shown in Table 8.29 indicate that a vessel could imply high inherent hazard 
due to either large volume or high corrosion potential. However, the output from this 
fuzzy inference system must be combined with the aggregated chemical hazard 
(ISICHEM) in order to combine the mechanical and chemical hazard.  
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Figure 8.16: Membership functions for corrosion when the temperature for 
excellent and good resistance is available 
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Figure 8.17: Membership functions for ISIMECH 
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Table 8.27: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for CORRH. The general rule is: 
IF (“operation temperature” is ____) THEN (HP is ____) 
 Corrosion temperature 
 ETcr GTcr STcr UTcr 
Hazard VLH LH MH VVHH 
 
 
Table 8.28: Parameters for ISIMECH inputs 
INPUTS NAME DESCRIPTION SHAPE PARAMETERS  
 
CVLH Very low hazard Triangular [0 0 0.25] 
HP CLH Low hazard Triangular [0 0.25 0.5] 
mechanical CMH Medium hazard Triangular [0.25 0.5 0.67] 
Failure CHH High hazard Triangular [0.5 0.67 0.83] 
 CVHH Very high hazard Triangular [0.67 0.83 1 ] 
 CVVHH Extreme hazard Triangular [0.83 1 1 ] 
 
AVLH Very small volume Trapezoidal [2 2 5.62 6.4] 
Volume ALH Small volume Trapezoidal 5.62 6.4 6.62 7.18] 
Ln(gal) AMH Medium volume Trapezoidal [6.62 7.18 8.5] 
 AHH Large volume Trapezoidal [7.18 8.5 9.39 10.59] 
 AVHH Very large volume Trapezoidal [9.39 10.59 12.89 14.59] 
 AVVHH Large storage tank Trapezoidal [12.89 14.5 15 15] 
 
 
 
Table 8.29: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for ISIMECH. The general rule is: IF (“hazard due to 
mechanical design” is ____) AND (“volume” is ____) THEN (HP is ____) 
  Volume 
  AVLH ALH AMH AHH AVHH AVVH
CVLH VLH VLH LH MH VH VHH 
CLH VLH VLH LH MH VH VVHH 
CMH VLH LH MH VH VHH VVHH 
 
Mechanical  
hazard 
CHH LH MH VH VHH VVHH VVHH 
 CVHH MH VH VHH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
 CVVHH MH VH VVHH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
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8.4 FUZZY MODELS FOR HAZARD AGGREGATION 
 
The last fuzzy inference system has the purpose of aggregating the two main hazards, 
as shown in Table 8.30, inherent to the chemical properties of the substances and to the 
design characteristics of the equipment.  
The fuzzy IF-THEN rules upon which the overall hazard is based are qualitative rules 
shown in Table 8.31. The rules require low chemical and mechanical hazard in order to 
obtain an overall low hazard and therefore a high inherent safety index for the evaluated 
equipment. 
When the methodology is applied to several equipment (i) for the same unit (j), the 
individual evaluations for each single equipment must be added by using fuzzy addition 
in order to obtain the overall index for the whole unit. 
 
 
 
Table 8.30: List of aggregation FIS and input parameters  
FIS  NAME INPUT UNITS 
OVERALL INHERENT SAEFTY INDEX ISICHEM HP* 
 ISIMECH HP* 
* HP = hazard potential index 
 
 
Table 8.31: Fuzzy IF-THEN rules for ISI. The general rule is: IF (“chemical hazard” is 
____) AND (“mechanical hazard” is ____) THEN (ISL is ____) 
ISI  ISIMECH 
  VLH LH MH HH VHH VVHH 
VLH VLH VLH VLH VLH VLH LH 
LH VLH VLH VLH LH LH MH 
MH VLH LH MH VH VHH VHH 
 
ISICHEM 
HH LH MH VH VHH VVHH VVHH 
 VHH MH VH VHH VHH VVHH VVHH 
 VVHH MH VH VVH VVHH VVHH VVHH 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
In this chapter a simple case study is presented and analyzed in order to show how 
the fuzzy hierarchical model is applied. In the first section a description of the processing 
unit is presented with the data of the two vessels analyzed.  Then results obtained by 
applying the fuzzy model are presented with the explanation of the results. For the first 
vessel three design modifications are tested in order to show the potential of the model.  
 
9.1 UNIT DESCRIPTION  
 
The case selected as example for this methodology is one unit of the process of 
hydrodealkylation of toluene for the production of benzene. This information used is 
reported by Turton et al. (1998). Only two pieces of equipment are modeled; the first is 
the storage tank TK-101 and the second is the process vessel V-102 which is the reflux 
drum of the distillation column for the purification of benzene. Figure 9.1 shows the 
location of the two vessels. 
The information regarding the two analyzed vessels is reported in Figures 9.2 and 
9.3. Additional information for the vessel TK-101 is the following: 
- Operation temperature: 59 °C 
- Operation Pressure: 2.0 atm 
- Operation levels: normal high = 60%, normal = 50%, normal low = 40% 
- Material of construction: carbon steel 
- Volume = 4,426 gal 
- Unit where it is located is assumed to be obstructed 90% on three sides, while 
one is 50% obstructed and the other is totally open. Therefore the fraction of 
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confinement is 84%. It is assumed that the overall volume blockage fraction (i.e., 
volume of equipment/volume of unit) is around 60%. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Diagram of the hydrodealkylation unit 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Diagram of the storage tank TK-101 
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Figure 9.3: Diagram of the vessel V-102 
 
 
 
- Carbon steel has an excellent corrosion resistance for toluene up to 350 °F 
- The wall penetrations for instrumentation and sampling are not taken into 
consideration. 
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of confinement is 72%. It is assumed that the overall volume blockage fraction 
(i.e., volume of equipment/volume of unit) is around 60%. 
- Carbon steel has an excellent corrosion resistance for toluene up to 350 °F 
- The wall penetrations for instrumentation and sampling are not taken into 
consideration. 
 
The information about toxicity and other properties of toluene and benzene are 
reported in Table 9.1, with all the used inputs. When a variable X appears as X1, X2, and 
X3, the user can feed the values of the variable as a fuzzy number. If the values given are 
equal, then they are taken as a crisp number. 
 
 
Table 9.1: Input values used for the analysis  
INPUT TOLUENE BENZENE DESCRIPTION 
Tb1 111 80.1 Lower limit for Boiling temperature (°C) 
Tb2 111 80.1 Normal Boiling temperature (°C) 
Tb3 111 80.1 Upper limit for Boiling temperature (°C) 
Tf1 4 -11 Lower limit for Flash Temp. C 
Tf2 4 -11 Normal Flash temperature (°C) 
Tf3 4 -11 Upper limit for Flash temperature (°C) 
Fnfpa 3 3 Decision variable: NFPA flammability score 
MPD1 0 0 Lower limit for  Max. power density  (W/mL at 250 °C) 
MPD2 0 0 Average  Maximum power density 
MPD3 0 0 Upper limit for  Maximum power density 
HWmix1 0 0 Lower limit for the Water heat of mixing [cal/gr] 
HWmix2 0 0 Average Water heat of mixing [cal/gr] 
HWmix3 0 0 Upper limit for the Water heat of mixing [cal/gr] 
Tt1 25 112 Lower limit for operation temperature (°C) 
Tt2 55 112 Operation temperature (°C) 
Tt3 70 112 Upper limit for operation temperature (°C) 
Pt1 1.9 2.5 Lower limit for operation pressure (atm) 
Pt2 2.0 2.5 Operation pressure (atm) 
Pt3 2.8 2.5 Upper limit for operation pressure (atm) 
Tbt1 115 112 Lower limit for Boiling temperature (C): at lowest vessel 
conditions 
Tbt2 115 112 Boiling temperature (°C): at lowest vessel conditions 
Tbt3 115 112 Upper limit for Boiling temperature (°C): at lowest vessel 
conditions 
Tatm1 25 25 Lower limit for atmospheric temperature (°C) 
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Table 9.1: Continued 
INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT 
Tatm2 25 25 Average atmospheric temperature (°C) 
Tatm3 25 25 Upper limit for atmospheric temperature (°C) 
Ovbf1 
0.6 
0.6 
Lower limit for the overall volume blockage fraction = 
Vobstr/Vtot=Veq/Vtot 
Ovbf2 0.6 0.6 Average overall volume blockage fraction 
Ovbf3 0.6 0.6 Upper limit for the overall volume blockage fraction 
Ocf1 0.84 0.72 Lower limit for the overall confinement fraction 
Ocf2 0.84 0.72 Average overall confinement fraction 
Ocf3 0.84 0.72 Upper limit for the overall confinement fraction 
Fbv1 10 10 Lower limit for the chemical flame burning velocity (cm/s) 
Fbv2 10 10 Average chemical flame burning velocity (cm/s) 
Fbv3 10 10 Upper limit for the chemical flame burning velocity (cm/s) 
Vis1 0.35 0.6 Lower limit for  Viscosity [cp] 
Vis2 0.0.4 0.6 Average  Viscosity [cp] 
Vis3 0.6 0.6 Upper limit for  Viscosity [cp] 
To1 5,000 4,700 Lower limit for Oral Toxicity     (mg/kg) 
To2 5,000 4,700 Average oral Toxicity     (mg/kg) 
To3 5,000 4,700 Upper limit for Oral Toxicity     (mg/kg) 
Td1 12,124 2,900* Lower limit for Dermal Toxicity  (mg/kg) 
Td2 12,124 2,900* Average dermal Toxicity   (mg/kg) 
Td3 12,124 2,900* Upper limit for Dermal Toxicity   (mg/kg) 
phase Vm vm DECISION VAR: liquid then phase='vm' 
GMc1 4,600 7,800 Lower limit for respiratory Toxicity: Gas concentration 
GMc2 4 9,000 Average respiratory Toxicity: Gas concentration 
GMc3 4 13,700 Upper limit for respiratory Toxicity: Gas concentration 
Che1 0.05 0.7 Lower limit of confidence in Human evidence for Cancer     (range 0-1) 
Che2 0.05 0.7 Average confidence in Human evidence for Cancer      
Che3 0.05 0.7 Upper limit for confidence in Human evidence for Cancer     
Cae1 0.95 0.6 Lower limit for confidence in Animal evidence for Cancer     
Cae2 0.95 0.6 Average confidence in Animal evidence for Cancer      
Cae3 0.95 0.6 Upper limit for confidence in Animal evidence for Cancer     
Halft1 2 2 Lower limit for degradability: Half time (days) 
Halft2 7 9 Average degradability: Half time (days) 
Halft3 14 16 Upper limit for degradability: Half time (days) 
LD501 6.4 6 Lower limit for Aquatic toxicity LD50 
LD502 13 11 Average Aquatic toxicity LD50 
LD503 24 22 Upper limit for Aquatic toxicity LD50 
LogKow1 2.69 2.13 Lower limit for Bioaccumulation factor LogKow 
LogKow2 2.69 2.13 Average Bioaccumulation factor LogKow 
LogKow3 2.69 2.13 Upper limit for Bioaccumulation factor LogKow 
HalftTr1 0.25 3 Lower limit for Tropospheric Degrad.: Half time (days) 
HalftTr2 0.5 4 Average Tropospheric Degradability: Half time (days) 
HalftTr3 1 5 Upper limit for Tropospheric Degrad.: Half time (days) 
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Table 9.1: Continued 
INPUT INPUT INPUT INPUT 
Info1 0.7 0.7 Lower limit for confidence in Type of information available  [0 1] 
Info2 0.8 0.8 Average confidence in Type of information available  [0 1] 
Info3 0.9 0.9 Upper limit for confidence in Type of information available  [0 1] 
crEm 350 350 T(°F) at which METAL Corrosion resistance is EXCELLENT (cr<2 mills/yr) 
crGm 15* 15* T(°F) at which METAL Corrosion resistance is GOOD (2<cr<20 mills/yr) 
crSm 15* 15* T(°F) at which METAL Corrosion resistance is SATISFACTORY (20<cr<50 mills/yr) 
crUm 15* 15* T(°F) at which METAL Corrosion rate (mills) for UNACCEPTABLE resistance (cr>50 mills/yr) 
N1 1 1 Level of nozzle 1: (0-100% vessel height) 
N2 1 1 Level of nozzle 2: (0-100% vessel height) 
N3 0 0 Level of nozzle 3: (0-100% vessel height) 
N4 1 - Level of nozzle 4: (0-100% vessel height) 
D1 4 3 Diameter of nozzle 1: (in) 
D2 2 4 Diameter of nozzle 2: (in) 
D3 4 4 Diameter of nozzle 3: (in) 
D4 4 - Diameter of nozzle 4: (in) 
OFL 1 1 Overflow level 
NHL 0.6 0.6 Normal high level 
NOL 0.5 0.5 Normal op level 
NML 0.4 0.4 Normal low level 
DRL 0 0 Min level 
VOL 4,426 1,368 Vessel volume [gal] 
* These values are set at upper or lower limit of the variable because not used or out of range 
 
 
 
9.2 CASES  
 
The vessel V-102 is evaluated according to the parameters reported in Table 8.1 The 
vessel is working under hazardous conditions because the operating conditions are 
saturated and the pressure is relatively high compared with the atmospheric pressure. The 
conditions of confinement and obstruction are also very high. The storage tankTK-101 is 
evaluated at the same conditions reported in Table 8.1; this vessel works at less 
hazardous conditions since the operating temperature is not close to the normal boiling 
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temperature. However, the pressure is relatively high and it is assumed that in case of 
failure of the pressure regulators on line 2, it can be pressurized. 
The values reported in Table 9.1 are assumed to be the normal operating conditions, 
therefore for Case 1, vessel V-102 is assumed to be equipment 1 of unit 1 and its overall 
hazard index will be FISI11; storage tank TK-101 is assumed to be equipment 2 of unit 1 
therefore its overall fuzzy hazard index will be FISI12 . If more equipment and pipelines 
were evaluated they would be equipment i of unit 1, where i = 0…n. Therefore, in order 
to obtain the overall index for unit j = 1, all the FISIij should be added by using fuzzy 
addition. This step is exemplified below. 
For Case 2 only TK-101 is reevaluated by reducing the overall fraction of 
confinement but the operating pressure is not changed. For Case 3, TK-101 is 
reevaluated by reducing the operating pressure at atmospheric and using the high degree 
of confinement; in Case 4, TK-101 is evaluated with low operating pressure and low 
degree of confinement. 
 
 
9.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section reports the results obtained for each case. The obtained results are 
plotted indicating the possible range of variability of the hazard degree and the value that 
is given by defuzzification and therefore is the crisp solution. The plots have been 
developed according to the advise given by Kletz (2003). The tables of results report at 
the top the values of FISIij and the two overall evaluations for the chemical hazard 
(ISICHEM) and the mechanical hazard (ISIMECH). Below the three main indices, the 
rest of the indices are reported. 
The vertical axis of the plot represents the scale of hazard, which is on the real 
interval [0 1] and the value of 0.5 indicates the threshold between conditions that 
represent relevant hazards and therefore cannot be considered inherently safer. Values 
lower than 0.5 represent conditions associated with low hazard degrees that should not 
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require complex layers of protection to control them and therefore are assumed to be 
conditions within the “inherently safer” region. 
 
9.3.1 Results and analysis for Case 1 
The values for each index for the Vessel TK-101 are reported in Table 9.2, and they 
are presented graphically in Figures 9.4 to 9.9. 
The lower part of the figures presents arrows that show which indices are aggregated 
to obtain the index indicated by the arrow, which is circled. 
From Figure 9.4 it is possible to detect that the major hazard contribution to the 
overall hazard for the storage tank TK-101 is given by the overall chemical hazard (i.e., 
ISICHEM) while the mechanical contribution is not important (i.e., ISIMECH). From 
Figure 9.5 the hazard due to corrosion is negligible while the major contribution for the 
nozzle (or pipe connection) for nozzle 3 (i.e., NLD 3) is the most important due to its 
size (i.e., 4 in) at its location at the bottom of the vessel. 
From Figure 9.6 it is possible to see that the hazard derived form the degree of 
obstruction and congestion (i.e., COBV) is very high, and although the explosive hazard 
due to flammability and reactivity is relatively low (i.e., AGOFR) as shown in Figure 
9.7, when combined with high congestion the hazard increases (i.e., AGEXPL). The 
hazard due to dispersion is relatively high because TK-101 works under pressurized 
conditions, but the temperature is lower than the normal boiling point of toluene.  
The overall hazard due to flammability and reactivity (i.e., AGOFR) is low because 
toluene is flammable (CHPFa) but is not reactive (AGORX) and therefore cannot 
undergo a runaway reaction. Because of the low viscosity of toluene, the hazard for the 
generation of heterogeneous hazardous conditions reduces the aggregated hazard of 
flammability and reactivity (i.e., AFRVISC). 
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Table 9.2: Results for the vessel TK-101 
INDICES   Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
FISI12     0.93 0.74 0.75 
ISICHEM    1.00 0.74 0.88 
ISIMECH     0.60 0.35 0.50 
ISIMECH            
CORNZ    0.15 0.00 0.00 
CORRH    0.40 0.10 0.25 
NLD    2.35 1.60 2.15 
1    0.60 0.35 0.53 
2    0.15 0.00 0.09 
3    1.00 0.90 1.00 
4     0.60 0.35 0.53 
ISICHEM            
AGEXPL    1.00 0.57 0.77 
DISP    0.76 0.57 0.60 
ACOFRV    0.91 0.59 0.70 
 COBV   1.00 0.90 0.89 
 AFRVISC   0.58 0.38 0.42 
 AGOFR   0.60 0.35 0.44 
  CHPFa 0.65 0.35 0.50 
  AGORX 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  CHPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    CHPRh2o 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AGCHM    1.00 0.57 0.79 
 DISPTX   0.76 0.57 0.60 
 AGCH   1.00 0.57 0.83 
 AGHEA   0.40 0.00 0.23 
  AGHEALTH 0.40 0.00 0.10 
  CHHc 0.15 0.00 0.00 
 AGET   1.00 0.74 0.77 
  CHEadt 1.00 0.60 0.80 
  CHEdt 0.90 0.35 0.57 
  CHEat 1.00 0.60 0.86 
    CHEp 0.40 0.00 0.20 
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Figure 9.4: Main overall hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 
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Figure 9.5: Overall mechanical hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 
 
 
 
The overall hazard due to environmental impact (i.e., AGET) as shown in Figure 9.8 
is relatively high because of the combination of the toluene toxicity, degradability, and 
bioaccumulation characteristics (i.e., CHEadt, CHEdt,CHEat,ad CHEp) which are 
relatively high as shown in Figure 9.9. 
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Figure 9.6: Overall mechanical and chemical indices for storage tank TK-101 
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Figure 9.7: Overall chemical hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 
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Figure 9.8: Overall aggregated hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 
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Figure 9.9: Overall aggregated environmental indices for storage tank TK-101 
 
 
 
The overall human toxicity and environmental hazard (i.e., AGCH) is high mainly 
due to the contribution of the environmental hazard. The overall hazard for humans (i.e., 
AGHEALTHa) as shown in Figure 9.9 is relatively low due to low dermal and 
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respiratory toxicity and the proven absence, and therefore low uncertainty, for the 
toluene potential to produce cancer in humans and animals (i.e., CHHc). 
The length of the lines representing each index indicates the uncertainty associated 
with each value (represented by white squares). Depending on the number of rules fired 
for each fuzzy inference system, the uncertainty can increase or be reduced. This effect is 
caused by the fact that some sets of IF-THEN rules have areas of high uncertainty (i.e., 
an output of LH next to an output of VH) to increase the speed on hazard increase or 
decrease. The uncertainty is also derived from the fact that in several cases the inputs are 
submitted as fuzzy numbers rather than crisp values. 
The values for each index for the Vessel V-102 are reported in Table 9.3, and they 
are plotted in Figures 9.10 to 9.15.  
Figure 9.10 shows the overall hazard index for the process vessel TV-102 which is 
relatively high (but lower than the overall index for the storage tank TK-101) and again 
the major contribution is given by the overall chemical hazard (i.e., ISICHEM). The 
chemical hazard is mainly caused by the operating conditions of the vessel that works at 
saturation conditions and under pressure. The mechanical hazard is low because of the 
excellent corrosion resistance and the relatively low volume of the vessel that reduces 
the overall mechanical hazard. As indicated in Figure 9.12, the explosion and dispersion 
hazards (i.e., AGEXPL and DISP) are high due to the saturation conditions and the high 
degree of obstruction and congestion (i.e., COBV). 
The hazard due to flammability (i.e., CHPFa) is high as shown in Figure 9.13 while 
the reactivity is low. Therefore the aggregated reactivity and flammability hazard is 
dominated by the flammability. It is interesting to note that while benzene and toluene 
have the same NFPA flammability score (i.e., 3) the flammability hazard score assigned 
to benzene is higher than the score resultant for toluene because the boiling temperature 
for benzene is thirty degrees lower than the boiling temperature of toluene, and the flash 
temperature of benzene is fifteen degrees lower than the flash point for toluene. 
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Table 9.3: Results for the vessel V-102 
INDICES   Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
FISI11     0.93 0.57 0.65 
ISICHEM    1.00 0.90 1.00 
ISIMECH     0.40 0.10 0.32 
ISIMECH            
CORNZ    0.15 0.00 0.00 
CORRH    0.40 0.10 0.22 
NLD    2.20 1.60 2.05 
1    0.60 0.35 0.53 
2    0.60 0.35 0.53 
3    1.00 0.90 1.00 
4     0.00 0.00 0.00 
ISICHEM        
AGEXPL    1.00 0.90 1.00 
DISP    1.00 0.90 1.00 
ACOFRV    1.00 0.75 0.86 
 COBV   1.00 0.90 0.89 
 AFRVISC   0.75 0.59 0.65 
 AGOFR   0.76 0.57 0.70 
  CHPFa 0.90 0.60 0.75 
  AGORX 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  CHPR 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    CHPRh2o 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AGCHM    1.00 0.90 1.00 
 DISPTX   1.00 0.90 1.00 
 AGCH   1.00 0.74 0.88 
 AGHEA   0.93 0.57 0.73 
  AGHEALTH 0.40 0.00 0.10 
  CHHc 0.90 0.60 0.75 
 AGET   1.00 0.74 0.77 
  CHEadt 1.00 0.60 0.79 
  CHEdt 0.90 0.35 0.57 
  CHEat 1.00 0.60 0.78 
    CHEp 0.40 0.00 0.15 
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Figure 9.10: Main overall hazard indices for vessel TV-102 
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Figure 9.11: Overall mechanical hazard indices for vessel TV-102 (NLD not shown 
because larger than 1) 
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Figure 9.12: Overall mechanical and chemical hazard indices for vessel TV-102 
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         Figure 9.13: Overall chemical hazard indices for vessel TV-102 
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As shown in Figures 9.12, 9.14 and 9.15 overall hazard for human health and the 
environment is high (i.e., AGCHM) because of the potential environmental 
consequences and the high dispersion hazard (i.e., DISPTX) given by the operating 
conditions of the vessel. The environmental hazard is caused by water toxicity and 
bioaccumulation (i.e., AGET, CHEadt), and the human toxicity. While the toxicity of 
benzene for humans is relatively low (i.e., AGHEALTHa) the cancer potential is high 
(i.e., CHHc). 
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         Figure 9.14: Overall aggregated hazard indices for vessel TV-102 
 
 
 
Assuming that the processing Unit 1 is formed only by storage vessel TK-101 and 
process vessel V-102, the overall inherent hazard can be obtained by adding the fuzzy 
triangular numbers obtained for FISI11 and FISI12 as shown in Table 9.4. Therefore the 
fuzzy hazard indices obtained for each equipment are used in a similar way as “cost” 
assuming that the overall hazard is given by the individual contributions of each piece of 
equipment. 
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Because the range of each individual index is [0 1] when two vessels are present, the 
overall range is [0 2], and the assumed inherent safety threshold would be located around 
1. Because the most possible value for FISI1 is 1.4 the overall unit presents a hazard level 
than what could be considered inherently safer and other extrinsic measures must be 
taken to reduce the potential consequences of a chemical release.  
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Figure 9.15: Overall aggregated environmental hazard indices for vessel TV-102 
 
 
 
  Table 9.4: Results for the Unit 1 
INDICES Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
Storage tank TK-101 
FISI12 0.93 0.74 0.75 
Process vessel V-102 
FISI11 0.93 0.57 0.65 
PROCESSING UNIT 
FISI1 1.86 1.31 1.40 
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The hazard is mainly produced by the flammability of the chemicals and the 
operating conditions (i.e., pressurized vessels) however the relatively small volumes help 
to reduce the mechanical hazards and the overall equipment hazard. 
 
9.3.2 Results and analysis for Case 2 
For this case, only the storage vessel TK-101 is analyzed; the input conditions 
presented in Table 9.1 are used but the degree of obstruction and confinement are 
reduced to 20% in order to analyze the potential hazard reduction effects due to a less 
congested unit design. Table 9.5 presents the relevant results.  
The overall hazard index FISI12 is lowered (e.g., values for Case 1 are: 0.93, 0.74, 
and 0.75) due to the reduction of the chemical hazard while, as expected, the mechanical 
hazard does not change. The hazard due to dispersion does not change because it 
depends only on the operating conditions, but the overall explosion hazard AGEXPL is 
reduced (e.g., values for Case 1 are: 1.0, 0.57, and 0.77) because of the reduction of the 
congestion degree. Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 show the new indices. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.5: Results for the vessel TK-101 when congestion is reduced 
INDICES   Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
FISI12        0.93 0.57 0.66 
ISICHEM    1.00 0.57 0.79 
ISIMECH     0.60 0.35 0.50 
ISICHEM           
AGEXPL    0.93 0.35 0.69 
DISP    0.76 0.57 0.60 
ACOFRV    0.75 0.38 0.50 
 COBV   0.60 0.35 0.39 
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Figure 9.16: Main overall hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 2 
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Figure 9.17: Explosion hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 2 
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9.3.3 Results and analysis for Case 3 
For this case, only the storage vessel TK-101 is analyzed; the input conditions 
presented in Table 9.1 are used but the operation pressure is reduced to atmospheric and 
the obstruction and confinement factors are high, as for Case 1. Table 9.6 presents the 
relevant results. Figures 9.18 and 9.19 show the results. 
The overall hazard indices are similar to the values obtained for Case 2, however the 
hazard reduction is achieved through reducing the dispersion hazard (e.g., values for 
Case 2 are 0.76, 0.57, and 0.60) but, because of the high degree of congestion, the overall 
hazard is constant. 
 
 
Table 9.6: Results for the vessel TK-101 for Case 3 
INDICES   Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
FISI12       0.93 0.57 0.63 
ISICHEM    1.00 0.57 0.69 
ISIMECH     0.60 0.35 0.50 
ISICHEM           
AGEXPL    0.93 0.35 0.62 
DISP    0.60 0.35 0.40 
ACOFRV    0.91 0.59 0.70 
 COBV   1.00 0.90 0.89 
 
 
 
9.3.4 Results and analysis for Case 4 
For this case, only the storage vessel TK-101 is analyzed; the input conditions 
presented in Table 9.1 are used but for this case the operation pressure is reduced to 
atmospheric and the degree of congestion is low, as in Case 2. Table 9.7 presents the 
relevant results.  
The overall hazard indices are reduced by the combined effect of operating pressure 
reduction  and  lower  congestion. While for Case 1 the inherent safety index  for  FISI12  
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was [0.93, 0.74, 0.75], in Case 4 the index is located around the inherent safety 
threshold. The hazard due to the chemical properties cannot be removed by design, 
unless the chemicals are substituted. Figures 9.20 and 9.21 show the indices for Case 4. 
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Figure 9.18: Main overall hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 3 
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Figure 9.19: Explosion hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 3 
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For Case 4, the uncertainty of several indices is increased because the new values are 
located in regions of the sets of rules that imply fast change, and this is reflected in the 
values of the obtained results. This is a problem associated with the fact that fuzzy 
numbers are used for the inputs rather than crisp numbers.  
 
 
 
Table 9.7: Results for the vessel TK-101 for Case 4 
INDICES   Upper  limit 
Lower  
limit 
Most  
possible 
FISI12       0.93 0.35 0.53 
ISICHEM    1.00 0.35 0.66 
ISIMECH     0.60 0.35 0.50 
ISICHEM            
AGEXPL    0.76 0.10 0.52 
DISP    0.60 0.35 0.40 
ACOFRV    0.75 0.38 0.50 
 COBV   0.60 0.35 0.39 
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Figure 9.20: Main overall hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 4 
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Figure 9.21: Explosion hazard indices for storage tank TK-101 for Case 4 
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CHAPTER X 
 
INHERENT SAFETY APPLIED TO TRANSPORTATION 
 
Raw materials, chemical products, and subproducts must be transported to/from the 
chemical facilities that produce or use them, and this activity extends the chemical 
hazards from the processing plant to the community. Therefore, to obtain a general 
evaluation of the inherent safety level of a chemical plant, it is necessary to consider the 
hazards due to transportation of chemicals and treat these as an additional “property” of 
the substance. 
 This chapter presents an overview of a prototype of inherent safety index based on 
fuzzy logic, which is useful to extend the concepts of inherent safety to transportation of 
chemical substances. An example evaluates the transportation step of chemical 
substances, shows how the index works, and describes how it can be applied to different 
stages of the life cycles of a chemical facility. 
It must be noted that the principles used for the design of the model for 
transportation are similar to the approach described in the previous chapters, but this 
chapter is based on the concept of risk, because the possible impact on the population is 
taken into account. Therefore the results obtained at the end of this chapter are not 
comparable with the results presented in Chapter VIII. 
 
 
10.1  TRANSPORTATION AS AN ELEMENT OF INHERENT SAFETY 
 
Transportation of chemical raw materials and chemical products plays a very 
important role in the analysis of the inherent safety level of a chemical plant. 
Transportation and inherent safety share also the common problems of data uncertainty, 
complexity due to the many factors that should be analyzed, subjectivity, and lack of a 
 279 
quantification methodology. The mathematical approach proposed in this chapter is 
based on the fuzzy set theory rather than probability and statistics. 
Inherent safety is based on the elimination of hazards rather than control of them. 
When an industry is forced to move towards an inherently safer approach, it is possible 
to interpret the principles in a way that will impact other related aspects of safety. For 
instance, one of the easier ways to improve the inherent safety level is to reduce the 
inventory of hazardous chemical substances. However, if this step causes an increase in 
the frequency of shipments of chemicals to or from the plant, the overall effect could be 
an increased transportation hazard. This example shows why transportation must be part 
of the inherent safety analysis of the plant and cannot be studied as a separate entity. 
Transportation of chemical substances is by itself an extremely complex and difficult 
topic, and when it is joined to the already complex issue of inherent safety 
quantification, the resultant problem could appear impossible to be solved. However no 
inherent safety quantification can be complete unless it takes into account the hazards 
related to transportation. The two questions that naturally appear here are: 
− How can transportation be included within inherent safety?  
− How to deal with all the complexity, uncertainty, and imprecision common to both 
inherent safety and transportation?  
 
Traditionally the hazards related to a specific chemical are health hazards (based on 
properties such as acute and chronic toxicity) and fire and explosion hazards (based on 
properties such as flammability, explosivity, and reactivity). These hazards are rated by 
using indices (e.g., NFPA ratings) based on chemical and thermodynamic properties. 
Following a similar approach, transportation hazards could be analyzed based on 
specific aspects such as mode of transportation, length of the route, and type of 
urban/rural areas traveled through. The transportation hazard then can be rated by a 
“transportation index”, which could be used by the general rules introduced in Chapter 
VI for the overall model of inherent safety. 
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Since each transportation mode has a characteristic range of possible volumes (e.g., 
tank trucks can transport less volume than a rail car) the number of trips per year is a 
function of the total required volume. The frequency of the shipments depends on the 
total volume of chemical required by the plant but also by the size of the storage tank. 
Because of this relation, the hazards posed by transportation are related to the hazards 
posed by the plant and then can be included within the inherent safety evaluation. This 
answers the first question. 
The answer to the second question requires the understanding of the source and type 
of uncertainty. The model examined in this chapter is based on fuzzy logic, that as 
explained in Chapters IV and VI allows one to take into consideration the uncertainty 
derived from vagueness. In some cases fuzzy logic has been used for risk assessment and 
fault tree analysis, and an interesting application of fuzzy logic to transportation risk 
assessment is presented by Bonvicini et al, (1998), where the authors treat the release 
frequency and rates as fuzzy numbers. 
 
10.1.1 Inherent safety for fixed site facilities 
The inherent safety index based on fuzzy logic measures hazards related to the 
chemical substance, the process, and the equipment present in the plant. The process 
hazard evaluation takes into account processing conditions such as temperatures and 
pressures, materials required for the construction of the equipment, protective equipment 
for workers, and the degree of packing of the evaluated unit or plant. The hazards related 
to process equipment are related to the type of equipment and the volume and conditions 
of storage and process tanks. The storage tanks represent a large accumulation of 
chemical substances and usually they are also a significant source of hazards. Because of 
this, one of the easier ways to reduce the risk of the plant is by reduction of inventory. 
When the reduction of stored volumes implies a higher transportation frequency, it is 
necessary to evaluate the options to identify the safest option. When, during the design 
stage it is possible to choose between two or more chemicals, the consideration of the 
transportation factors in the analysis can help  one to select the best option. 
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The evaluation of the chemical substance is based on an approach simpler than the 
one proposed in Chapters VII and VIII, however the principles are similar.  
 
10.1.2 The transportation problem 
Transportation is becoming every day more of a major concern for the chemical 
industry especially after the events of 9/11 and lately with the controversy associated 
with the transportation of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain.  Transportation is also 
assumed to be required, but in some cases it can be avoided or reduced if the chemicals 
can be substituted, shipped under a different mode, or produced on site. 
The typical transportation problem occurs when a plant A requires a certain chemical 
that can be shipped by different modes (e.g., truck or train) from different plants located 
at different distances. Each possible route goes through different environments (e.g., 
populated and rural areas) and consequently has a different risk. The problem is how to 
choose the best route and the best mode to reduce the hazards. The required storage tank 
in plant A varies according to the frequency and volume of the shipments, and this 
dependency links transportation to inherent safety. Additional decisions can improve the 
inherent safety level of transportation by choosing the type of container and the 
conditions (e.g., pressure, temperature, and concentration) that reduce the hazards 
[Bollinger et al., 1996]. Refrigerated storage is usually safer than pressurized storage 
tanks, but if the total quantity of stored chemicals is small, as in transportation, the 
observation might not be true [Kletz, 1998]. Because the transportation problem is 
affected by many external and unpredictable variables, the selection of the conditions 
that minimize the risk represents also the inherently safer option. 
When decisions have to be made, the typical questions asked are related to the 
associated risk. However, the problem is complex, and the answer is not easy to 
determine due to the lack of consensus on a systematic methodology (e.g., Saccomano 
(1993)). Traditional risk assessment for transportation is based on the typical risk 
definition: 
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RISK = f (Accident rate, Probability of release, Consequences) 
 
The accident rate for transportation is mode specific (e.g., road, railroad, pipeline, 
barge, ship) but also depends on factors such as the environment (e.g., urban, rural, 
suburban, remote), contributing factors, and initiating events. The accident rate for 
trucks depends on the type of truck, the type of road, traffic, and velocity, among others. 
For railroads, the class of track is important, as well as the location (main track or yard), 
the number of intersections with roads and highways, among others.  
The probability of release describes the likelihood of the tank to suffer a failure 
following the accident. It depends on the type of tank, the wall thickness, and the 
pressure of the tank but also on dynamic factors such as the velocity, the type and size of 
impacted object, the position where the tank of fittings are hit, the material and wall 
thickness of the tank, and the type of force (e.g., puncture, crush, fire).  
The consequences of the accidents depend on several other factors such as the size 
and position of the hole, the geographical location of the car, the time of the day which 
affects the number of exposed people, the weather conditions that affect the dispersion 
modeling, and the direction of the release. The size of the hole in the railcar has been 
studied by Raj and Turner (1993) and the data are in some case inconclusive. The size of 
the hole affects directly the release rate of the chemical but the location of the hole is 
also important. If the hole is in the vapor space the release rate is lower, however the 
vapor space is not always at the top of the car because the car could be overturned as a 
result of the accident. 
The combination of all the factors produces a large number of possible release 
scenarios. Additionally, the accident can happen along the selected route in any location, 
each one characterized by different weather conditions, socioeconomic, and terrain 
characteristics. Because of all these possible variations, the transportation problem is not 
so well defined as in the case of a fixed facility. Another factor in the analysis of 
transportation risk is the presence of accidents characterized by high consequences but 
low frequency [Brown, 2000]. 
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How to present and analyze the risk is another problem for transportation. The 
individual risk at any specific location is given by the sum of the contributions of each 
scenario. While individual risk does not depend on the length of type of the route and is 
normally very low, societal risk depends on the length of the route and could be 
potentially unacceptable due to the additive effects along the route [Rhyne, 1994].  
 
10.1.3 The problem about transportation data  
Transportation risk assessment is based on the same principles as the fixed site 
procedure and relies on accident databases for the statistical data required to calculate 
accident frequencies, release probabilities, and other parameters. However, these 
databases are not immune to the typical accident data collections such as underreporting 
(which is difficult to quantify), different reporting criteria, and various reporting 
parameters and scopes. Because of these problems, database accident data are difficult to 
compare. However, to develop a transportation analysis, data from several different 
databases must be used, and this requirement increases the uncertainty and complexity of 
the analysis. Additionally the required data must span several years during which 
regulation changes occurred and technical improvement of tank railcars and truck design 
occurred. The drop in accident rate for railroads during the last 20 years is a good 
example of this effect. The accident rate dropped from 15.8x10-6 accident/train mile in 
1977 to 4.6 8x10-6 accident/train mile in 1986. Since then it has been fluctuating around 
that value with a lowest rate of 4.3x10-6 accident/train mile in 1987 [FRA, 2000]. During 
1980 the railroad tank cars design was modified with self-couplers and head shields that 
dramatically reduced risk of head puncture during an accident. In 1990 regulatory 
changes for transportation of toxic liquids reduced the likelihood of tank failures [Rhyne, 
1994]. This and other regulatory changes contributed to the decrease of accident rates 
and release probabilities, but their effect is not immediate and continues during several 
subsequent years.  
Additional sources of uncertainties are related to the reporting of total number of 
miles traveled, quantities of transported substances, conditions before and during the 
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accident, and detailed information on the construction of the tanks (such as material and 
wall thickness). Also the data problem is different for each mode of transportation. For 
railroad the collected data have a better quality and are more nearly complete with 
respect to data collected for truck and road transportation.   
All these elements together show the complexities associated with the evaluation of 
the transportation problem. Several methodologies have been proposed, but two of them 
are the most significant. Saccomano (1993) proposed an exercise where the same 
specified corridor was analyzed for two transportation modes (truck and railroad) by 
seven different academic, industrial, or consulting organizations. The goal was to 
compare the assumptions and results obtained by the seven groups. Each group 
developed the transportation risk analysis for the given corridor based on very different 
assumptions and different factors that yielded final results with great variability. For 
instance the accident rate used for road transportation varied between 0.31 x10-6 and 2.6 
x10-6 accident/train mile. 
The AIChE (1995) proposed a transportation risk assessment procedure based on a 
well-defined and systematic methodology for fixed site facility. However, when most of 
the expected important factors are taken into account (each one with several possible 
levels) the complexity of the problem is overwhelming and it becomes difficult to keep 
track of all the information used. Additionally, the lack of detailed and specific data for 
the development of the analysis contributes to the difficulty of applying the 
methodology. 
 
 
10.2  A FUZZY MODEL FOR TRANSPORTATION  
 
The proposed transportation index is based on nine fuzzy inference systems from the 
Mamdami [Yen and Langari, 1999] model, and the definition of the AND and OR 
operation   is   based   on   MIN  and  MAX  operations,  respectively  [Zadeh,  1999]  as 
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explained in Chapter V. The software that is used for the calculations is the Fuzzy Logic 
Toolbox and Simulink from MATLAB. 
The model proposed here has the purpose of evaluating the hazards of truck 
transportation from a macroscopic approach given the fact that during the early stages of 
process design only fundamental transportation information is available and easy to get. 
The procedure is based on the general idea that three major components contribute to the 
transportation risk: accident frequency, release probability, and consequences. Each one 
of these components must be described by factors that are selected according to 
knowledge that can be extracted from the statistical information in the databases. 
Keeping in mind the uncertainty associated with the data, the lack of detailed 
information, the learning from the corridor exercise, and the problems of complexity for 
detailed analysis, the development of the transportation index is based on the following 
steps: 
1) Analysis of information and data reported by several studies and literature sources.  
2) Selection of the most important macro factors that appeared to be relevant to the 
specific component (accident rate, release probability or consequences) for which 
the information can be available during the early design stages. 
3) Selection of the data used to extract the knowledge needed to design the 
membership functions, fuzzy relations, and fuzzy inference systems. 
4) Design of fuzzy relations and fuzzy IF-THEN rules to model the behavior of the 
selected factors and its relations with respect to other factors. 
 
The three major components of the index depend on the following factors, and they 
are described by three fuzzy inference systems: 
1) ACCIDENT RATE:  
a) Environment: rural or urban 
b) Type of road: highway, multilane divided, multilane undivided, two lanes, one-
way 
2) RELEASE PROBABILITY:  
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a) Environment: rural or urban 
b) Type of road: freeway or non-freeway 
c) Type of truck: simple, single trailer, double trailer 
 
3) CONSEQUENCES:  
a) Dispersion hazard: based on boiling point of the substance and transportation 
temperature 
b) Toxicity: based on the ERPG-2 of the chemical 
c) Flammability and explosivity: based on the NFPA ranking 
d) Volume transported by the truck (which depends on the type and configuration of 
the truck) 
 
In order to generalize the model and including other important factors that can affect 
the components, the following correction factors are applied and they are described by 
three fuzzy inference systems: 
1) ACCIDENT RATE: Correction due to the type of the truck 
a) Environment: rural or urban 
b) Type of road: highway, multilane divided, multilane undivided, two lanes, one-
way 
c) Type of truck: simple, single trailer, double trailer  
2) RELEASE PROBABILITY: Correction for wall thickness  
a) Design pressure of the tank 
3) CONSEQUENCES: Correction for population concentration  
a) Number of people/mile2  
 
The final transportation hazard, TH, is calculated using the following formula: 
 
THi = {((ACCIDENT RATE)i  (CORR. FACTOR1) i)) * ((RELEASE 
PROBABILITY)i  (CORR. FACTOR2)) * 
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* ((VOLUME)(TOXIC INDEX)(EXPLOSIVE/FLAMM. INDEX)(CORR. 
FACTOR3))} * 
* (TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS PER YEAR) * (MILES)i 
TH =  ΣTHi 
 
The total number of shipments per year is given by  N = V/ x n vhw ,where V is the 
total volume of the chemical required in one year, n is the number of trailers per 
shipment and vhw is the volume of each trailer. The volume of the tank that must be 
refilled per shipment is given by v = x n vhw , where x represents the number of trucks 
required to refill the tank. Adjustment factors are used to calculate N and x when the 
volumes V, v and vhw yield fractional values for N and x. 
The sub-index i represents the different combinations of factors along the route. It is 
assumed that the route can be divided in segments where the population density, the type 
of road, and type of environment are constant. The calculations must be performed for 
each one of the i uniform segments, and the results must be added to obtain the final 
value. The weather is a major component for assessment of the consequences of a 
release, but for the purposes of this study, the evaluation of the area covered by the cloud 
is based on the dispersion index explained below. Additional assumptions are the 
following: 
a) The total hazard index is based on the total length of the route and the number of 
shipments required per year. The frequency of the shipment is affected by the 
following variables: 
1.  Total amount of chemical required by the plant during one year (V) 
2. Volume of the storage tank (v) 
3. Volume of the tank truck (vhw) 
4. Truck type (single truck or single trailer, double trailer) 
b) The data used are based on the Harwood and Russell (1990) report and other data 
reported by Rhyne (1994) and CCPS (1993). The purpose of the present work is the 
development and testing of an index to evaluate transportation hazards to be used by 
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the inherent safety index. The limitations and uncertainties associates with the data 
are recognized, but the analysis of accuracy and goodness of the data is beyond the 
scope of this work.  
 
The factors selected for the transportation index are described next. For the Accident 
Rate and the Consequences evaluation, the fuzzy sets and the fuzzy rules used are 
presented. 
 
10.2.1 Truck accident frequency 
Truck accident can happen as a consequence of several factors or combination of 
factors. Harwood and Russell (1990) and Karlaftis and Golias (2002) reported lists of 
possible factors. In general they include the truck configuration, including its size and 
weight, truck operation, including cargo type and human factors associated with the 
driver, highway or road type, type of environment and geographical location, weather, 
and temporal factors such as time, day and month. Intuitively any of these factors can 
have an effect on the accident rate of a truck; however, as pointed out in both studies, the 
statistical data show that some of them, such as the weather condition, apparently does 
not affect the accident rate. Other factors, such as environment, road geometry and 
traffic volumes have been recognized by both studies to have a strong effect on the 
accident rate. The same conclusion is reached by the two studies although they used 
different sets of data. Karlaftis and Golias (2002) used the Road Inventory database from 
the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) and the Accident Information 
Record from the Indiana State Police for the years 1991 to 1995. These data are for any 
type of vehicular accidents. Harwood and Russell (1990) used the FHWA Office of 
Motor Carriers for the Sates of Michigan, Illinois, and California for the years 1984-
1985, and these data are for truck accidents. 
The common conclusion and the additional analysis presented by Harwood and 
Russell (1990) indicates that these three parameters are the most important to describe 
the accident frequency for trucks. For the purpose of this research, the data presented by 
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Harwood are used here because it reports the accident frequency for the three states 
based on type of environment and type of roadway. 
The type of environment is classified into urban or rural according to the expected 
population concentration. This is also an indirect measure of the expected traffic (heavier 
in urban environments) and the possibility of accidents due to vehicular impact.  The 
road type is classified into highway, multilane divided and undivided, and two-lanes. It 
is expected that the accident rate decrease to the degree that the type of road is similar to 
a highway.  
A scale from 0 to 10 describes the type of environment, while a scale from 1 to 5 
describes the type of road. A scale from 0 to 16 describes the accident frequency, and it 
represents the accident frequencies multiplied by a factor of 106. The fuzzy sets are 
shown in Figure 10.1. The data used and reports the fuzzy set classification used to 
develop the fuzzy rules, reported in Tables 10.1 and 10.2. 
 
10.2.2 Correction due to type of truck 
As reported by Harwood (1990) the type of truck and its configuration can affect the 
accident rate. The trucks can be classified as: simple, single trailer, and double trailer. 
Simple trucks are formed by a single unit consisting of the cargo compartment mounted 
on the same rigid frame as the cab. These trucks are smaller compared to the other two 
types and are used for short-range routes. Single trailers consist of a tractor and a 
separate trailer. Double trailers consist of a tractor and two separate trailers.  
Because of the different design and dimensions, these three trucks present different 
driving problems. Large trucks are affected by the geometry of the roads such as curves, 
horizontal and vertical alignment, interchange ramps, shoulders, and railroad crossing 
[Harwood and Russell, 1990].  The truck configuration is a parameter that should be 
taken into account during the design stage to optimize the size of the tank and the 
transportation hazards. 
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Figure 10.1: Fuzzy sets for the inputs “Type of road” (a), “Type of environment” (b), 
and for the output “Accident frequency” (c); defuzzified output surface (d) 
 
 
 
Table 10.1: Accident frequencies as reported by Rhyne (1994) based on 
Harwood (1990) data from the averages for California, Illinois, and 
Michigan 
AREA 
TYPE 
ROAD TYPE ACCIDENT 
RATE 
Accident/mi 
FUZZY 
SET 
RURAL TWO-LANE 2.19E-06 Low 
RURAL MULTILANE UNDIVIDED 4.49E-06 Med-low 
RURAL MULTILANE DIVIDED 2.15E-06 Low 
RURAL FREWAY 6.40E-07 V-low 
URBAN TWO-LANE 8.66E-06 Mid 
URBAN MULTILANE UNDIVIDED 1.39E-05 V-high 
URBAN MULTILANE DIVIDED 7.47E-06 Mid 
URBAN FREWAY 2.18E-06 Low 
URBAN ONE-WAY STREET 9.70E-06 Mid-high 
 
a   b 
c   d 
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Table 10.2: Definition of fuzzy rules that express the knowledge extracted 
from the data in Table 10.1 
 AREA   TYPE 
ROAD TYPE URBAN RURAL 
TWO-LANE MID LOW 
MULTILANE UNDIVIDED VERY_HIGH LOW_MID 
MULTILANE DIVIDED MID LOW 
FREWAY LOW V_LOW 
ONE-WAY STREET MID_HIGH LOW 
 
 
 
 
The data reported by Harwood and based on a study developed by the California 
Department of Transportation for the years 1979 to 1983 are useful for developing a 
fuzzy relation between the type of environment (rural or urban), the type of road 
(freeway or non-freeway), and the type of truck (simple, single trailer, or double trailer). 
The data indicate that the accident rates are generally higher on non-freeways in urban 
areas.  
This information can be used to modify the accident rate according to the expected 
type of truck and the route environment. The value for “all trucks” is taken as an average 
from which deviations occur according to the case. The percentage of deviation is used 
for designing the fuzzy relation that describes how much the accident rate should be 
affected. The maximum increase/decrease allowed is 50%. 
 
10.2.3  Release probability 
Because of the accident, the tank-truck can suffer different types of damages 
depending on several factors such as the velocity, dynamics of the accident, type of force 
and type of terrain that can cause the truck to overturn or not. A detailed analysis of 
several factors is proposed by Rhyne (1994) based on reports and studies presented by 
other researchers.  
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The velocity is the most important factor related to release probability along with the 
thickness of the wall of the tank. The velocity can be related to the type of road by a 
fuzzy relation developed using the data presented by Rhyne (1994) and is based on 
Harwood and Russell (1990). An additional advantage of this set of data is that it is 
directly related to the set of data used for the accident rate model.  
 
10.2.4  Correction due to thickness of the wall 
The analysis of data developed for railroad accidents clearly suggests that the 
increased thickness of the head of the tanks acting as shields decreases the incidence of 
tank-car punctures during an accident [Raj and Turner, 1993]. Additionally, the internal 
pressure of the tank can reduce the tank’s resistance to puncture [Phillips and Olson, 
1986]. Similar information is not available for tank-trucks, however it can be inferred 
that as the tank is designed for higher pressures, the wall thickness should increase. 
Based on this, the classification of tanks presented by AIChE (1995) and based on 
specific regulations is used here to develop a fuzzy relation based on internal pressure of 
the tank and the possible effect on the puncture resistance. This fuzzy relation is based 
only on knowledge, since no data are available to relate these variables and the material 
tensile strength. The relation is then used to modify (up to 50%) the release probability 
calculated with the relative fuzzy relation. 
 
10.2.5 Tank volume 
The volume of the tank is a direct measure of the amount of chemical transported by 
the truck (assuming it is full) and it affects the hazard of a release, since larger volumes 
represent longer leak times and population exposure. This fuzzy variable is designed 
based on the data presented by AIChE (1995). It is assumed that the volume of the tank 
can range from 2,000 to 45,000 gal, and this range is transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm to maintain a good representation of the smaller volumes. 
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10.2.6 Toxicity, explosivity and flammability indices  
As mentioned at the beginning of the section, hazards due to toxicity and 
flammability are evaluated by using a simpler version of the hierarchical methodology 
proposed in Chapters VII and VIII, however the general ideas are the same. The fuzzy 
relation describing the toxicity index is based on the ERPG-2 value of the chemical 
substances. The chosen scale ranges from a concentration lower than 1 ppm (e.g., 
phosgene) to concentrations of 500 ppm. The range of the linguistic variable “toxicity” 
is transformed by taking the natural logarithm of the ERPG-2 range to achieve a good 
differentiation of the fuzzy sets for the lower (and most toxic) concentrations.  
Explosivity and flammability are described by using the NFPA 704 ratings (2002).  
The fuzzy variable here describes the hazards associated with the flammability and 
explosivity of the chemical. The linguistic variable here has a range between 0 and 32 
and the input is given by the sum of the squares of the two NFPA indices. The square of 
the index (that varies between 0 and 4) acts as a penalty for the higher scores.  
Dispersion of hazardous chemicals after their release is also important for 
transportation, however the methodology followed here is simpler than the approach 
proposed in Chapters VII and VIII, but the general principles are the same: 
1) The boiling point (Tb) of a substance indicates its phase at normal conditions and its 
volatility when released at conditions different from the atmospheric temperature and 
pressure. This behavior is described by ∆t1 = 25 - Tb. When ∆t1 is large the 
substance will tend to evaporate faster and cover a larger area than a less volatile 
substance. The range for ∆t1 is (-100, 100) and it is divided into five fuzzy sets, as 
shown in Table 10.3. 
2) The tank temperature (Tt) indicates the condition at which the chemical is shipped 
(e.g., pressurized or refrigerated). This is described by ∆t2 = 25 - Tt and it is 
assumed that when ∆t2 is large the tank is refrigerated and when it is small the tank 
is pressurized. As noted by Kletz (1998) a refrigerated tank tends to be inherently 
safer than a pressurized tank because the substance is at low temperature and its 
vaporization will be slower due to the absorption of heat required to reach the boiling 
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temperature. Additionally, for a pressurized tank the release rate will be larger than a 
refrigerated tank due to the higher-pressure difference with respect to the 
atmospheric pressure, so it is expected that the area covered by the dispersion plume 
increases as the tank pressures increases. The range for ∆t2 is (-100, 100), and it is 
divided into five fuzzy sets, as shown in Table 10.3. Figure 10.2 shows the resultant 
defuzzified surface that describes the expected hazard proportional to the size of the 
dispersion plume. 
 
 
Table 10.3:  Definition of fuzzy rules that express the hazard as a function of the 
expected area covered by a dispersion plume under steady state conditions 
DISPERSION   ∆t2=25-Tt   
∆t1=25-Tb VERY LOW LOW 0 HIGH VERY HIGH 
VERY LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW 
LOW HIGH MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW 
0 HIGH MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW 
HIGH VERY HIGH HIGH MEDIUM LOW LOW 
VERY HIGH VERY HIGH VERY HIGH HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
 
 
 
10.2.7  Correction for population density 
The consequences and hazards of the plume dispersion are related to the density of 
the population present in the area of the release. Therefore, the dispersion index must be 
corrected for the expected population density. The location of the population and the 
variation in density are neglected during the daytime. This correction factor is based on 
the idea that as the population density increases the hazards of highly negative 
consequence increases too. The fuzzy sets, shown in Figure 10.3, describing the 
population density are based on the classification, displayed in Table 10.4, used by the 
United States Census 2000 [Census, 2000] and are more detailed than the sets used to 
model the accident rate to provide more sensitivity to the correction factor. 
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Figure 10.2: Defuzzified output surface for the inputs “∆t2 = 25-Tb” and “∆t2 = 25-Tt” 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.4:  Definition of fuzzy set for population density as a 
correction factor for the dispersion index  
CATEGORY DENSITY 
(people/mi2) 
SCALED 
DENSITY 
Ln(people/mi2) 
REMOTE 20 3.0 
RURAL 100 4.6 
SUBURBAN 1,000 6.9 
URBAN 3,000 8.0 
EXTREMELY HIGH 10,000 9.2 
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Figure 10.3: Fuzzy sets describing the population density from the data in Table 10.4 
 
 
 
10.3 CASE  STUDY 
 
The fuzzy logic methodology described in this chapter has been applied to three 
fictitious routes with different lengths and classifications that are reported in Table 10.5. 
Each route is divided into segments (i) with constant population density, type, and 
condition of the road. It is expected that this type of information can be easily obtained 
from the Census data and GIS (Geographic Information System) software. 
The index for population density (expressed as ln(people/mi2)) is used as input in 
Figure 10.1a, while the index for type of road is used as input in Figure 10.1b. The index 
for type of road can be increased or decreased according to the expected condition that is 
evaluated subjectively.  
Route 3 is longer than the other two routes but it does not intercept highly populated 
areas. Four different cases have been used with the three routes. The conditions for each 
case are presented in Table 10.6. 
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  Table 10.5: Description of the three routes used as example 
ROUTE ENVIRONMENT POP. DENSITY 
Ln (people/mi2) 
LENGTH 
mi 
TYPE 
ROAD 
ROAD 
CONDITION 
LENGTH 
mi 
 
REMOTE 3 100 TWO 
LANES 
Good condition 2.5 
 
RURAL 5 50 MUND Bad condition 2.8 
1 SUBURBAN 7 20 MDIV Many 
intersections 
3.8 
 
URBAN 9 20 MDIV Very good 4.3 
 
VERY HIGH 10 0 MDIV Bad condition 4 
 
REMOTE 3 50 TWO 
LANES 
good condition 2.5 
 
RURAL 5 150 MUND Bad condition 2.8 
2 SUBURBAN 7 20 MDIV Many intersect. 3.8 
 
URBAN 9 10 MDIV Very good 4.3 
 
VERY HIGH 10 10 MDIV Bad condition 4 
 
REMOTE 3 250 TWO 
LANES 
good condition 2.5 
 
RURAL 5 100 MUND Bad condition 2.8 
3 SUBURBAN 7 10 MDIV Many intersect. 3.8 
 
URBAN 9 0 MDIV Very good 4.3 
 
VERY HIGH 10 0 MDIV Bad condition 4 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.6: Description of the four cases used as example 
  CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 
CHEMICAL ERPG-2 (ppm) 3 3 3 3 
Chlorine NFPA FIRE 0 0 0 0 
 
NFPA EXP 0 0 0 0 
 
Tb  (F) -29 -29 -29 -29 
 
Type Single trailer Single trailer Double   trailer Single trailer 
TRUCK VOL (gal) 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
 
T   (F) 80 80 80 32 
 
P rating (psi) 400 400 400 400 
STORAGE VOL (gal/yr) 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
TANK tank VOL (gal) 5,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 
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The results reported in Table 10.7 are for the first route and the first three cases. It is 
possible to observe how the accident rate and release probability change depending on 
the environment and the type of truck.  Also, it is possible to observe how the total 
hazard indices change depending on the route and the conditions of each combination of 
case and route. 
The values of the indices reported in Table 10.7 are based on ideas similar to the 
ones used in the rest of the research project but because they are not exactly the same. 
The indices are not comparable. The hazard index for this chapter is based on incident 
rates modified by the factors listed in the previous section. 
In Figure 10.4 the total hazard indices are plotted for Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 on Route 3. 
It is possible to observe how Case 3 (double pressurized trailer) seems to present the 
higher potential hazard while Case 4, single refrigerated trailer, offers the safest option 
among the four studied. 
The fuzzy logic methodology described in this chapter represents a first step in the 
development of a transportation index that can be included in the overall inherent safety 
evaluation of a chemical plant. This methodology must be expanded to other 
transportation modes, such as railroad, pipelines, and barges, and each one of these 
modes represents a different problem that must be analyzed by taking into account the 
data available and the knowledge obtained from it. Fuzzy logic provides a flexible 
approach to model transportation problems because of its ability to work with uncertain 
data and include subjective evaluations. 
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Table 10.7: Results for Cases 1, 2, 3 for Route 1 
CASE  HAZ 
INDEX 
Rel. Prob. Acc/mi Rel. prob. Rel. rate 
 REMOTE 0.003204 0.000641 5.79E-06 0.0626 3.62E-05 
 RURAL 0.003031 0.000606 8.94E-06 0.05747 2.57E-05 
1 SUBURBAN 0.001582 0.000316 9.94E-06 0.0527 1.05E-05 
 URBAN 0.001603 0.000321 8.08E-06 0.05 8.09E-06 
 VERY HIGH 0 0 1.06E-05 0.05 0 
 Total 0.00942     
 REMOTE 0.001602 0.00032 5.70E-06 0.0626 1.81E-05 
 RURAL 0.009093 0.001819 8.94E-06 0.05747 7.71E-05 
2 SUBURBAN 0.001582 0.000316 9.94E-06 0.0527 1.05E-05 
 URBAN 0.0008017 0.00016 8.08E-06 0.005 4.04E-06 
 VERY HIGH 0.001104 0.000221 1.06E-05 0.05 5.29E-06 
 Total 0.0141     
 REMOTE 0.00801 0.001602 5.78E-06 0.0626 9.06E-05 
 RURAL 0.006062 0.001212 9.94E-06 0.05747 5.14E-05 
3 SUBURBAN 0.000791 0.000158 9.94E-06 0.0527 5.24E-06 
 URBAN 0 0 8.08E-06 0.005 0.00E+00 
 VERY HIGH 0 0 1.06E-05 0.05 0.00E+00 
 Total 0.0148     
 
 
 
 
            Figure 10.4: Total hazard index for Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 for Route 3 
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CHAPTER XI 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Inherent safety is a concept derived from the learning that no matter how well 
hazards are controlled by extrinsic measures and protective barriers, there is always a 
possibility for abnormal events that can degenerate into industrial chemical incidents. 
Kletz’s famous expression “what you don’t have cannot leak” became the motto of 
inherent safety because it summarizes the very essence of the approach: hazard 
elimination rather than control. Because the idea sounds as a very reasonable approach, 
regulatory efforts have been undertaken but the application of the inherent safety 
principle has proven to be complex and difficult to analyze because of the complexity of 
the chemical industry and the several aspects that must be taken into account.  
One of the most important limitations of inherent safety is the lack of a methodology 
able to measure how well the principles have been applied. As explained in Chapter II 
several approaches have been proposed and they constitute important starting points 
from which to develop and explore other approaches. Another limitation associated with 
the inherent safety analytical methods available so far is the fact that they are based on 
worst hazards and therefore focus mainly on the most hazardous chemicals and largest 
vessels. However, because hazards are derived from the interaction of several factors, it 
is necessary to take into account the contributions of all equipment and pipelines of a 
plant in order to capture and model the complexity of the chemical plant. Another 
limitation of the analytical methodologies described in Chapter II is that they are based 
on interval scales that present limitations associated with sensitivity within and around 
the limits of the subintervals, giving therefore a discrete overall index.  
The present research focuses on understanding how the methodologies and 
approaches available for safety analysis today were developed and after identifying the 
fact that they derive from the limitations imposed by the procedure followed for plant 
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design, a conceptual background was proposed. Because safety analysis requires a large 
amount of information, in the past it was only possible to develop safety analysis after 
the design stage was completed. However, today, with the availability of computers, 
mathematical modeling, and process simulators it is possible to move the safety analysis 
towards earlier stages of the plant design phase. However, this requires the development 
of analytical methodologies developed for computer use, in order to integrate it into 
process simulators and facilitate the analysis of safety.  
Process safety is similar to a non-well defined science because of the lack of enough 
constructs to rigorously understand and model “safety”. It is therefore necessary to 
integrate technical information and empirical engineering knowledge. Traditional 
mathematical methods do not have such capability; hence the model proposed by this 
research is based on fuzzy modeling that can interpret numerical and linguistic 
information in a rigorous mathematical approach.  Additionally, fuzzy logic can deal 
with the high uncertainty associated with factors that are relevant for process safety. The 
proposed fuzzy logic model has the advantage of being transparent and easy to 
understand, as demanded by the nature of fuzzy logic, without sacrificing the 
mathematical rigor. Because of the simplicity of the approach it is expected that non-
safety-specialized design engineers can apply it to identify potential hazardous 
combination of conditions during the design stage.  
The hierarchical fuzzy model for the analysis of inherent safety proposed in this 
research is computer-based and relies on information that can be obtained during early 
design stages by using process simulation, cost estimation, and approximate equipment 
sizing. Because of the hierarchical nature of the model it is possible to analyze the 
interaction existing between the hazards inherent to the chemical properties of the 
substances and to the characteristics and the equipment. The interaction analysis is 
fundamental for inherent safety analysis because one change toward inherently safer 
design in one unit can increase the hazard in another part of the process. The model is 
based on the observation that safety can be understood as a complex system formed by 
several subsystems that can be modeled by simple sets of local rules; however the 
 302 
interaction of the result of each set of rules can describe the complicated net of 
interaction among the factors. 
The main idea upon which the model is based is that each single equipment and 
pipeline contributes to the overall hazard of the plant; this concept is parallel to the idea 
of cost that adds up to the capital cost of the plant. The model is based on a scale of 
hazard with a lower value of 0 and an upper value of 1. The value of zero implies 
absolute physical lack of hazard and is therefore the inherently safest option; the value of 
one implies an extremely high level of hazard whose physical implications are 
catastrophic. The value of 0.5 is assumed to be the threshold between inherent safety and 
unsafe design. Because the hazard scale is based on a continuous ordinal scale, it is not 
possible to establish a relation between two values of hazard, but it is possible to rank 
the values and identify them as safer or unsafer. However, as the hazard value tends to 
zero, the level of inherent safety increases while, as it tends to one, the level of inherent 
safety drops. The problem related to scaling, scale development, and variable type has 
been discussed in Chapter IV and Chapter VII. 
In the case of inherent safety, the contribution of each pipe and piece of equipment 
adds up to the overall hazard for the plant. It is assumed that when the hazard level is 
low (i.e., below 0.5) the equipment has a high degree of inherent safety and will 
therefore require fewer or no protective barriers; if the hazard level is high (i.e., above 
0.5) then it is required to reduce it by modifying the design or substituting the chemical 
or by applying the ideas of extrinsic safety, such as protective barriers.  
The model described in Chapter VII and Chapter VIII provides a systematic approach for 
the evaluation of inherent safety taking into account the subjectivity and uncertainty 
characteristic of safety evaluations. The application of fuzzy logic provides an ideal 
approach to model fuzziness and subjectivity. The inherent safety evaluation obtained 
directly from a process simulation, without requiring extra tedious work for manual 
safety evaluations, will allow design engineers to apply the inherent safety approach in a 
more efficient way. 
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The results presented for the case study show how the model is applied and its 
sensitivity to design changes. The results are encouraging and show the potential 
modeling power of the proposed hierarchical fuzzy-based approach. However, this 
research represents only the first step, and due to underlying complexity can be expanded 
and improved. As future work, it is suggested to revise the fuzzy inference systems in 
order to incorporate more linguistic variables and improve the modeling capacity of the 
system. The designed inference system should be revised by experts and optimized 
according to their assessments; additionally, the system should be tested on real cases 
and tuned when discrepancies with reality are found. The model proposed here is mainly 
for vessels and must be adapted to other equipment such as pumps, pipes, towers, and 
reactors 
Future work is required in order to expand the model including other factors as 
explained in Chapter VII and to adapt the basic model for vessels to other equipment. 
Because the software relies on information that is available in equipment datasheets it 
will be useful to develop a Visual Basic version able to run in Excel and facilitate the 
application during the plant design stage.  On the other hand, by linking the proposed 
methodology to process simulation and cost estimation, it will be possible to create a 
powerful engineering tool able to evaluate processing units or plants from often 
conflicting criteria such as technical requirements, cost limitations, environmental, and 
safety aspects.  
The challenge of designing membership functions based on the magnitude of the 
potential physical consequences has been addressed by this work for the fuzzy inference 
systems of dispersion, however additional work is required on the issue. If the approach 
is used for the other factors, then it would be possible to evaluate inherent safety on a 
interval or ratio scale that allows direct comparison of the points on the scale.   
Transportation is another important aspect that must be included in inherent safety, 
and while the example presented in Chapter X is a first step, the methodology must be 
expanded to other transportation modes.  
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